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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is concerned with recovering the figure of the migrant in Indian diplomatic 
history in the decades after independence. I do so by examining British-Indian 
diplomatic relations as a negotiation of the limits of citizenship and mobility encountered 
by ‘overseas Indians’ and postcolonial Indian migrants – two figures shaped by the 
histories and afterlives of the indentured labour system, and subject to the provisions of 
the 1948 British Nationality Act (BNA). The BNA‘s recognition of Indians as British 
subjects after independence had significant consequences for both long-settled and 
prospective migrants, producing Indians resident in British colonies and Commonwealth 
nations as ‘entangled citizens’ with multiple, contested claims to citizenship, while also 
providing prospective migrants with the right freely to enter Britain. Contrary to much of 
the literature that regards the Indian state’s relationship with its diaspora as a binary of 
exclusion/inclusion where 1947 marked a clean break, I show that the Indian diplomatic 
engagement with overseas Indians was complex, often paradoxical, yet continual. The 
status of overseas Indians shaped both India’s articulation of ‘reciprocity of citizenship’ 
as the basis of its Commonwealth membership, and the making of the 1955 Indian 
Citizenship Act. Moreover, the Indian state projected its diplomatic stature in terms of its 
ability to know, mediate and represent overseas Indian communities in British colonial 
territories. I argue that the Indian state regarded the ‘international’ as a sanctified space 
imbued with the afterlives of indenture qua caste, wherein lower caste and class migrants 
were considered unworthy of holding Indian passports and representing India in the 
international realm. These ‘unskilled’ migrants were deemed legatees of the dreaded 
‘coolie’, a dual threat to British public health and India’s international reputation. Moving 
away from the dominant focus on the ‘high politics’ of conflicts and conferences, this 
thesis puts the people back into Indian diplomatic history. In so doing, it recognises the 
history of indenture as a constitutive element in the making of Indian diplomacy and 
locates the intersection of caste, class and race in Indian diplomatic discourse.  
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RESUMÉ 
 
I denne afhandling sættes migrantens rolle som en central figur og omdrejningspunkt i 
indisk diplomatisk historie i centrum. Det gør jeg ved at undersøge britisk-indiske 
diplomatiske relationer, som gennem forhandling formede begrænsningerne for tilegnelse 
af statsborgerskab og mobilitet for ’oversøiske indere’ og postkoloniale indiske migranter 
– to kategorier, som på kompliceret vis var omfattet af bestemmelserne i den britiske 
nationalitetslov fra 1948, og som var formet af det indiske kontraktarbejdes mange 
historier og efterliv. Den britiske nationalitetslovs anerkendelse af indere som britiske 
undersåtter efter uafhængigheden i 1947 havde betydelige konsekvenser for migranter, 
som allerede havde været bosiddende udenfor Indien i en længere periode, samt for 
fremtidige migranter. Ifølge loven blev indere bosat i britiske koloniale besiddelser og 
andre lande indenfor Commonwealth regnet for borgere med en kompliceret status qua 
deres mange og omstridte krav på statsborgerskab. Samtidig gav lovens bestemmelser 
fremtidige migranter retten til fri indrejse i Storbritannien.  I modsætning til meget af den 
eksisterende forskningslitteratur, som primært kigger på den indiske stats forhold til 
diasporaen gennem binære eksklusions-/inklusionsmønstre og hvor uafhængigheden i 
1947 markerer et klart brud, viser jeg, at det indiske diplomatis omgang med oversøiske 
indere var mere kompliceret, ofte paradoksal, og vedvarende. De oversøiske inderes 
status påvirkede nemlig både Indiens betoning af gensidig anerkendelse af 
statsborgerskab som forudsætning for landets medlemskab af Commonwealth, samt 
tilblivelsen af loven om indisk statsborgerskab i 1955. Dertil kommer, at den indiske stat 
byggede sit diplomatis status på en antagelse om, at det skulle kunne indsamle viden om, 
mediere på vegne af, og repræsentere oversøiske indiske befolkningsgrupper i britiske 
kolonier. Jeg argumenterer for, at den indiske stats opfattelse af den internationale arena 
som et ophøjet rum, hvor lavkaste- og underklassemigranter blev anskuet som uværdige 
besiddere af indisk pas og uværdige repræsentanter for Indien i den internationale 
verden, var præget af kontraktarbejdets og kastesystemets dybe historiske spor. Disse 
ufaglærte migranter blev anset som den frygtede kulis arvtager, der på én og samme tid 
udgjorde en trussel mod den offentlige sundhed i Storbritannien og Indiens 
internationale omdømme. Afhandlingen udfordrer den fremherskende forskning i indisk 
diplomatisk historie og dens fokus på højpolitiske konflikter og konferencer ved i stedet 
at placere individer og mennesker centralt. På den måde anerkender afhandlingen 
kontraktarbejdets historie som et afgørende element i tilblivelsen af indisk diplomati, og 
lokaliserer kaste, klasse og race, som et centralt spændingsfelt i indisk diplomatisk tæ. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
‘The migrant is, perhaps, the central or defining figure of the twentieth century.’ 
- Salman Rushdie1 
 
In September 1955, Pritam Singh arrived in Britain – gaining free entry as an Indian 
passport holder and thereby a British subject as per the 1948 British Nationality Act.2 
Traveling from Jodhpur airport to Coventry, where a growing number of Indian 
‘unskilled immigrants’ were settling in, he found employment as a factory worker. Three 
years later, in January 1958, Singh changed his name by deed poll to Isher Dass Bhagat 
and applied to register as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (UKC). Singh’s 
quest for a new life – a ‘new’ name accompanied by a new claim to citizenship – was 
greeted with grave suspicion by British officials. Questioned by Detective Constable 
Mellors about his sudden transformation from Singh to Bhagat, he clarified that he had 
always been called ‘Pritam Singh’ but had recently decided to honour his late father by 
adopting his surname ‘Bhagat’.3   
 
Mellors knew this was a weak explanation, having studied the discrepancies between 
Bhagat’s citizenship application and Singh’s Indian passport: although the passport and 
citizenship form carried his photograph, the names of the father, the details of place and 
date of birth were entirely different in both documents. Bhagat soon admitted that he 
had carried a forged passport to enter Britain since the process of getting an Indian 
passport legally was a ‘difficult matter’. Indeed, Bhagat had long been wary of the 
consequences of using his real name in Britain. As Mellors wrote in his report: 
 
He was apparently so afraid to use his real name that he used the name Pritam 
Singh even when writing to his wife in India, and she has written back repeatedly 
saying that she does not know anyone of that name. This worried the applicant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Salman Rushdie, ‘On Gunter Grass,’ Granta 15: The Fall of Saigon, March 1, 1985 https://granta.com/on-
gunter-grass/  
2 As we shall see in great detail in the coming chapters, the BNA provided for British subject status on the 
basis of ‘local citizenship’ of a Commonwealth nation.  
3 Letter from N. Mellors to the Undersecretary of State, Home Office, 7.5.58, HO 344/151, ‘Police 
information about organisers of immigration. Replies to a Home Office questionnaire concerning race 
relations that was sent to police forces across the country’, The National Archives at Kew (TNA hereafter) 
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so much that eventually he consulted a solicitor as to the best means of re-
assuming his proper name.4 
 
Bhagat’s predicament was not particularly unique: thousands of ‘unskilled’ Indians had 
utilised forged passports in the 1950s to bypass emigration restrictions enforced by the 
Indian government to prevent the mobility of those they deemed unworthy of traversing 
the international realm.5 This was further reinforced by the inability of the British 
government to intervene directly in these passport transgressions: these Indians were, 
after all, British subjects with the right of free movement to Britain. Indeed as Mellors 
wrote to the Home Office after interrogating Bhagat, he did not think there was much 
chance of proceeding against him for an offence that had ‘taken place in India before the 
applicant’s departure’. Moreover, he did not think that the possession of a forged 
passport – which Bhagat had blamed entirely on an unscrupulous agent in Punjab – 
should necessarily prejudice Bhagat’s application for UKC citizenship. By registering for 
citizenship as Isher Dass Bhagat and not Pritam Singh, Mellors noted that the applicant 
had, in fact, avoided providing any false information in the form and fulfilled most other 
qualifications for gaining citizenship.6  
 
This extraordinary tale raises several key questions that are germane to this thesis: why 
was an Indian also a British subject and what were the consequences of such an 
entangled status? Why did the Indian government restrict the mobility of prospective 
migrants through the discretionary grant of passports? What was the Indian state’s 
relationship with ‘overseas Indians’? 
 
My thesis is concerned with recovering the figure of the migrant in Indian diplomatic 
history. I do so by examining British-Indian diplomatic relations as a negotiation of the 
limits of citizenship and mobility encountered by ‘overseas Indians’ and postcolonial 
Indian migrants – two figures shaped by the histories and afterlives of the indentured 
labour system and subject to the provisions of the 1948 British Nationality Act (BNA). 
The BNA’s recognition of Indians as British subjects after independence had significant 
consequences for both long-settled and prospective migrants, producing Indians resident 
in the British colonial territories and Commonwealth nations as ‘entangled citizens’ with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Mellors to the Undersecretary of State, Home Office, 7.5.58, HO 344/151, TNA 
5 The Pakistani government had also similarly imposed restrictions.  
6 Mellors to the Undersecretary of State, Home Office, 7.5.58, HO 344/151, TNA 
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multiple, contested claims to citizenship, while also providing prospective migrants with 
the right freely to enter Britain.  
 
Much of the historical literature tends to treat the Indian state’s relationship with its 
diaspora as a binary of exclusion/inclusion, where 1947 is generally thought to mark a 
clean break with the wider entanglements of empire. In this scheme of things, 
Independence served to demarcate the limits of Indian citizenship, thereby placing 
overseas Indians at one remove from the priorities and preoccupations of the new Indian 
state. Challenging this view, I set out to show that the Indian diplomatic engagement 
with overseas Indians was complex, often paradoxical, yet clearly persisting into the post-
imperial era. Indeed, the status of overseas Indians shaped both India’s articulation of 
‘reciprocity of citizenship’ as the basis of its Commonwealth membership, as well as 
furnishing a crucial context for the making of the 1955 Indian Citizenship Act.  
 
Moreover, the Indian state projected its diplomatic stature in terms of its ability to know, 
mediate and represent overseas Indian communities in far-flung British colonies. I argue 
that the Indian state regarded the ‘international’ as a sanctified space imbued with the 
afterlives of indenture qua caste, wherein lower caste and class migrants were considered 
unworthy of holding Indian passports and representing India in the international realm. 
These ‘unskilled’ migrants were deemed legatees of the ‘coolie’, a dual threat to British 
public health and India’s international reputation. I therefore read the history of 
indenture as a constitutive element in the making of Indian diplomacy and a means 
through which to understand the imprint of Empire. Moving away from the dominant 
focus on the ‘high politics’ of conflicts and conferences, this thesis puts the people back 
into Indian diplomatic history. In so doing, it recognises the history of indentured labour 
as a constitutive element in the making of Indian diplomacy and locates the intersection 
of caste, class and race in Indian diplomatic discourse.     
 
OF MIGRANTS AND DIASPORAS 
By framing my thesis broadly as an exploration of the Indian state’s diplomatic 
engagement with Indian migrants, I have refrained from using the term ‘diaspora’ or 
situating this topic in terms of what Kishan S. Rana has called ‘India’s diaspora 
diplomacy.’7 This does not imply the irrelevance of diaspora studies to my work: indeed, 
I draw considerably on the vast scholarship about the Indian and South Asian diaspora. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Kishan S. Rana, ‘India’s Diaspora Diplomacy,’ The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 4, no. 3, (2009): 361-372. 
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Yet, as I seek to demonstrate by way of an overview of the conceptual framework of 
diaspora in the Indian context, ‘diaspora’ is a less useful term for the purpose of 
interrogating the postcolonial state’s engagement with the very act of migration and the 
precarious, ‘undesirable’ status of a certain kind of migrant – defined through the 
dynamics of caste and class and imbued with the afterlives of indenture.   
 
Although the term ‘diaspora’ itself derives from the Greek word for ‘dispersion’ and has 
been utilised in the context of the Greek, Armenian, and later African diasporas, it was 
long anchored to the Jewish experience of exile and the possibility of return to a 
conceptual homeland.8 The thriving literature of the 1990s moved decisively from the 
paradigmatic value ascribed to the Jewish diaspora and instead reimagined diasporas as 
‘emblems of transnationalism’ that could accommodate ‘a larger semantic domain that 
includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile community, 
overseas community, ethnic community.’9 While such a conception has facilitated a 
tremendous range of applications for the term ‘diaspora’, well beyond its initial 
moorings, debates about the exact criterion through which diasporas can be categorised 
continue. These have been motivated by an overarching attempt to avoid what Brubaker 
has termed the ‘“let-a-thousand-diasporas-bloom” approach’ that renders the term 
‘stretched to the point of uselessness.’10 The utilisation of the diaspora framework in the 
context of ‘Indian’ or ‘South Asian’ migrants has been wide-ranging and often 
innovative, if nevertheless somewhat unwieldy – evident in the range of terminologies in 
use from ‘Global South Asians’ to ‘Transnational South Asians’, to name just a few.11  
 
Some of the most conceptually rich histories of the Indian diaspora draw on the 
transnationalism imbued in Indian Ocean scholarship.  In so doing, this literature 
challenges simplistic notions of Indian diasporic histories in terms of a ‘linear journey (of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Khachig Tölölyan, ‘Rethinking diaspora(s): Stateless power in the transnational moment.’ Diaspora: A 
Journal of Transnational Studies, 5, no. 1, (1996): 3-36 and Stéphane Dufoix, Diasporas, translated by William 
Rodarmor (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008) 
9 Khachig Tölölyan, ‘The nation-state and its others: in lieu of a preface’, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational 
Studies, 1, no. 1 (1991), 4. 
10 Rogers Brubaker, ‘The ‘diaspora’ diaspora’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28, no. 1, (2005), 3. See also 
Tololyan, ‘Rethinking diaspora’, 10.  
11 See, for example, Judith M. Brown, Global South Asians: Introducing the Modern Diaspora (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), Susan Koshy and Rajagopalan Radhakrishnan, eds. Transnational South 
Asians: The making of a neo-diaspora (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). Excellent edited volumes 
include Joya Chatterji and David Washbrook, eds, Routledge Handbook of the South Asian Diaspora (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2014), Brij V. Lal, Peter Reeves and Rajesh Rai, eds, The Encyclopedia of the Indian 
Diaspora (Singapore: Didier Millet, 2006), Gijsbert Oonk, ed, Global Indian diasporas: Exploring trajectories of 
migration and theory. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007),  
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migration) from source to destination’, where diasporic individuals merely replicate the 
markers of ‘Indian culture’ in their countries of residence and are seemingly bereft of 
political identity.12 Instead, in a number of regions across South East Asia and Africa in 
the nineteenth and twentieth century, scholars have shown how ‘diasporic consciousness’ 
was born out of the linkages and interconnections between what Sana Aiyar terms the 
‘homeland’ and ‘hostland’.13 Thus identities were forged in dialogue with other diasporas, 
and through the growth of political discourse and anticolonial nationalism in spaces well 
beyond the territorial confines of British India.14 While their utilisation of the diaspora 
framework in their work has been nuanced, these scholars have nevertheless pointed to 
some of the key limitations of this terminology. Sunil Amrith refers to the popularity of 
the term itself, making it  ‘analytically useful if anachronistic … anemic through overuse’, 
while Aiyar calls for a new conception of diasporas that are ‘not determined entirely by 
involuntary exile and the inability to return to the homeland.’15 Many have questioned 
both the Indianness of the ‘Indian diaspora’ and the diaspora-ness of the ‘Indian’ 
communities overseas, particularly in earlier historical contexts.16 
 
Perhaps most important are the calls to avoid positioning the Indian diaspora as 
unitary.17 This is a tension inherent in the literature, most evident in the ways in which 
histories of indentured labour migrants fit uneasily within the rubric of the ‘Indian 
diaspora.’ Indeed, Khal Torabally and Marina Carter’s description of their framework of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Sunil S. Amrith, ‘Tamil diasporas across the Bay of Bengal,’ American Historical Review, 114, no. 3 (2009), 
547. This is a vast scholarship, but a few important examples include Amrith, Crossing the Bay of Bengal: The 
Furies of Nature and the Fortunes of Migrants (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), Amrith, 
Migration and Diaspora in Modern Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), Sugata Bose, A 
Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2006), Sana Aiyar, ‘Anticolonial Homelands across the Indian Ocean: The politics of the Indian diaspora in 
Kenya, ca. 1930–1950’, American Historical Review, 116, no. 4 (2011): 987-1013, Aiyar, Indians in Kenya: The 
Politics of Diaspora (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). Jon Soske, Internal Frontiers: African 
Nationalism and the Indian Diaspora in Twentieth-century South Africa. (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2017), 
Isabel Hofmeyr, ‘Universalizing the Indian Ocean,’ PMLA 125, no. 3 (2010): 721-729, Hofmeyr, ‘The 
complicating sea: the Indian Ocean as method,’ Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 
32, no. 3 (2012): 584-590, Pamila Gupta, Isabel Hofmeyr, and Michael Naylor Pearson, eds, Eyes across the 
Water: Navigating the Indian Ocean (Pretoria : Unisa Press, 2010)  
13 Aiyar, ‘Anticolonial Homelands across the Indian Ocean,’ 990. Also see Amrith, Crossing the Bay of Bengal 
and Soske, Internal Frontiers.  
14 Amrith, ‘Tamil Diasporas,’ 572 and Aiyar, ‘Anticolonial Homelands’. 
15 Amrith, Crossing the Bay of Bengal, 179 and Aiyar, ‘Anticolonial Homelands,’ 988. 
16 See Oonk, ‘Introduction’, in Global Indian diasporas, 10 and Chatterji and Washbrook, ‘Introduction’ in 
Routledge Handbook of the South Asian Diaspora, 4. 
17 N. Jayaram, ‘Heterogeneous Diaspora and Asymmetrical Orientations: India, Indians and the Indian 
Diaspora,’ Diaspora Studies, 1, no. 2 (2008), 1-21 See also Bose, A Hundred Horizons, 149. 
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‘Coolitude’ as an attempt to ‘redefine’ the Indian diaspora is telling.18 In a provocative 
and insightful intervention, Vijay Mishra has articulated the existence of two distinct 
Indian diasporas divided by time and space: the ‘old’ diaspora of the indentured 
labourers who migrated to the colonies and the ‘new’ migration of ‘free’ ‘skilled’ migrants 
– especially those who migrated to the developed economies of the West. As he notes, 
the ‘homogenization of all Indian diasporas … has led to the fetishization of the new 
diaspora and an amnesiac disavowal of the old.’19 In this reading, the ostensibly inclusive 
accommodation of histories of indenture into the overarching framework of the ‘Indian 
diaspora’ is nevertheless also an erasure of sorts. Indeed, this is the tension that underlies 
Amba Pande’s assertion of a ‘sense of strangeness’ that exemplifies the interactions 
between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ diaspora.20 
 
Moreover, it is worth paying attention to the ways in which the Indian state has itself 
been imbricated in articulating a narrative of a homogenous, united Indian diaspora, 
while nevertheless still distinguishing between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ – indeed when 
provisions for dual citizenship were first announced in 2003, this was initially extended 
only to those persons of Indian origin resident in Western, ‘developed’ countries.21 Thus 
the overarching narrative of one united diaspora is a strategic act of states ‘appropriating 
the concept as part of their globalising strategies.’22 Yet, as Elaine Ho points out, even 
where scholars ‘recognize that the idea of diaspora is appropriated in strategic ways ... 
and that there may in fact be “varieties of diasporas”… debates are nonetheless anchored 
on the idea of diaspora.’23 Indeed, the retrospective rewriting of the distinctive histories 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Marina Carter and Khal Torabully, Coolitude, (London: Anthem Press, 2002), 11. They draw on Stuart 
Hall’s conception of diasporas and hybridity. See Stuart Hall, ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora’ in Colonial 
Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader, eds, Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, (London: Harvester 
Whaeatsheaf, 1993),  227-237 
19 Vijay Mishra, ‘The diasporic imaginary: Theorizing the Indian diaspora,’ Textual Practice, 10, no. 3 (1996), 
427. 
20 Amba Pande, ‘India and its Diaspora in Fiji,’ Diaspora Studies, 4, no. 2, (2011), 127 
21  Itty Abraham, How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics (Stanford:  Stanford 
University Press, 2014), 101. Also see Bakirathi Mani and Latha Varadarajan, ‘"The Largest Gathering of 
the Global Indian Family": Neoliberalism, Nationalism, and Diaspora at Pravasi Bharatiya Divas,’ Diaspora: 
A Journal of Transnational Studies, 14, no. 1 (2005): 45-74, Jen Dickinson, ‘Decolonising the diaspora: neo‐
colonial performances of Indian history in East Africa,’ Transactions of the Institute of British Geographer, 37, no. 
4 (2012): 609-623 and Jen Dickinson and Adrian J. Bailey. ‘(Re)membering diaspora: Uneven geographies 
of Indian dual citizenship,’ Political Geography, 26, no. 7 (2007): 757-774. 
22 Jen Dickinson and Adrian J. Bailey. ‘(Re)membering diaspora: Uneven geographies of Indian dual 
citizenship,’ Political Geography, 26, no. 7 (2007), 765. See also Himadeep Muppidi, The Politics of the Global 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004) 
23  Recognising the limitations of the term diaspora, Ho uses the term ‘extraterritorial citizenship strategies’ 
instead. See Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho, ‘“Claiming” the diaspora: Elite mobility, sending state strategies and the 
spatialities of citizenship,’ Progress in Human Geography, 35, no. 6 (2011): 760-761. 
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of Indian migrants into a history of a singular ‘Indian diaspora’ thus often carries with it 
a propensity for simplistic, overarching narratives – evident in the almost entirely 
undisputed narrative of the postcolonial state’s exclusion of the diaspora until the era of 
neoliberalisation, as I will show. 
 
Calls for more nuanced perspectives on the Indian or South Asian diaspora reflect an 
inherent discomfort in negotiating histories of indentured labour, the outlier within this 
larger diasporic framework. Drawing on Mishra’s categorisation of the old and new 
diaspora, Amitava Chowdhury has recently argued that the ‘uncritical’ inclusion of the 
descendants of indenture into a larger ‘“global Indian diaspora” … calls for a 
reassessment of the concept of diaspora.’24 This is not, he reiterates, a claim against the 
inclusion of the indentured labour diaspora in the overarching category of the Indian 
diaspora, but a call for critically interrogating the ways in which this was enabled. In his 
view, indentured labourers and other members of the diaspora could not be grouped 
together: ‘migration is an essential part of diaspora formation, but that alone does not 
satisfactorily explain diasporic emergence.’25 This is a remarkably revealing statement: 
unlike other members of the ‘diaspora’ who were automatically eligible for diasporic 
status, indentured labourers would remain ‘migrants’ until otherwise indicated. In this 
reading, the term diaspora is laden with meanings of elite class and caste privilege, 
unsuited to indentured labour ‘migrants’ carrying with them the burdens of history. 
Indeed, in his remarkable history of migration across the Bay of Bengal, Amrith writes: 
‘now, as in the early twentieth century, working-class Tamil migrants are excluded from 
the clubs, societies, and newspapers that constitute the “Indian diaspora” in contemporary 
Southeast Asia.’26  
 
It is this intrinsic tension between the terminologies of ‘migrants’ and ‘diaspora’ in Indian 
discourse – with the former more clearly speaking to the precarious, undesirable, 
entangled status of those I study – that prompts my preference for the terms ‘migrants’ 
and ‘overseas Indians’ in this thesis.27 Indeed, in many ways, my thesis is an interrogation 
of the discomfiting historical status of those deemed ‘migrants’, who apparently do not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  Amitava Chowdhury, ‘Narratives of Home: Diaspora Formations among the Indian Indentured 
Labourers’ in Between Dispersion and Belonging: Global Approaches to Diaspora in Practice, eds, Donald Harman 
Akenson and Amitava Chowdhury (Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen's Press, 2016), 243. 
25 Chowdhury, ‘Narratives of Home,’ 244. 
26 Amrith, Crossing the Bay of Bengal, 268. Italics added.  
27 Given the limitations of the term ‘diaspora’, I find it more useful to use it in the contemporary context, 
rather than retrospectively writing it into the histories of migrants.  
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fit seamlessly into the rubric of ‘the diaspora’. While I do not conflate the indentured 
labourer with the migrant in my analysis, I am interested in tracing the afterlives of 
indenture in shaping the migration of Indians after independence. This was a discourse 
shaped by caste, class and race, evident in the longstanding continuities of terms like 
‘coolie’, ‘undesirable’, ‘unskilled’, ‘pedlar class’ – all utilised interchangeably to refer to a 
certain category of Indian migrants. My focus on the migrant is largely concerned with 
‘skilled’ and ‘unskilled’ labour migrants, while also drawing significantly on indentured 
labour migrants.28 My preference for the term ‘overseas Indians’ reflects its widespread 
usage in the period between 1947-1962 that forms the core temporal framework of this 
thesis – a timeframe bookended by the British Nationality Act of 1948 and UK 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962. These landmark legislative instruments would 
profoundly shape the citizenship status and freedom of mobility of overseas Indians. 
Where necessary, however, I also draw on events both before and after this period. The 
category of ‘overseas Indians’ was produced out of the ‘engagement between the claims 
of Indian nationalists and the imperial structures of government’, framing their status as 
central to the issue of Indian identity and thus closely entwined in the wider politics of 
India’s diplomatic standing.29 This thesis is, therefore, concerned with overseas Indians 
and postcolonial Indian migrants: overlapping categories mapped on to the distinctive 
realm of Indians in British colonial territories and Commonwealth nations, whose 
histories indicate the pervasive legacies of Empire negotiated in the making and practice 
of Indian diplomacy.  
 
INDIAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY AND THE ‘LOST HISTORIES’ OF 
INDENTURE 
In contrast to the neglect of migration in much of the contemporary literature on Indian 
diplomacy, early scholars and practitioners had long been concerned with the status of 
overseas Indian migrants. Lanka Sundaram, a scholar of international law and later 
Director of the Indian Institute of International Affairs, published a comprehensive 
monograph on the status of Indian overseas migrants in 1933, while Dharam Yash Dev, 
Secretary of the Indian National Congress’ Indians Overseas Department, wrote an 
account titled Our Countrymen Abroad: a brief survey of the problems of Indians in foreign lands in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For an excellent delineation of the different kinds of migrants, see Amrith, Migration and Diaspora in 
Modern Asia, 3.  
29 Sunil S. Amrith, ‘Indians Overseas? Governing Tamil Migration to Malaya 1870–1941,’ Past and Present, 
208, no. 1 (2010): 243. 
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1940, featuring a foreword by Jawaharlal Nehru.30 Others such as P. Kodanda Rao, 
Sripati Chandrasekhar and C. Kondapi also published widely on a range of topics related 
to Indian communities settled overseas.31 This was a subject of keen interest to the 
nascent nation-state and its diplomatic repertoire: as Sundaram noted in the preface to 
his book, ‘a systematic survey of this type at the present time is a national duty.’32 
 
Contemporary scholarship on Indian diplomacy has, however, largely neglected the 
question of overseas Indians, even in works that otherwise usefully explore the 
‘prehistory’ of Indian foreign policy – an increasing area of focus for scholars challenging 
the tendency to view Indian diplomacy as beginning on the sacred date of 15 August 
1947.33 This diverse literature has drawn attention to British India’s status as a ‘sub-
imperial’ actor with its own ‘empire of the Raj’ – a status reiterated by the postcolonial 
Indian state’s conscious self-fashioning as the rightful heir to the Raj’s legacy and thereby 
the predominant power of the subcontinent. 34  Narratives of Indian exceptionalism 
inherent in Indian foreign policy discourses have also been examined in this literature, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Lanka Sundaram, Indians Overseas: A Study in Economic-Sociology (Madras: GA Natesan & Co., 1933) and 
Dharam Yash Dev, Our Countrymen Abroad: a brief survey of the problems of Indians in foreign lands, (Allahabad: All 
India Congress Committee, 1940). 
31. Some of their works include P. Kodanda Rao, ‘Indians Overseas’, The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 233, no. 1 (1944), 200-207, Sripati Chandrasekhar, ‘The Emigration and Status of 
Indians in the British Empire,’ Social Forces, 24, no. 2, (1945) and C. Kondapi, Indians Overseas, 1838-1949 
(New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1951). Kodanda Rao had served as Secretary to India’s first 
Agent in South Africa, Sir V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, and later became the Vice President of the Indian Council 
for World Affairs. 
32 Sundaram, Indians Overseas, v. Also see Lanka Sundaram, ‘The International Status of India,’ Journal of the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 9, no. 4, (1930): 452-466. For more on Sundaram, Rao and the study of 
International Relations in India, see Vineet Thakur and Alexander E. Davis, ‘A Communal Affair over 
International Affairs: The Arrival of IR in Late Colonial India,’  South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 40, 
no. 4, (2017), 689-705. 
33 Notable examples of this scholarship include Ali Raza, Franziska Roy and Benjamin Zachariah, eds, The 
Internationalist Moment: South Asia, Worlds, and World Views, 1917–39 (New Delhi: Sage, 2014), Vineet 
Thakur, ‘Liberal, Liminal and Lost: India’s first diplomats and the narrative of foreign policy,’ Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 45, no. 2 (2017): 232-258. Rahul Sagar, ‘Before Midnight: Views on 
International Relations, 1857-1947’ in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, eds, David Malone, C. 
Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 65-79. Carolien Stolte and 
Harald Fischer Tine, ‘Imagining Asia in India: Nationalism and Internationalism (ca. 1905–1940),’ 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 54, no. 1, (2012), 65–92, William Kuracina, ‘Colonial India and 
External Affairs: Relating Indian Nationalism to Global Politics,’ Journal of Asian and African Studies, 42(6). 
517-532, Stephen Legg, ‘An international anomaly? Sovereignty, the League of Nations and India’s princely 
geographies,’ Journal of Historical Geography, 43, (2014), 96-110  
34 Robert J. Blyth, The Empire of the Raj: India, Eastern Africa, and the Middle East, 1858- 1947 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) James Onley, ‘The Raj Reconsidered: British India’s Informal Empire and 
Spheres of Influence in Asia and Africa,’ Asian Affairs, 40, no. 1, (2009), 44-62, C. Raja Mohan, ‘India as a 
Security Provider: Reconsidering the Raj Legacy,’ ISAS Working Paper No. 146, (2012), Ashwini Tambe 
and Harald Fischer Tiné, eds, The limits of British colonial control in South Asia: spaces of disorder in the Indian 
Ocean region (London and New York: Routledge, 2008.) 
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reiterating the ways in which India’s self-perception as a ‘Leader of the Third World’ was 
shaped not just by its former sub-imperial status, but very much also through a nostalgic 
rendering of the unique civilizational and expansionist past of ‘Greater India.’35 Yet these 
attempts to recover the ‘past’ of Indian foreign policy are not principally concerned with 
the historical aspects of Indian migration or the processes that produced the colonial 
Indian state as the arbiter of mobility and migration – a discourse integral to the making 
of Indian diplomacy, with significant postcolonial continuities.36 
 
The widespread neglect of migration in Indian diplomatic history has also facilitated an 
erasure of the history of the indentured labour system constituted by the colonial state, 
which transported Indians to far-flung colonial territories including Fiji, Mauritius, 
British Guiana, Trinidad, to replace slave labour in plantations after abolition. This vast 
migration, involving the movement of more than a million Indian labourers, is almost 
entirely absent even in accounts examining the ‘foreign policy of colonial India’, 
including those referring to ‘overseas Indians’.37 Recent overarching attempts to theorise 
Indian foreign policy are also largely silent about this aspect of Indian history – only 
cursorily mentioning indenture, if at all.38 This is so despite the existence of a remarkably 
comprehensive, evocative scholarship about indenture: works intertwining history, 
poetry and memory, often written by descendants of indentured labourers.39 These 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See Priya Chacko, Indian foreign policy: the politics of postcolonial identity from 1947 to 2004. (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2013). 
36 While there is a growing scholarship on the colonial state’s regulation of Indian migration, many 
accounts of Indian diplomatic history do not sufficiently engage with these works. For an excellent recent 
history of colonial migration, see Radhika Viyas Mongia, Indian Migration and Empire: A Colonial Genealogy of 
the Modern State. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018). Also see Radhika Singha, ‘The Great War 
and a ‘Proper’ Passport for the Colony: Border-Crossing in British India, c.1882–1922,’ Indian Economic and 
Social History Review, 50, no. 3 (2013), 289-315. 
37 Sneh Mahajan, Foreign Policy of Colonial India: 1900–1947 (London and New York: Routledge, 2018) and  
Vineet Thakur, ‘The colonial origins of Indian foreign policymaking,’ Economic and Political Weekly, 49, no. 
32 (2014): 58-64. For details of the numbers of indentured labourers, see Gaiutra Bahadur, Coolie Woman: 
The odyssey of indenture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), xx. 
38 Even accounts with a clear historiographical focus do not mention indenture. See Mischa Hansel, 
Raphaëlle Khan, and Mélissa Levaillant, eds. Theorizing Indian foreign policy. (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2017), David M. Malone, Does the elephant dance?: contemporary Indian foreign policy (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2011).  
39 A few examples of this vast scholarship include Brij V. Lal, ‘Understanding the Indian indenture 
experience,’ South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 21, no. s1 (1998): 215-237, Lal, Chalo Jahaji: On a journey 
through indenture in Fiji. (ANU E Press, 2012), Lal, ‘The Odyssey of indenture: fragmentation and 
reconstitution in the Indian diaspora,’ Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 5, no. 2 (1996): 167-188, 
Surendra Bhana, ed. Essays on indentured Indians in Natal. (Leeds: Peepal Tree Press, 1990). Bahadur, Coolie 
Woman, David Dabydeen, Maria del Pilar Kaladeen and Tina K. Ramnarine, eds, We Mark Your Memory: 
writings from the descendants of indenture, (London: School of Advanced Study University of London, 2018), 
Vijay Mishra, The literature of the Indian diaspora: theorizing the diasporic imaginary. (London and New York: 
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scholars have been at pains to point out the widespread neglect of such histories: indeed, 
Gaiutra Bahadur articulates her recent work on indentured women as an attempt to 
recover ‘a lost history within a lost history.’40 The Indo-Fijian academic Brij V. Lal wrote 
in a 1983 article that an emerging scholarship on indenture was beginning to ensure that 
the topic would no longer be ‘treated as a stepchild of either British colonial or modern 
Indian historiography.’41 However, this cannot be said of most contemporary histories of 
Indian diplomacy and international relations.  
 
Indenture produced distinct vocabularies exemplifying this unique experience: the 
labourers referred to themselves as girmitiyas, a derivative of the English word 
‘agreement’, referring to the contracts of indenture that formed the basis of  their 
migration. They were also jahajis, ‘shipmates’ – an exceptionally close bond shared by 
those undertaking the voyage across the perilous dark waters, the kaala paani, to reach 
new destinations: what Lal evocatively terms the ‘brotherhood (or sisterhood) of the 
crossing’.42 These terminologies were in stark contrast to the sting of the word used to 
refer to these indentured labourers – coolie. Likely derived from the Tamil word for 
‘wages’ but used as a racial slur dehumanising the indentured labourers, the term has a 
painful history and legacy.  While descendants have sought to reclaim the term through 
prose and poetry, often explicitly titled ‘Coolie Odyssey’, ‘Coolie Woman’, even 
constituting a remarkable poetics of ‘Coolitude’ by drawing on the voyage of these 
labourers to ‘revoice’ the coolie, debate over its usage still continues.43  
 
I therefore use ‘coolie’ advisedly, with the purpose of  interrogating the ways in which 
upper caste Indian elites read the term through meanings of caste – understanding its 
racial properties very much through the intersections of caste and class. Such elites 
viewed the term ‘coolie’ as synonymous with the lowest caste and class Indians 
exemplified by indentured labourers, a shameful categorisation within which they were 
loath to be included. Indeed, the backlash against the usage of the term came not only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Routledge, 2007). Ashutosh Kumar, Coolies of the Empire: Indentured Indians in the Sugar Colonies, 1830-1920 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017)  
40 See Max Bearak, ‘A Conversation With: Author Gaiutra Bahadur,’ The New York Times, November 21, 
2013. https://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/a-conversation-with-author-gaiutra-bahadur/  
41 Brij V. Lal. ‘Indian indenture historiography: A note on problems, sources and methods,’ Pacific Studies 6, 
no. 2 (1983): 33-50.  
42 Brij V. Lal, Intersections: history, memory, discipline (ANU E Press, 2012), 161 
43  David Dabydeen, Coolie Odyssey (London: Hansib, 1988), Bahadur, Coolie Woman and Carter and 
Torabully, Coolitude, 214. Scholars have cautioned against ‘a growing trend among some historians to 
employ this term (coolie) casually without reference to the longstanding arguments against it.’ See 
Dabydeeen, del Pilar Kaladeen and Ramnarine, eds, We Mark Your Memory, xii. 
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from the racist connotations of the term itself, but also (indeed more so) from the fact 
that it was additionally used to refer to upper caste and class non-indentured Indians in 
these colonies.44 These coolies were widely regarded as tarnishing India’s reputation 
abroad, a narrative central to defining the postcolonial Indian state’s perception of the 
international realm as one imbued with the afterlives of indenture and understood 
through markers of caste and class.  
 
Scholars of indentured labour have done important work in emphasising the agency and 
diverse caste backgrounds of these labourers, and the heterogeneity of the experience 
itself – the contexts and histories varying considerably from colony to colony.45 Yet the 
reductive colonial representation of coolies had considerable postcolonial continuities, 
shaping the ways in which ‘similar’ migrants were deemed unworthy of travelling abroad, 
especially to hallowed Western spaces. Indeed, ‘unskilled' postcolonial Indian migrants 
who did manage to reach Britain were perceived through the vocabularies of indenture. 
A 1958 police report surveying ‘coloured’ Indian immigrants like Isher Dass Bhagat – 
who we encountered in the beginning of this chapter – noted that these men were ‘of the 
coolie class … i.e. from villages.’46 
 
The figure of the coolie has long occupied a liminal space, ‘both to define and to obscure 
the boundary between enslavement and freedom, and to normalize both.’47 As Nalini 
Mohabir has argued, this intermediate status has often perpetuated an invisibility for 
histories of indenture.48 Even when histories of the diaspora engage with the experience 
of indenture, this is often treated as a distinct event from the past unrelated to the 
transformations and identities of the contemporary diaspora. As Lily Cho convincingly 
argues: 
Clearly, indenture, even in its multiplicity, is not responsible for all Asian       
Migration. And yet, we have to learn from black diaspora studies in order to 
understand how indenture produces constitutive effects ... The old diasporas of 
indenture and bondage cannot be separated from the new diasporas of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Kumar, Coolies of the Empire, 205.  
45 Lal, Intersections, 151-152. Lal, ‘Understanding the Indian indenture experience,’ 215-237. Crispin Bates, 
‘Some Thoughts on the Representation and Misrepresentation of the Colonial South Asian Labour 
Diaspora,’ South Asian Studies, 33, no. 1, (2017), 7-22. The term ‘coolie’ was also used to refer to Chinese 
labourers.  
46 Report by F. W. Burgan, 27.4.58, HO 344/151, TNA. 
47 Lisa Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 25. 
48 Nalini Mohabir, ‘Picturing an Afterlife of Indenture,’ Small Axe: A Caribbean Journal of Criticism 21, no. 2 
(53), (2017): 81-93. 
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transnational elite ... They are constitutive of each other and we risk shoring up a 
colonialism that never ended when we lose sight of these constitutive effects of 
indenture on Asian diasporic subjectivity.49 
 
Where the transition from ‘old diaspora’ to ‘new diaspora’ has been taken to imply the 
migration of skilled, elite Indians to the West, I situate instead the figure of the 
‘unskilled’, prospective migrant seeking to travel to Britain – a figure carrying the baggage 
of colonial history and the burdens of coolie status. That is, as Goffe has argued, ‘these 
Asian Diasporic workers, represent the afterlife of the “coolie” experience, the afterlife 
of “indenture.”50 These afterlives of indenture are also the afterlives of Empire, and yet 
remain an aspect deemed largely peripheral to other overarching imperial histories.51 
Indeed historians of indenture speak of their consciousness about the ways in which 
their histories and scholarship are regarded as marginal in academia and beyond. Brij Lal, 
whose pioneering work has opened up transnational avenues for the study of indenture, 
has frequently called on ‘sub-continental Indians … to re-define their attitude to the 
overseas Indians. They are not children of some lesser gods, culturally deficient and 
deformed, who inhabit the remote, unlovely fringes of Indian culture and civilization.’52 
 
Even where scholars of Indian diplomatic history have paid attention to the existence of 
indenture in South Africa, thanks to the overwhelming influence of Gandhi, their focus 
rarely extends to the ‘sugar colonies’ of indenture – a neglect that stems from larger 
misconceptions. The historian Goolam Vahed’s experience of academic conferences 
about the Indian diaspora is telling: 
 
I was struck by the differences in attitude towards India and Indian academics 
between Indian South Africans and many of those from other former colonies 
who believe that Indians from India look down upon them as having low-caste 
indentured origins and as people who have lost their ‘authentic’ culture, caste and 
religious practices.53 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Lily Cho, ‘The turn to diaspora,’ Topia: Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies, 17 (2007), 25. 
50 Tao Leigh Goffe, ‘Intimate Occupations: The Afterlife of the “Coolie”,’ Transforming Anthropology, 22, no. 
1 (2014), 60 
51 For a fascinating overview of the conceptual provenance of the ‘afterlives’ of Empire, see Jordanna 
Bailkin, The Afterlife of Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012) 
52 Lal, Intersections, 155. 
53 Goolam Vahed, ‘Brij V. Lal: Rooting for History’ in Bearing Witness: Essays in Honour of Brij V. Lal, eds, 
Doug Munro and Jack Corbett, (ANU Press, 2017), 70. 
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Given such widespread narratives, it is perhaps unsurprising that studies concerned with 
Indian diplomatic history – a  field so wedded to the idea of ‘great powers’ and power 
politics – deem the stories of migrants in ‘tertiary’ countries like Fiji, Guyana, Mauritius 
as too insignificant to matter.  
 
DIASPORA, DIPLOMACY, AND THE UNDERLYING FRAMEWORK OF 
THE BNA 
Scholars of International Relations and foreign policy have only recently begun to 
explore the ‘unfamiliar peoples’ and ‘unfamiliar sites’ of indenture as a means of 
understanding its impact on international politics. Randolph Persaud has focused on the 
sugar plantations in British Guiana as a means of tracing the ‘racio-gendered’ violence 
constitutive of the indentured labour system, while Alexander Davis locates the debate 
over the possible introduction of Indian indentured labourers in northern Australia as a 
discourse of othering through which Australian identity was reiterated.54 Yet it is the 
recent work of Itty Abraham and Latha Varadarajan – both of whom draw on the history 
of indentured labour – that breaks significant ground by critically examining the Indian 
diaspora through the lens of Indian diplomacy and foreign policy.55 Throughout this 
thesis, I engage with their innovative scholarship while departing from their framing and 
consideration of Indian diplomacy vis-à-vis the diaspora in important ways.  
 
The most widely accepted narrative of the Indian state and the diaspora, one that 
Abraham and Varadarajan articulate to a significant extent, unfolds in three stages.56 
First, the movement of Indian indentured labourers and other migrants under the 
auspices of the British Raj and the importance of overseas Indians to the anticolonial 
struggle. Second, the territorialising Indian state’s decision to ‘exclude’ and ‘turn its back 
on’ the diaspora at the ‘moment of independence’, denying them any protections or 
citizenship and instead calling on them to identify with their countries of residence. This 
was a task made easier by the fact that this diaspora largely comprised lower caste and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 ‘Randolph B. Persaud, ‘Colonial Violence: Race and Gender on the Sugar Plantations of British Guiana’ 
in Race and Racism in International relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line, eds, Alexander Anievas, Nivi 
Manchanda and Robbie Shilliam. (London and New York: Routledge, 2014) and Alexander E. Davis, 
‘Rethinking Australia’s International Past: Identity, Foreign Policy and India in the Australian Colonial 
Imagination'. The Flinders Journal of History and Politics, 29. 
55 Itty Abraham, How India Became Territorial and Latha Varadarajan, The Domestic Abroad: Diasporas in 
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
56 See Marie Lall’s work for an example of this stark narrative. Marie-Carine Lall, India's Missed Opportunity 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2001) and ‘Mother India's Forgotten Children’ in International Migration and 
Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations, ed, Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 121-139.  
	   15	  
class indentured labourers who were far from normative Indian citizens. Third, the 
rapprochement of sorts from the 1990s onwards spurred by the ‘neoliberal restructuring’ 
of the state and the economic successes of the Indian diaspora that now comprised 
‘skilled’  upper caste and class migrants – embodiments of the ideal Indian citizen eligible 
to be granted a form of dual citizenship. 
 
While such a reading is perceptive in bringing to the fore the intersections of caste and 
class, its analysis of the postcolonial state’s engagement with this diaspora is deeply 
reductive. For Abraham, 1947 is the moment that creates a diaspora: ‘what was once a 
globally dispersed nation … (became) formally differentiated into citizens of the 
territorial Indian state and an “overseas” diaspora with little claim on the protections of 
the Indian state.’57 Such an understanding of the diaspora as a singular, homogenous, 
hermeneutically sealed category cut off from the state at the dawn of independence 
ignores the extent to which the status of overseas Indian migrants was integral to 
postcolonial diplomacy. 
 
 First, the utilisation of ‘diaspora’ as an umbrella term ignores the specificity of the 
experiences of Indian migrants, a majority of whom were resident across British colonial 
territories and Commonwealth nations – thereby subject to the provisions of the 1948 
British Nationality Act. Second, the binary of the state’s inclusion/exclusion of the 
diaspora facilitates an erasure of the Indian state’s complex yet continual engagement with 
Indian migrants. Third, the experience of indenture was not forgotten at the moment of 
independence: indeed it had a lasting impact on Indian diplomacy and its very 
conceptualisation of the international realm. Finally, the tendency to point to moments 
of crises in the 1970s as an indicator of the Indian state’s exclusion of its diaspora – 
India’s response to the expulsion of Ugandan Asians being the go-to example – ignores 
the state’s longstanding engagement with the often precarious citizenship status of 
overseas Indians in British colonial territories that in many ways portended such a 
crisis.58 Contrary to established narratives, I argue that there was anything but a clean 
break between the state and its overseas populations in 1947: indeed the Indian state’s 
relationship with Indian migrants after independence was complex, entangled, often 
paradoxical, yet continual.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Abraham, How India Became Territorial, 74. 
58 Both Abraham and Lall use the Uganda example. See Abraham, How India Became Territorial, 75-76 and 
Lall, ‘Mother India's Forgotten Children,’ 122. 
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The histories and afterlives of Empire and indenture united the ‘overseas Indians’ and 
newer ‘unskilled’ migrants. Yet in a more direct, legal sense, it was the British Nationality 
Act of 1948 that brought these two categories of Indian migrants, past and present, 
within one domain by delineating Indians as British subjects after Indian independence. 
That is, the BNA and the restructuring of the Commonwealth were the legal and political 
mechanisms mapped over the colonial realm of indenture, where a vast majority of 
overseas Indians were present. In some ways this intertwined India’s relationship vis-a-
vis overseas Indians and its diplomatic relations with Britain. For instance, the provisions 
of the BNA had to be negotiated by the Indian government in the making of its own 
citizenship legislation, shaping the entangled citizenship status of overseas Indians 
resident in British colonies. The BNA also enabled Indians, as British subjects, to enter 
Britain freely – a migration of mutually ‘undesirable’, ‘unskilled’ Indians of lower caste 
and lower class origins that both the Indian and British governments sought to curtail. 
The entanglements of the BNA and the possibilities of the Commonwealth have often 
been neglected in accounts of the Indian diaspora and diplomacy that ignore the 
longstanding impact of the experience of indenture and the particularities of the ‘British 
world’ that shaped citizenship and mobility.59  
 
While scholars of British nationality legislation and immigration policies have dealt with 
the BNA in considerable detail, they are less concerned with the ways in which this 
played out in the Indian context.60 Moreover, the literature on British-Indian diplomatic 
relations largely ignores the significance of this legislation, focusing instead on the high 
politics of Britain’s economic and strategic role in the South Asian ‘periphery’ during the 
Cold War.61 A fascinating range of literature has traced the diverse histories and contours 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Important exceptions include Sarah Ansari, ‘Subjects or Citizens? India, Pakistan and the 1948 British 
Nationality Act,’ Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 41, no. 2 (2013): 285–312, Deborah Sutton, 
‘Imagined sovereignty and the Indian subject: Partition and politics beyond the nation, 1948–1960,’ 
Contemporary South Asia, 19, no. 4 (2011): 409-425 and Joya Chatterji, ‘From Imperial Subjects to National 
Citizens: South Asians and the International Migration Regime since 1947’ in Routledge Handbook of the South 
Asian diaspora, eds, Joya Chatterji and David Washbrook (New York: Routledge, 2013), 183-197. I engage 
with these works in detail in the forthcoming chapters. 
60 See, for instance, Rieko Karatani, Defining British Citizenship: Empire, Commonwealth and Modern Britain 
(London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), Jatinder Mann, (2012) ‘The evolution of Commonwealth 
citizenship, 1945–1948 in Canada, Britain and Australia,’ Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 50, no. 3 
(2012): 293-313 and Randall Hansen, ‘The politics of citizenship in 1940s Britain: the British Nationality 
Act,’ Twentieth Century British History, 10, no. 1 (1999): 67-95. 
61 Some examples include Anita Inder Singh, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American 
Relationship 1947-56, (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), Paul M. McGarr, The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the 
United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), Rakesh 
Ankit, ‘Britain and Kashmir, 1948:“The Arena of the UN”’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 24, no. 2 (2013): 273-
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of colonial Indian migration to the ‘metropole’.62 In the context of post-independence 
migration however, with the exception of Alison Blunt’s work on the Anglo-Indian 
community, the significance of the BNA is not a widely discussed topic.63  While 
sociological accounts of Indian immigration mention the BNA, they largely neglect its 
broader historical and diplomatic significance.64 This elision is all the more surprising 
given the important secondary material provided by the magisterial scholarship of Hugh 
Tinker whose work addresses a range of themes related to overseas Indians. The very 
trajectory of Tinker’s scholarship – from a famous account of Indian indentured labour 
to the status of Indians in the British Commonwealth until 1950 – hints at the important 
interconnections in histories of Indian migrants before and after independence. 65 Indeed, 
the journeys of those like Isher Dass Bhagat who sought to migrate after 1947 were 
indelibly shaped by the legacies of those who had migrated long before, and the 
particular geographies that they traversed.  
 
TOWARDS A CRITICAL READING OF THE ‘INTERNATIONAL’ 
Histories of Indian diplomacy and foreign policy have long viewed their remit as limited 
to the high politics of conflicts and conferences that seemingly take place in a bounded, 
abstract ‘international’ space populated by ‘rational’ diplomatic actors. A range of critical, 
postcolonial approaches have sought to unsettle such prevalent assumptions: most 
importantly, by going beyond binaries of the domestic/foreign to show their intertwined 
status.66 As Sankaran Krishna has argued in a compelling intervention, it is more useful 	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Identity, and South Asians in Britain, 1858–1914. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), Antoinette 
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York: Oxford University Press, 1974), Separate and Unequal: India and Indians in the British Commonwealth, 
1920-1950, (London: C. Hurst & Co, 1976), The Ordeal of Love: C. F. Andrews and India (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1979). For a profile of Tinker, see Peter Lyon, ‘Tinker, Hugh Russell (1921–2000), 
historian.’ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2008) 
 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-
74069.  
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to view the ‘discourse of Indian foreign policy as an important and constitutive moment 
in the emergence of India itself.’67 Such a reading also enables a more considered view of 
the often casual usage of the term ‘international.’ Itty Abraham regards the ‘international’ 
as a ‘site of struggle’, a zone of ‘attraction and anxiety’ wherein the promise of 
decolonization and political freedom came with the opportunity to participate in and 
shape ‘the international.’68 Drawing on these perspectives, I argue that ‘the international’ 
was a space produced by the history of Indian migration –  imbued with the  legacies of 
indenture and the entanglements of Empire. This was a space marked by the crises of 
citizenship and discrimination encountered by overseas Indians, a space where the state 
sought to renegotiate the ‘shame’ of the coolie by preventing the entry of new ‘unskilled’ 
migrants. The afterlives of indenture are evident not only in the perpetuation of the 
‘inequalities of humanity based on labor categories labeled unskilled/skilled’, but also in 
its spectral presence in shaping Indian ideas of the international realm as one marked by 
criterion of caste and class.69 That is, I read Indian diplomacy as imbued with the 
afterlives and vocabularies of indenture qua caste.  
 
The notion of the indentured labourer as belonging to the lowest castes and classes of 
Indian society was a pervasive narrative in elite Indian discourse both before and after 
independence. This is evident in their reading of the term ‘coolie’ through the 
intersections of race, caste and class. Gandhi’s interpretation exemplifies such a narrative: 
 
We have become the untouchables of south Africa … The word coolie … means 
what a pariah or untouchable means to us. 70 
 
Indeed, Charles Freer Andrews and William Pearson, influential supporters of the Indian 
nationalist cause, noted in their report of the conditions of Indian indentured labourers 
in Fiji: 
 
We were startled every now and then to find in the coolie 'lines' a young lad of 
high caste and education, whose whole appearance showed that he had no 	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business at all in such a place. The condition of such lads, when they arrive and 
have to be lodged in the same quarter with men of low morals and unclean habits 
of life, is pitiable indeed.71 
 
Thus a Brahmin indentured labourer seemed an oxymoron to Andrews and Pearson, in 
contrast to the norm of the lower caste and class indentured labourer – the reference to 
questionable morals and ‘unclean’ habits further reiterating the ominous markers of 
casteism. Such discourse had significant continuities in the Indian diplomatic discourse 
on the ‘unhygienic’, ‘unsanitary’ ‘unskilled’ Indian migrants in Britain. Euphemisms of 
caste as hygiene defining Indian ‘unskilled’ migrants thus very much revealed the 
lingering effects of indenture. Indeed, the recurrent tropes about migrants in elite Indian 
discourse make clear the salience of indenture qua caste – where distinctions between ‘free’ 
and coolie Indians, skilled and unskilled Indians, were, ultimately, means of transcoding 
Brahmin and untouchable Indians. 
 
Thus, where Abraham has perceptively noted that ‘diaspora is foreign policy as a caste-
class boundary’, I argue that the postcolonial Indian state’s regulation of the very act of 
migration produces the international as a sanctified space imbued with the markers of 
caste and class.72 Through its control of passports, the state would actively seek to 
construct its ‘diaspora’ by not permitting the undesirable Indian citizen to emigrate: 
embarrassing lower class and caste Indians were deemed best contained within the 
territorial limits of India. The grant of passports was therefore a mechanism through 
which the imperative of upholding India’s international reputation and status filtered 
down to the individual passport-holder and potential migrant. Such a conception of the 
international reiterates the mutually-constitutive nature of the domestic and the foreign: 
lower caste and class Indians on the margins of Indian citizenship at home would not be 
permitted to trespass on the international. Moreover, framing ‘the international’ as a 
space shaped by the journeys of migrants, serves to put the people back into the study of 
Indian diplomatic history. 
 
Peopling the international also facilitates an emphasis on the performance of everyday 
diplomacy and a focus on diplomats themselves – not as abstract, generic, rational actors 
but as ‘emotion-capable actors’ who serve as anthropomorphic embodiments of the 	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state.73 Elite, Western-educated, upper caste and class diplomats were therefore the most 
ideal citizens, best suited to represent India – in stark contrast to the ‘unskilled’ Indian 
migrant they were called on to engage with and teach ‘how to live’ in Britain.74 The 
performing body of the elite Indian diplomat was thus central to the task of redefining 
Indian identity in the international realm, writing out the lasting damage caused by 
narratives of the coolie.  
 
This is evident from the example of Sir V. S. Srinivasa Sastri’s term as India’s first Agent 
in South Africa from 1927 to 1929. Famously known as the ‘Empire’s Silver-Tongued 
Orator’, Sastri ‘lectured extensively on Indian philosophy and literature’ during his 
tenure.75 This was a performance of Indian identity that marked him as the rightful heir 
to the ancient glories of Indian civilisation and thereby served to counteract the 
perception of Indianness as synonymous with the coolie. The propagation of these 
civilizational histories was a central part of Sastri’s diplomatic oeuvre: indeed Gandhi 
termed these lectures ‘his greatest and most permanent contribution to the Indian cause 
in South Africa.'76 Even a contemporary academic like Uma Dhupelia-Mesthrie concurs, 
arguing that ‘Sastri weaved magic … with his brilliant speeches on Indian culture and 
civilisation, hoping to convert whites to a better understanding of the Indians in their 
minds.’77 Thus Sastri’s role as one of India’s earliest diplomatic representatives was not 
just about ‘protecting’ labourers and other Indian communities in South Africa. 
Representing an Anglicised, elite Indian identity that was in stark contrast to the identity 
of the coolie, Sastri was performing his role of diplomat-as-exemplar-of-Indianness. The 
almost entirely upper caste and class profile of the Indian diplomats appointed by the 
postcolonial state would also similarly reiterate a normative Indian identity, vastly 
different from that of the ‘unskilled’, ‘undesirable’ Indian immigrants they were engaging 
with. 
 
While much of the recent literature on everyday diplomacy highlights the need to 
recognise the diplomatic practices of non-elites who do not represent a state, it is also 	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useful to re-examine assumptions of how and where ‘official’ forms of everyday 
diplomatic work is performed. Iver Neumann has usefully described diplomacy as 
‘everyday activity that has been an aspect of social life’, drawing attention to the ‘sited’ 
nature of diplomacy.78 This is a subject that has received considerable attention from 
political geographers who have examined the sites where diplomacy takes place, 
emphasizing the performative aspect of conferences – be it Bandung or Commonwealth 
conferences – as ‘geopolitical events.’79 While these critical perspectives are no doubt 
helpful, their focus on international conferences only reiterates familiar sites of 
diplomatic performance. Yet, Indian diplomatic engagement with migrants necessitated 
performing Indianness in unlikely international sites.  Locating everyday Indian 
diplomatic engagement in the immigrant localities of Birmingham, an ‘out of place’ and 
intimate site away from the usual metropoles of London and New Delhi, enables me to 
trace the euphemisms of caste and class that shaped the ways in which the Indian 
migrant was held up as a dual threat to British public health and India’s diplomatic 
stature in equal measure.80 The performance of everyday diplomacy by High Commission 
officials in such ‘out of place’ sites – called on to act ‘in loco parentis’ (as one observer 
termed it) vis-à-vis new Indian immigrants in Britain – considerably challenges binaries 
of the Indian state’s inclusion/exclusion of a unitary diaspora.81 
 
My exploration of Indian migration as central to the making of postcolonial diplomacy 
differs from the ways in which studies in other national contexts have conceptualised 
‘migration diplomacy.’ In a fascinating study of US-China relations in the Cold War, 
Meredith Oyen examines this bilateral relationship in terms of the states’ utilisation of  
‘migration policy for diplomatic ends.’ 82  Most recently, scholars have attempted to 
formulate a theoretical framework of ‘migration diplomacy’ in the field of International 
Relations, viewing this as ‘states’ use of diplomatic tools, processes, and procedures to 
manage cross-border population mobility.’ 83 While such perspectives employ realist, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Iver Neumann, Diplomatic Sites: A Critical Enquiry (New York : Columbia University Press, 2013), 21.  
79 See Merje Kuus ‘“To Understand the Place”: Geographical Knowledge and Diplomatic Practice,’ The 
Professional Geographer, 68, no. 4 (2016), 546-553, Ruth Craggs, ‘Postcolonial geographies, decolonization 
and the performance of  geopolitics at Commonwealth Conferences,’ Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 
35,  no. 1 (2014), 39–55, Ruth Craggs, ‘Hospitality in geopolitics and the making of Commonwealth 
international relations,’ Geoforum, 52 (2014), 90-100, Shimazu, ‘Diplomacy as theatre’. 
80 See Neumann, Diplomatic Sites, 23-24. 
81 Desai, Indian Immigrants in Britain, 76 
82 Meredith Oyen, The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations in the 
Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015) 
83 Fiona B. Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas. ‘Migration diplomacy in world politics,’ International Studies 
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instrumental approaches to trace the strategic purposes of ‘migration diplomacy’, my 
framing of the issue is considerably different in viewing the diplomatic history of Indian 
migration, so to speak, as a postcolonial negotiation of the entangled claims to 
citizenship and mobility encountered by overseas Indians and prospective Indian 
migrants. This did not, of course, mean that there was no strategic value to mediating 
migration or engaging with overseas Indians – indeed, the Indian state sought to utilize 
the presence of Indian communities in British colonial territories as its locus standi in 
calling for the development of an Indian diplomatic infrastructure of sorts in these areas. 
Yet the overarching emphasis in calling for the citizenship rights of overseas Indians 
while preventing any further emigration of ‘unskilled’, ‘undesirable’ Indians can be better 
understood through the limits of performing postcolonial diplomacy in an international 
realm imbued with the afterlives of indenture and shaped by notions of caste and class. 
In so doing, I situate this thesis within a growing critical scholarship that goes beyond 
realpolitik driven accounts to instead consider the ways in which Indian diplomacy is 
produced by the experience of the colonial encounter and is replete with markers of race, 
caste and class.84 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Finding the space to tell my ‘archive stories’ after the long process of writing this thesis – 
journeying into both conventional and unlikely archives – is gratifying.85 My archival trail 
was shaped by the overarching question: how does one locate the migrant in the archive 
of Indian diplomacy? A significant portion of my archival research was first carried out 
in the well-established sources for Indian diplomatic history: the National Archives of 
India and the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi, and the National 
Archives at Kew and British Library in London.  
 
While pertinent files on Indian immigration are easily available in the British archives, 
this is far from the case in the notoriously labyrinthine National Archives of India. 
Scholars who have traversed the NAI are familiar with the dread of the N.T. (Not 
Transferred) slip: a device utilised to inform researchers that a file explicitly listed as 	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International Relations (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), Vineet Thakur, Jan Smuts and the Indian 
Question (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu Natal Press, 2017), Sankaran Krishna, ‘A Postcolonial 
Racial/Spatial Order: Gandhi, Ambedkar and the Construction of the International,’ in Race and Racism in 
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available in the catalogue has not been transferred – usually misplaced – after it has been 
requisitioned. As Alexander Davis has pointed out, the dysfunctional setup of these 
archives and the lack of access to archival material has often resulted in the privileging of 
‘the sources of the ‘North’ over the ‘South’, the colonizer over the colonized.’86 With 
persistence, however, I have managed to access valuable material from the NAI 
especially pertaining to the making of the 1955 Indian Citizenship Act and the 
functioning of the passport system.  
 
In considerable contrast to the NAI, the sprawling grounds and excellent facilities of the 
Nehru memorial museum and library provide easy access to the private papers of some 
of the Indian High Commissioners in London – B. G. Kher, M. C. Chagla and 
Vijayalakshmi Pandit. The notably missing name here is, of course, Krishna Menon 
whose private papers were closed for almost the entirety of my research, although I have 
been given to understand exactly two weeks before submission that these papers are 
finally available for the perusal of researchers. I have nevertheless been able to utilise a 
significant number of Menon’s letters to other bureaucrats and politicians available in 
their private papers, most notably to Jawaharlal Nehru, to bridge these gaps. While 
Nehru’s prolific correspondence has been well-documented, I have also been able to 
consult his post-1947 private papers made available to researchers since 2016.  
 
My interest in tracing the Indian ‘unskilled’ migrant and in so doing, critically 
interrogating the euphemisms of caste and afterlives of indenture in diplomatic discourse 
has also necessitated accessing the ‘unlikely’ diplomatic archive. Histories of Indian 
diplomacy have often tended to render categories of caste, class, race, religion and gender 
invisible in their discourse, delineating them instead as ‘domestic’ issues seemingly 
unrelated to the international ambit of foreign policy. Thus if caste is relegated to the 
social and domestic realm, where does one trace caste in the archive of Indian 
diplomacy? I am acutely aware of my own privileged subjectivity as an upper caste 
researcher based in Western academia with easy access to archives of the metropole that 
instrumentally shape my research. Indeed, Dalit scholars have emphasized the need to 
draw on the ‘unique strengths of district and provincial repositories in contrast to 
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imperial archives based in the metropolitan centers of Delhi and London.’87  
 
I have found it useful in this regard to trace the euphemisms of caste in the diplomatic 
correspondence and memoirs of Indian diplomats, vocabularies evident in discussions of 
a certain type of Indian immigrant abroad viewed as likely to shame the Indian state: a 
combination of caste and class that rendered them as ‘not the best type’, ‘dirty’, ‘unclean’ 
and ‘undesirable’. The archive of everyday diplomacy thus offers a space to recover 
discourses of caste as hygiene where the Indian immigrant is frequently a source of elite, 
upper caste embarrassment.  
 
In attempting to locate the stories of migrants in Indian diplomacy, I have drawn on the 
inspiring work of Jordanna Bailkin who ‘humanizes’ the history of decolonization by 
shifting the archive from the usual suspects of the Home Office, Colonial Office, 
Foreign Office, to instead reveal the ways in which Empire was ‘cloaked in the avalanche 
of paper that accompanied the welfare state.’88 Examining the everyday diplomacy of the 
High Commission officials engaging with ‘unsanitary’ Indian immigrants, often couched 
in vocabularies of ‘public health’, led me to some important if unlikely archives for 
Indian diplomacy: the Wellcome library of medical history in London and the Wolfson 
Centre for Archival Research at the Library of Birmingham. My initial discomfort (borne 
of unfamiliarity) in utilising these unlikely archives only served to reiterate the 
importance of decentering the conventional archive of Indian diplomacy in order to 
write a more critically engaged history.  
 
Exploring Indian diplomatic engagement in Birmingham, a city receiving a significant 
influx of the Indian immigrant population, I have highlighted the diplomatic relevance of 
an ‘out of place’ site beyond the metropoles of London and New Delhi. I have thus 
sought to go beyond diplomatic memoirs by also including the memoirs of other actors 
mediating the journeys of Indian migrants – for instance, the remarkable account of 
Ishwar Das Pawar, a Scheduled Caste passport officer who was one of the very few to 
grant passports to applicants who belonged to the most marginalised castes, and the 
memoir of Dr Dhani Prem, an Indian immigrant and political activist in Birmingham.89 
Critical perspectives on Indian diplomacy and foreign policy would therefore benefit not 	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only from challenging the overemphasis on Nehru and his readily-available archive by  
utilising the histories of the ‘little-known and lost diplomats’90, but also by ‘humanising’ it 
with the stories of non-diplomats and migrants.  
 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis examines the centrality of the migrant to Indian diplomacy, focusing on the 
production of ‘entangled citizens’ and ‘undesirable migrants’ – figures shaped by the 
histories and afterlives of indenture and reiterated by the provisions of the 1948 British 
Nationality Act. Identifying Indians as British subjects, the BNA intertwined the mobility 
of postcolonial Indian migrants to Britain with the histories and status of overseas 
Indians long resident in the ‘British world’. At the famed stroke of the midnight hour 
that marked India’s independence, the nascent Indian state was faced with the crises of 
citizenship encountered by overseas Indians across British colonies and Commonwealth 
nations. Contrary to the widespread assumption that the Indian state made a clean break 
with the diaspora at the moment of independence, Chapters 1 and 2 emphasise the 
ongoing if often messy engagement between the Indian state and overseas Indians in 
negotiating identities shaped by Empire. In so doing, these chapters interrogate the 
legislation of the 1948 British Nationality Act, India’s eventual membership of the 
Commonwealth in 1949, and the making of the 1955 Indian citizenship act, as processes 
mutually shaping one another and reiterating the significance of overseas Indians to 
Indian diplomacy.  
 
The Indian state often viewed the dismal status of overseas Indians as a commentary on 
India’s place in the international system. How could a nascent postcolonial state navigate 
an international order designed to perpetuate these hierarchies of unequal citizenship and 
sovereignty? Chapter 1 titled The Quest for Reciprocity examines the ways in which India 
articulated ‘reciprocity’ as a conceptual framework through which to utilise its newly-
sovereign status and position within the ‘Commonwealth family’ to  ensure the ‘un-
foreignness’ of overseas Indians. ‘Reciprocity’ was a strikingly persistent term 
underpinning India’s demands at imperial conferences for the fair treatment of Indians 
across the Empire, and had significant postcolonial resonance in shaping India’s call for 
‘reciprocity of citizenship’ as the basis of its Commonwealth membership. Where Manu 
Bhagavan has pointed to India’s involvement in the making of the Universal Declaration 
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of Human Rights as a means of ensuring the fundamental rights of ‘external populations’ 
that it had distanced itself from, I show that the framework of ‘reciprocity’ within the 
Commonwealth served as a leverage to more directly engage with the status of overseas 
Indians and ensure their rights.91 
 
Chapter 2, titled Entangled Citizens, delves into the diplomatic haze about the exact 
provisions of the BNA and its applicability to Indians, factors that produced what I term 
‘entangled citizens’: overseas Indians who were potentially eligible for multiple claims to 
citizenship and yet whose claims were often contested by all countries involved. While a 
significant literature has focused on the making of Indian citizenship legislation in the 
context of Partition, I show that the  ‘eternal’ making of the 1955 Indian Citizenship Act 
was due to the difficulties of reconciling the provisions of the British Nationality Act 
pertaining to overseas Indians with the fundamental premises of the new Indian 
legislation. Focusing on the seemingly paradoxical insistence of the Indian state that 
overseas Indians identify with their countries of residence while nevertheless providing 
them with provisions for citizenship by registration, I show that these actions are best 
understood as a process through which Indian diplomacy continually sought to ensure 
that its overseas communities had citizenship rights – not necessarily Indian citizenship.  
 
Chapter 3, titled Performing Postcolonial Diplomacy, examines the Indian state’s quest for 
diplomatic representation in British colonial territories, articulated in terms of their ability 
to know, mediate and represent overseas Indian communities in these regions. 
Representing these Indians as poor, illiterate communities in grave need of Indian 
expertise, Indian diplomatic discourse was shaped by the afterlives of indenture. Even as 
the British government agreed to the appointment of Indian Commissioners, these 
Indian diplomats were asked to follow an unprecedented set of instructions to demarcate 
their jurisdiction over Indians in these regions. Navigating these highly restrictive 
conditions, Indian diplomats were attuned to the limits and realities of performing 
postcolonial diplomacy – skilfully drawing on the rhetoric of the ‘Commonwealth family’ 
to bring up the causes of overseas Indians to otherwise reluctant British officials. This 
chapter also places British-Indian diplomatic deliberations beyond the metropoles of 
London and New Delhi, viewing them from the vantage point of colonial territories 
shaped by histories of indenture. 
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 These three chapters together articulate a reading of the Indian state’s relationship with 
overseas Indians that is not limited to the exclusion/inclusion of the diaspora, but pays 
more attention to the complex realities and limits of such an engagement shaped by 
Empire. Indeed well after the purported exclusion of its overseas communities, the 
Indian state was providing them provisions for citizenship by registration, seeking 
Commonwealth membership on terms of reciprocity of citizenship, and indeed seeking 
diplomatic representation in colonial regions by drawing on the presence and status of 
overseas Indians. Chapters 4 and 5 shift from the focus on long-resident overseas Indian 
communities to explore the Indian state’s regulation of postcolonial migrants – often in 
coordination with British officials in the case of those migrating to Britain, given their 
status as British subjects as per the BNA.   
 
Chapter 4, titled The Privilege of the Indian Passport, examines the remarkable 20-year period 
of discretionary grant of Indian passports aimed at preventing the mobility of lower 
caste, lower class, ‘unskilled’ migrants deemed unworthy of journeying into the 
international realm as representatives of India. While a vast literature has shown the 
racialised limits to mobility perpetuated by the passport and visa system, this chapter 
considers the Indian state’s own restrictions on a particular category of citizens regarded 
as reminders of the ‘shame’ of the coolie.  In so doing, I show that Indian diplomacy and 
its ideas of the international were intimately shaped by the intersections of caste and 
class. 
 
Chapter 5, titled The ‘Unskilled’ Immigrant examines the everyday diplomacy of Indian 
High Commission officials in Birmingham, a city receiving an increasing number of 
Indian ‘unskilled’ immigrants who were declared a threat to public health. Examining the 
euphemisms of caste and class embedded in narratives of hygiene, I show that the ability 
of ‘unskilled’ Indians to assimilate into British society was viewed as a larger discourse on 
the Indian capability for modernity. 
 
After all, these migrants were not just travellers, but representatives of India overseas: as 
Jawaharlal Nehru had pointed out, ‘wherever in this wide world there goes an Indian, 
there also goes a bit of India with him … By his actions India will be judged.’92 These 
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were journeys where the ‘self-respect’ and ‘izzat’ (honour) of India was at stake and 
therefore could only be undertaken by those possessing the right ‘bit of India’ in them, 
so to speak.93 Indeed, Nehru’s vision of the ‘international’ had long been inescapably 
intertwined with the figure of the migrant: 
 
You … may be largely acquainted with the Indian ‘coolie’ as he is called with 
some contempt. It is true perhaps because India herself has sunk to the coolie 
ranks among nations, and perhaps that contempt is justified, but remember that 
if India has gone down, she has also the vitality to rise again.94 
 
That was in 1937. Ten years later, as the following chapters set out to show, such 
narratives continued to influence India’s attempts to ‘rise again’ as a diplomatic actor – a 
process shaped by the presence and status of overseas Indians and imbued with the 
legacies of indenture and Empire. 
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1 
THE QUEST FOR ‘RECIPROCITY’ 
INDIAN DIPLOMACY AND THE STATUS OF OVERSEAS 
INDIANS 
 
Will you please send me information on immigration to Western countries and 
the way an Indian citizen can gain citizenship of a Western country? I want to 
offer myself as an immigrant.1  
 
This enquiry from C.B Purohit of Jodhpur in 1953 was typical of many that the fledgling 
Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had been receiving from anxious potential 
settlers and immigrants. Asserting their eagerness to emigrate, these letters often sought 
to clarify whether India had any agreements with foreign – often Western – countries to 
facilitate Indian immigration. As one letter from Bombay noted in October 1952, ‘the 
difficulty is that there are so many immigration laws in every country that I do not know 
exactly in which country I can easily get entry.’2 These letters made for uncomfortable 
reading for Indian officials: not only did people want to leave a newly-independent India 
– one letter proclaimed to be ‘pleased to go anywhere outside India as a permanent 
settler’, the word ‘anywhere’ underlined testily by an MEA official – there were few 
countries that allowed the entry of Indian immigrants. 3 Indeed, the only two countries 
with whom India had arrangements to facilitate Indian immigration were Canada and the 
United States, with a paltry quota of 150 and 100 immigrants each year respectively.4 
Even in the case of neighbouring countries across the Bay of Bengal with long histories 
of Indian migration and considerable Indian populations, there were growing restrictions 
aimed at preventing the entry of Indians alongside attempts to repatriate existing Indian 
communities.5 As a response to such developments and anti-indenture protests earlier 
on, the Indian state had itself become increasingly involved in governing the mobility of 
Indians. Indian emigration law had banned ‘unskilled’ labour emigration to many 
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countries well before 1947 and increasingly sought to regulate the mobility of the other 
category of ‘free’, ‘skilled’ migrants.6  
 
At the dawn of independence, India thus encountered a deeply hierarchical international 
system exemplified by severe restrictions on the mobility of prospective Indian migrants, 
and widespread crises of citizenship faced by overseas Indians settled across the ‘British 
world’. While this considerably shaped the making of India’s identity as an international 
actor both before and after independence,7 I am interested in understanding exactly how 
Indian diplomacy sought to navigate the unequal status of India and its overseas 
communities. I do so by interrogating the striking persistence of the term ‘reciprocity’ in 
colonial and postcolonial Indian diplomatic discourse, reading reciprocity as a framework 
for diplomatic interaction aimed at securing the equal status of overseas Indians and 
India’s parity with the white Dominions. With the important exception of Radhika 
Mongia, much of the relevant literature ignores the salience of ‘reciprocity’ as a 
conceptual structure even as it pays attention to reciprocity resolutions and the like 
adopted by India.8 Instead, I trace the evolution of ‘reciprocity’ in Indian diplomacy 
before and after 1947 as a framework negotiating the limits of sovereignty and 
cooperation. I interrogate India’s ‘reciprocity resolution’ at the imperial conferences, 
where reciprocity was less about securing equality of treatment for overseas Indians and 
more about establishing some semblance of a sovereign status for India – a seat at the 
imperial table that made it capable of reciprocity vis-à-vis the white Dominions. Severe 
criticism about such a conception of reciprocity, exemplified in the particular instance of 
India’s ineffective 1943 Reciprocity Act aimed at South Africa, led to considerable 
modifications in the utility of the framework. Examining the sovereign postcolonial 
state’s negotiation of Commonwealth membership on the basis of ‘reciprocity of 
citizenship’, I argue that this was explicitly aimed at securing the ‘un-foreignness’ if not 
citizenship rights of overseas Indians. While scholars have examined the importance of 
the United Nations as an arena for India’s anticolonial, antiracist politics, I argue that the 
Commonwealth was another significant arena in which Indian diplomacy sought to 
achieve these goals vis-à-vis overseas Indians. 9 As Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 	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acknowledged, ‘there is one major reason for our remaining in the Commonwealth and 
that is that a very large number of Indians live abroad in what are called British colonies 
or dependencies.’10  
 
‘Reciprocity of citizenship’ was thus a means to call the bluff of the Commonwealth 
‘family’, seeking to address the status of overseas Indians in British colonial territories 
and Commonwealth nations at much the same time that the 1948 British Nationality Act 
(BNA) delineated multiple possibilities of citizenship that would impact them. Contrary 
to much of the literature that suggests a clean break between the Indian state and its 
diaspora after 1947, I argue that Indian diplomacy continued to engage with overseas 
Indians in complex, even paradoxical ways. That is, the Indian state sought to negotiate 
the status of its overseas communities through frameworks of reciprocity, even as they 
acknowledged the limits of being ‘trapped’ into notions of reciprocity-as-equality – such 
were the realities of performing postcolonial diplomacy in a deeply unequal international 
order. 11 
 
EMIGRATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY  
While there was little precedent for attempts to regulate emigration until the 
establishment of the Indian indentured labour system – indeed, the term ‘emigrant’ in 
Indian law referred only to indentured labourers until 1915 – this had increasingly 
become an arena of great scrutiny for the Government of India.12 Campaigns critiquing 
indenture as a ‘new form of slavery’ had ‘precipitated state control of migration along the 
axis of freedom’, with the Indian state putting in place mechanisms and contracts to 
affirm the ‘free’ nature of indentured migration. 13 Debates over the freedom and agency 
of the migrant (or the lack of it) sought to draw a distinction between heavily regulated 
indentured migration and the comparatively less scrutinised ‘free’ non-indentured 
migration (a ‘more free, ‘free’ migration’, as Mongia notes).14  This distinction of freedom 
was one of great emotive and political significance, carrying with it markers of caste and 
class. For instance, ‘free’ ‘passenger Indians’ in South Africa – a term used broadly to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Quoted in Michael Brecher, ‘India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth,’ Journal of Commonwealth & 
Comparative Politics, 12, no. 1, (1974): 69 
11 Gandhi uses the word ‘trapped’ as a means of defining India’s early attempts at reciprocity. See ‘Indians 
in South Africa’, excerpted from Young India, 6.9.19, Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (CWMG 
hereafter), Vol 16, (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1964), 88-89  
12 Radhika Viyas Mongia, ‘Race, Nationality, Mobility: A History of the Passport,’ Public Culture, 11, no. 3, 
(1999): 532 
13  Mongia, Indian Migration and Empire, 19 
14  Mongia, Indian Migration and Empire, 19 
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refer to those who paid for their own passage – utilised this distinction as a crucial 
marker of differentiation from the much maligned coolie, instead identifying themselves 
as much more deserving of the rights that came with British subject status.15 These 
binaries between ‘free’ and ‘coolie’ migrants were often blurred, even in the case of old 
patterns of circular and chain migration across the Bay of Bengal – viewed as both 
‘entirely natural’, ‘free’ migration and as a ‘regularly organized system of kidnapping’.16 By 
the 1870s, the hitherto less surveyed migration to Ceylon, Burma and Malaya was also 
heavily regulated, drawing on procedures governing indentured labour emigration in the 
sugar colonies to appoint a ‘Protector of immigrants’ in Malaya, for instance.17  
By the early 20th century, categories of ‘free’ and indentured Indians were increasingly 
transmuted as ‘skilled’ and ‘unskilled’ Indians – imbued with the same distinctions of 
caste and class. Severe restrictions however prevented the entry of either category of 
Indian migrant into the white Dominions, despite nominal arrangements for a miniscule 
percentage of ‘skilled’, ‘respectable’ Indians in some cases.18 By the 1920s, long histories 
of Indian migration had given way to rising hostility in regions such as Burma, Malaya 
and Ceylon where indigenous nationalist movements were contesting the rights of Indian 
labour migrants and their claim to nationality and citizenship. Pressed into action, the 
Government of India passed the Indian Emigration Act of 1922, creating a formal legal 
infrastructure for the governance of both ‘skilled’ and ‘unskilled’ emigration, delineating 
the ports from which Indians could emigrate and the countries to which emigration was 
permitted (declared by notification in the Gazette of India). The law also facilitated the 
appointment of Protectors of Emigrants and medical inspectors in the ports of 
departure, while enabling the Government of India ‘for the purpose of safeguarding the 
interests of emigrants in any place outside British India (to) appoint persons to be agents 
in such places and … define their powers and duties.’19 This was a highly significant 
diplomatic move, resulting in the appointment of quasi-consular Agents in regions such 
as Malaya and Ceylon which comprised significant numbers of Indian migrants20  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Ashwin Desai and Goolam Vahed, The South African Gandhi: Stretcher-Bearer of Empire (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2015), 49 and Sukanya Banerjee, Becoming Imperial Citizens: Indians in the Late-
Victorian Empire (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 83 
16 Amrith, Crossing the Bay of Bengal, 130-131 
17 Amrith, Crossing the Bay of Bengal, 130 
18 See Radhika Singha, ‘The Great War and a ‘Proper’ Passport for the Colony: Border-Crossing in British 
India, c.1882–1922,’ Indian Economic and Social History Review, 50, no. 3 (2013): 289–315. 
19 ‘A Collection of the Acts of the Indian Legislature and of the Governor General for the year 1922’, 
(Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1923), 40-53.  
Available at https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.210300  
20 Amrith, Crossing the Bay of Bengal, 176 
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This legislation also provided the framework for the Indian government’s decision to ban 
the emigration of unskilled labour to countries where there was worsening discrimination 
against Indians. Unskilled labour emigration to Malaya and Ceylon was banned in 1938 
and 1939 respectively – following increasing disputes with the concerned governments 
regarding the wages and treatment of Indian labour.21 This ‘solution’ had been a long 
time in the making, drawing again from the campaigns of nationalist anti-indenture 
activists who had argued that banning the emigration of indentured labourers was the 
best way to prevent their exploitation and avoid bringing further shame to India.22 
Indeed as P. Kodanda Rao, writer and secretary to the diplomat Sir V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, 
pointed out, ‘It is humiliating to hear that her nationals should be considered undesirable 
and excluded. If Indians are not wanted elsewhere, it will be a lesser hurt to her self-
respect to impose restrictions on emigrations from India.’23 While these bans neither 
addressed the movement of ‘skilled’ labourers nor the discrimination faced by those 
Indians who had already migrated to these regions, the paternalistic Indian state’s 
decision to ban ‘unskilled’ labour was viewed as a long-overdue measure to ‘protect’ and 
preserve national honour.24 In so doing, it delineated a particular class of Indians as more 
eligible to travel abroad as representatives of India: this narrative governed the grant of 
passports long after independence, as we shall see in chapter four. Indeed, echoing past 
critiques of indentured labourers, MEA officials noted in 1953 that unlike their unskilled 
counterparts, the skilled Indian was more capable of agency and ‘does not, it is felt, need 
the same degree of protection as unskilled workers and can very well look after his own 
interests.’25  
 
These were also the Indians regarded as more likely to stand a chance of entry into much 
coveted Western spaces: officials declared that ‘there may be no objection to allow the 
few (skilled) workers, who can find a better footing in a country abroad to stay there, 
subject to the local immigration regulations permitting them to do so.’26 The creation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Kernial Singh Sandhu, Indians in Malaya: Some Aspects of Their Immigration and Settlement (1786-1957) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 114 and Amita Shastri, ‘Estate Tamils, the Ceylon 
citizenship act of 1948 and Sri Lankan politics,’ Contemporary South Asia, 8, no. 1 (1999): 72. Also see 
Amrith, Crossing the Bay of Bengal, 193 
22 A temporary ban on indentured labour emigration to Mauritius and the West Indies was in place 
following protests in the 1830s. Amrith, Crossing the Bay of Bengal, 130 
23 P. Kodanda Rao, ‘Indians Overseas’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 233, 
no. 1 (1944), 204  
24 See Ashutosh Kumar, Coolies of the Empire: Indentured Indians in the Sugar Colonies, 1830-1920 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017) 
25 File 20(5)-PV(I)/53, ‘Guarantees in respect of skilled workers emigrating to overseas countries’,  NAI 
26 File 20(5)-PV(I)/53, NAI 
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immigration control in white settler colonies was a considerably recent development 
spurred by this migration of non-indentured ‘free’ Indians who were not subject to any 
of the internal restrictions on emigration encountered by indentured Indians.27 These 
Indians asserted their right to imperial citizenship and free mobility within the Empire by 
drawing on their status as British subjects.28  
 
Debates pitted the normative equality of all British subjects and freedom of movement 
within the Empire against the claims of white settler colonies who defined their nation-
state as bounded, and sovereignty as the right to prevent the entry of ‘undesirables’ into 
their territories.29 This had significant consequences for the mobility of Indians and the 
common British subject status. As an anxious Canadian government sought to prevent 
the entry of growing numbers of Indians, the Government of India cautioned against 
legislating blatantly racially exclusionary frameworks that would expose the fallacy of 
equality and ‘imperial citizenship’. Instead, they recommended racial exclusion by other 
means. A bevy of techniques were used to effect racial discrimination without naming 
race: literacy tests, monetary requirements, and even recourse to climatic explanations 
with the Canadian authorities expressing much concern for the health of migrants 
unsuited to the brazen cold. 30  The measure eventually implemented by Canadian 
authorities sought to prevent the entry of Indians by permitting only those who ‘come 
from [their] country of birth or citizenship by continuous journey.’31 
 
The famous 1914 voyage of the Komagata Maru exemplified many of these debates: the 
chartered ship carrying Punjabi migrants from Hong Kong to Canada was an attempt to 
confront Canadian immigration restrictions and assert their rights as British subjects. 
Indeed, they would claim as proof of their mobility the fact that ‘as long as we are British 
subjects, any British territory is the land of our citizenship.‘32 Even though these claims 
of equality between India and the Dominions were rejected, the passengers and 
supporters of the Komagata Maru had challenged the limits of Dominion sovereignty. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Mongia, Indian Migration and Empire for an excellent exploration of this.  
28 Sukanya Banerjee, Becoming Imperial Citizens: Indians in the Late-Victorian Empire (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2010) 
29 See Mongia, ‘Race, Nationality, Mobility’ and Sherally Munshi, ‘Immigration, Imperialism, and the 
Legacies of Indian Exclusion,’ Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, 28. no. 1, (2016). 
30 This education or literacy test was particularly popular among the dominions, starting with Natal’s 
legislation and later followed by Australia and New Zealand too. See W. K. Hancock, Survey of British 
Commonwealth Affairs: Volume I, Problems of Nationality, 1918–1936 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1937), 173 
31 Munshi, ‘Immigration, Imperialism,’ 14 
32 Mongia, ‘Race, Nationality, Mobility,’ 543 
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Not only did they assert the dominance of the overarching imperial framework of shared 
British subject status, many decried the illegitimacy of Canadian attempts to designate 
who can enter ‘their’ territory, ‘insisting that Britons and Europeans were foreign 
intruders and settlers who occupied lands that did not belong to them.’33 Yet, far from 
considering Indians as fellow British subjects with the right to citizenship and mobility, 
white Dominions regarded them as aliens, seditious and ‘undesirable’ immigrants, 
designating them as potent public health threats to the body politic of white societies – 
narratives that would continue to cast a shadow on Indian migrants long after.34 Such 
discourse was the overarching concern of Indian diplomatic representatives who sought 
to affirm the equal status of overseas Indians at imperial conferences. 
 
RECIPROCITY AND A PLACE AT THE IMPERIAL TABLE 
India’s attempts to negotiate the inequities of the international system it confronted – 
exemplified by the status of overseas Indians – were marked by the pervasive presence of 
the term ‘reciprocity’. As a concept with resonance in international law, ‘reciprocity’ was 
widely discussed in the context of India’s status within the Empire, particularly in relation 
to the Dominions; at imperial conferences where Indian diplomats sought to assert the 
equality of British subjects, this was a term rapidly coming into vogue. Spearheaded by 
the liberal diplomat Sir Satyendra Sinha, the Imperial War Conference of 1917 adopted a 
resolution calling for reciprocity between India and the dominions with regard to the 
question of immigration. That is, it postulated that the treatment of Indians in dominions 
would shape India’s ‘reciprocal’ policies relating to Dominion nationals who were in 
India. As Thakur has argued, this resolution had however been watered down by the 
India Office, with a remarkable clause added to assure the Dominions that ‘it is an 
inherent function of the governments of the several communities of the British 
Commonwealth, including India, that each should enjoy complete control of the 
composition of its own population by means of restriction on immigration from any of 
the other communities.’35  
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Unfazed by the criticism regarding such privileging of territorial sovereignty over free 
mobility within Empire, Sinha noted that it was the ‘fundamental right’ of every 
‘governing country’ to do so. He argued that he ‘could not insist on unlimited numbers 
of my countrymen having the right to settle in Canada or Australia … I could not 
contemplate similar settlements say of our English subjects in Kashmir or our Negro 
fellow subjects in the plains of the Bengal.’36 Even as Sinha regarded this resolution as a 
considerable victory, it was not lost on many critics that this represented a ‘distinct gain’ 
for the dominions, reiterating their right to restrict Indian immigration and cementing a 
diminished notion of a common imperial citizenship and free emigration within 
Empire.37 Given that South Africa was the main target of India’s attempts to seek 
‘reciprocity’, their passage of the discriminatory Asiatics act of 1919 almost immediately 
after the adoption of the reciprocity resolution was a grave reality check on the limits and 
meanings of ‘reciprocity’. Indeed as Mohandas Gandhi argued, ‘It is murdering the 
language to use so good a word as reciprocity for so bad a cause as the one under notice 
… we must at least recognize it by its correct name – which is retaliation.’38  
 
The illusory terminologies of ‘reciprocity’ are worth interrogating as a commentary on 
notions of sovereignty and equality. Frameworks of reciprocity relied on a conception of 
the international system as made up of territorially sovereign nation states, potentially 
capable of cooperation. It is not a coincidence that this term gained considerable 
provenance from the nineteenth century onwards when notions of sovereignty were 
being increasingly defined not as a universal concept stemming from natural law, but as 
one which required the reciprocal recognition of (Western) states. That is, ‘states outside 
European civilization must formally enter into the circle of law-governed countries’, their 
sovereignty derived from the constitutive recognition of European states permitting their 
entry into the ‘family of nations.’ 39  Paradoxically enough, sovereignty was both a 
precondition for reciprocity between states and was itself derived from the reciprocal 
recognition bestowed by states. As Inayatullah and Blaney have argued: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Satyendra Sinha, Speeches and Writings of Lord Sinha: With a Portrait and a Sketch (Madras: G. A.  Natesan & 
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37 Hancock, Survey Of British Commonwealth Affairs Vol 1, 172. See also Mrinalini Sinha, ‘Whatever happened 
to the Third British empire?: Empire, Nation Redux,’ in Writing imperial histories, ed, Andrew S Thompson 
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The act of reciprocal recognition is necessary to create the condition in which 
states treat each other as discrete and disparate entities … Other states participate 
in a fundamental way in the constitution of a state: their acts of recognition are 
part of creating the sovereign statehood of the other. Thus, as a-social as the 
outcome may seem, the creation of a society of sovereign states is inherently a 
social process, involving the mutual constitution of states.40 
  
Within the ‘family’ of the British Empire-Commonwealth of the time, official 
conceptions of reciprocity relied on a reading of Dominion autonomy as a territorially 
bounded nation-state with the right to restrict immigration and define its own 
population: this was, in effect, the terms of reciprocity extended to India. Thus 
reciprocity vis-à-vis immigration had to take into account three different categories of 
Indians: indentured and ‘unskilled’ Indians, ‘free’ Indians who had already migrated to 
the Dominions, and the ‘free’ ‘skilled’ Indians who sought to travel or settle in the 
Dominions concerned. Increasing protests against the system of indentured labour 
marked the year leading up to the 1917 imperial conference. In February 1916, Charles 
Freer Andrews and William Pearson, anti-indenture campaigners and supporters of the 
nationalist movement, published their much-discussed report on the conditions of 
Indian labour in Fiji. A month later, the nationalist leader Madan Mohan Malaviya 
moved a resolution calling for the abolition of the indenture system.41 The scandal of the 
1914 Komagata Maru voyage and the long history of discrimination against Indians in 
South Africa were vivid in public memory – the latter especially thanks to the recent 
return of Gandhi in 1915.  In this political climate, Indian officials negotiating terms of 
reciprocity at the imperial conference were in an unenviable position: as W. K. Hancock 
has perceptively noted, ‘they had to resist simultaneously immigration-promotion policies 
which implied Indian inferiority, and immigration-restriction policies which implied the 
same inferiority.’42  
 
This reciprocity over immigration restrictions was to be implemented through the 
formalization of the Indian passport system, a ‘mechanism that would conceal race and 
the racist motivations for controlling mobility in the guise of a reciprocal arrangement 	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between states described as national.’43 Indeed the Defence of India (Passport) Rules 
came into effect in 1915 after the Government of India had resisted earlier suggestions 
from Australia and Canada to use passports as a means of regulating Indian immigration, 
on the grounds that this effaced the equality and mobility of British subjects.44 Notably, 
indentured labourers did not qualify for the grant of passports under this act: indeed this 
was in some ways the very purpose of the passport system for India. Enshrining the 
government’s control over the mobility of ‘free’ Indians too, this act enabled the 
discretionary grant of passports as a ‘civic credential’ only for ‘respectable’ Indians most 
eligible to represent India abroad. Indian officials sought to convince the white 
Dominions to permit the migration and travel of this category of Indians: indeed as 
Sinha argued at the imperial conference in 1918, India would ensure ‘that the system of 
passports now in existence be continued which would prevent any influx of undesirable 
labour population.’45  
 
The 1922 Indian Emigration Act banning the emigration of unskilled labour – following 
the abolition of the indenture system – likewise reiterated the disparate categories of 
Indian migrants. In practical terms, reciprocity with the Dominions regarding 
immigration restrictions did not pertain as much to indentured Indians whose influx was 
widely regarded as embarrassing for India. For those seeking to travel to the Dominions 
on a temporary basis, ‘reciprocity’ would be established through the system of passports 
provided by India, and visas stamped by the country to which they were traveling, 
thereby permitting their entry.46 The terms of ‘reciprocity’ elaborated by Sinha, drawing 
from the acceptance of the 1917 reciprocity resolution, also enabled the entry of the 
wives and minor children of those Indians already settled in the Dominions and set the 
stage for more diplomatic attempts to negotiate an improved status for them.47  
 
For all these meager gains, the great significance of ‘reciprocity’ for India lay in the fact 
that this implied a reciprocal recognition and acceptance of its quasi-sovereign status, a 
symbolic parity of sorts with the Dominions at a time when it was increasingly 	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attempting to speak as a distinct international actor.  Indeed the 1917 imperial 
conference had been the first time that India – a non self-governing nation –  was invited 
to participate as an equal member, and the first time that the three-member delegation 
comprised of two Indians. The precondition of sovereignty upon which rested the 
concept of ‘reciprocity’ had considerable allure for India at a time when its status had 
been considerably enhanced by the scale of its contribution during the First World War, 
and lent more ballast to its increasing demands to be treated on a par with the 
Dominions. In the words of one Indian politician, ‘‘Will the Imperial Government … be 
reluctant to remove once and for all our badge of inferiority and … raise us in the scale 
of nations?’48 
 
India’s very presence at the imperial conference was a performance of national identity 
and status derived from its newfound seat at the international table, alongside the white 
Dominions. Indeed in discussing the ‘success’ of the 1917 conference, Sinha counted as 
his first victory the adoption of his resolution calling on the Dominions to revoke a 1907 
Colonial conference resolution excluding India from the conferences and to assure that 
India would be represented in all future conferences. This marked ‘the definite and 
irrevocable admission of India into the great partnership of the British Empire,’ 
facilitated by the Dominions’ recognition of India as an international actor inching 
towards sovereign status and thereby capable of reciprocity. 49 As Sinha gushed at a royal 
banquet in Delhi honouring India’s representatives at the imperial conference, this was a 
unique opportunity to perform diplomacy as a fledgling state:  
 
One must remember the nature of the meetings in which it is our privilege to take part. It 
was a War Conference, a War Cabinet of the Empire summoned for definite and 
specific purposes. We were there more to receive than to give information, and 
principally as to the immediate needs and necessities of the War. Nevertheless, 
we were free to express our opinions on all matters under discussion, and on all 
occasions when we felt it was necessary to express our views, we were given as 
patient and as courteous a hearing as any of the great statesmen, who took part in those 
memorable meetings.50 
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Indeed V. S. Srinivasa Sastri – who would be India’s representative at the 1921 imperial 
conference – argued that the post-war recognition of India’s rising status and move 
towards self-government had ‘gained strength from the presence of India's 
representatives at the seat of empire among the leading lights of the empire.’51 Reading 
this imperial conference as a ‘forum that catapulted India into international 
consciousness as a diplomatic unit’ and  ‘reciprocity’ as a recognition of India’s 
international status vis-à-vis the Dominions helps illuminate the salience and limitations 
of the resolutions adopted. 52 The fact that these terms of reciprocity related only to the 
subject of immigration control is particularly significant: indeed it served to cement a 
notion of the nascent Indian state’s autonomy as derived through the (reciprocal) 
administrative control over mobility and migration. While many critics argued that this 
did little in the way of enabling sovereignty in any real sense, the larger problem lay in the 
fact that even the nominal recognition of India’s national status and right to be 
represented at the imperial conference did not imply a recognition of the rights of 
Indians.53 Reciprocity was thus largely relegated to a performance of administrative 
statehood at the cost of Indian claims to common imperial citizenship.  Indeed as 
Gandhi argued: 
 
 The Imperial conference resolution on the status of our countrymen emigrating 
to the Colonies reads well on the surface but it is highly deceptive. We need not 
consider it a great achievement that we may pass laws against the colonials that 
they may pass against us. It is like a giant telling a dwarf that the latter is free to 
give blow for blow. Who is to refuse permission and passports to the colonials 
desiring to enter India?54 
 
A year later, when these accepted terms of reciprocity were again cited as a way in which 
India could respond to the South African government regarding the 1919 Asiatics act, 
Gandhi warned against falling into the ‘trap’ of reciprocity. Asserting that reciprocity was 
a futile form of administrative retaliation that made no gains for the people it claimed to 
protect, he noted: 	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It is terrible to think of it (reciprocity as retaliation) when it is men and women 
who constitute the stake. What comfort can it be to our countrymen in South 
Africa for India to be able to send back a steamer-load of cargo from South 
Africa, to refuse to send to South Africa a few tons of coal and to shut the gates 
of India in the face of a stray South African tourist … as against the banishment 
… of a hundred and fifty thousand Indian settlers.55 
 
That is, the recognition of India’s ‘equal’ status within Empire and nominal statehood 
had not extended to recognizing the citizenship rights of its people. These were the 
limitations that Sir V. S. Srinivasa Sastri and the Indian delegation sought to go beyond in 
the 1921 Imperial conference by framing the reciprocity resolution as a ‘compromise’ 
adopted by India precisely in order to guarantee the equality and citizenship rights of 
Indians already domiciled in the Dominions.56 Thus, for those Indians who were ‘lawfully 
settled, they must be admitted into the general body of citizenship and no deduction 
must be made from the rights that other British subjects enjoy.’57 Skillfully drawing on 
Lloyd-George’s own remarks describing the Empire as a ‘Confederation of Races into 
which willing and free peoples had been admitted’, Sastri pitched this as his very 
argument too in putting forth the citizenship rights of overseas Indians: ‘consent is 
incongruous with inequality of races, and freedom necessarily implies admission of all 
peoples to the rights of citizenship without reservation.’58  Although some modifications 
were made, the conference adopted the Indian resolution recognizing the ‘incongruity 
between India’s position as an equal member of the British empire and the existence of 
disabilities upon British Indians lawfully domiciled in some other parts of the British 
Empire.’ 59  Indeed the resolution asserted that ‘the rights of such Indians to citizenship 
should be recognized.’60 Despite the fact that it did not specify particular policies in this 
regard, this was a great diplomatic victory for India. South Africa’s protestations had not 
prevented the adoption of the resolution, making it the ‘the first time that India’s 
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concerns had been recognized over the concerns of a white dominion in a resolution at 
an Imperial Conference … the first ever resolution passed without unanimity.’61  
 
The optimism brought about by this 1921 resolution was short-lived, even for liberals 
such as Sastri. While there was some improvement for already domiciled Indians in the 
Dominions, with Australia granting full citizenship rights in 1925 for instance, the status 
of Indians in South Africa and British colonies in Africa was worsening. 62  In Kenya, the 
1923 ‘Devonshire declaration’ rejected long-held Indian demands by excluding Indians 
from the highlands and extending the franchise to Indians only on a communal basis – a 
‘national humiliation’, as the Viceroy, Lord Reading, termed it.63 Even while there were 
no limits on Indian immigration – indeed Sastri had firmly argued that the imperial 
conference resolutions permitting immigration controls pertained only to Dominions 
and not Crown colonies64 – the declaration controversially asserted the principle of 
‘native paramountcy’ in order to reject Indian demands, no doubt ‘mere smokescreens to 
preserve white dominance.’65 A fuming Sastri expressed his great disappointment with 
the Devonshire declaration, reiterating Indian perceptions of their role in Kenya as part 
of the civilizing mission: 
. 
We are the only people now that do anything to teach and train the Native in the 
arts of civilised life … After many years during which we were invited, employed 
and encouraged, to be now told … that we are a danger to the Native … a moral 
and physical infection and that our future immigration must be controlled and 
finally stopped; – this is a refinement of ingratitude and tyranny, the thought of 
which still lacerates my heart.66 
 
This ‘betrayal’ was one of many pertaining to the treatment of overseas Indians that 
disillusioned those demanding Dominion status as a means of equality within Empire. 
Even as Tej Bahadur Sapru led the Indian charge at the imperial conference in 1923 
against the developments in Kenya and rebutted Smuts’ attempts to set aside previous 
resolutions asserting the equality and citizenship rights of Indians settled in Dominions, 	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these diplomatic representations did not amount to much; Sastri had in fact suggested 
that Sapru withdraw.67 For a dependent India unable to effect much change in the 
treatment of overseas Indians, the chimera of ‘reciprocity’ had come full circle. As Sastri 
pointed out: 
 
I well remember being told in I921: ‘If we hit you, why don't you hit us in return? 
We have accorded you full power of reciprocity.’ Where one is in the grip of a 
big bully, patient and philosophic submission is no remedy. To hit out with all 
one’s strength may not be effective either, but it is at least a vindication of one’s 
manhood. The poet has said that the imprisoned cobra strikes not so much to 
punish the tormentor, as out of wounded pride.68 
 
In many ways it was helpless yet ‘wounded pride’ that defined India’s  decision to 
retaliate against South Africa’s Trading and Occupation of Land (Natal and Transvaal) 
Act in 1943. The act renewed the segregationist policy of the 1939 Transvaal Act that 
had imposed a two-year ban on ‘the sale or hire of property and the issue of new trade 
licences to Indians in the Transvaal’ as a means of tackling Indian ‘penetration’.69 Furious 
protests at the legislative council and an angry response from the Indian High 
Commissioner in South Africa, Shafa’at Ahmad Khan, calling for sanctions and the recall 
of the High Commissioner, led to the Reciprocity Act of 1943.70 Even as Lord Wavell 
tried to prevaricate, the lack of a response from Smuts and the increasing virulence of 
protests in India – reaffirmed by Narayan Bhaskar Khare, the council member in charge 
of the Department of Indians Overseas who was under severe pressure to act – led to 
the Reciprocity Act being applied to South Africa in 1944. The Gazette of India thus 
announced that South African Europeans in India would be subjected to the same kinds 
of discrimination faced by Indian nationals in South Africa.71  	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This was of course a largely symbolic shot at retaliation, finally implementing long-
discussed notions of reciprocity vis-à-vis the Dominions. Apart from the famed instance 
of Bombay’s iconic Taj Mahal hotel installing a notice that South African visitors would 
not be permitted, there was not much that could be done.  As the scholar Sripati 
Chandrasekhar quipped, ‘the number of South Africans in India does not total even ten. 
Hence this is merely a matter of face-saving.’72 As a state inching towards independence, 
‘reciprocity’ as diplomatic practice meant the recognition of India’s nationhood, growing 
status as an international actor, and claim to some semblance of parity with the 
Dominions in the British imperial system.  Yet in so doing, it also exemplified the 
precarity of all these claims and the fact that despite their awareness of the severe 
limitations of reciprocity, this nevertheless remained one of the few diplomatic options 
available to India.  
 
In seeking to explore the recurrence of the term ‘reciprocity’ in Indian discourse and 
reading it as an underlying framework for diplomatic practice, I have departed from 
much of the scholarship that has discussed the reciprocity resolutions adopted by India, 
without necessarily viewing reciprocity as a conceptual frame. 73  Moreover the few 
mentions of ‘reciprocity’ in the literature also largely focuses on this as a pre-1947 
conception. Having traced the uses of reciprocity in colonial India’s diplomacy, I will 
show that this remained a significant framework for the postcolonial state. Seeking to 
utilise India’s newfound sovereignty as a means of negotiating the status of its overseas 
communities, the Government of India put forth a framework of ‘reciprocity of 
citizenship’ – a concept that underpinned the terms of its membership of the 
Commonwealth and also shaped discourse on Indian citizenship legislation. Addressing a 
lacuna in the literature on Indian diplomacy, diaspora and citizenship studies, I trace the 
uses and limitations of ‘reciprocity of citizenship’ and its correlation with the provisions 
of the 1948 British Nationality Act – a process that had far reaching consequences for 
the status of Indians domiciled in India and overseas.  
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RECIPROCITY AND A PLACE AT THE COMMONWEALTH TABLE 
 
The British Nationality Act of 1948 brought far-reaching consequences for the status and 
mobility of Indians, and other nationals of British colonies and dominions.74 The passage 
of Canada’s citizenship act in 1946 had been a ‘revolutionary departure’ undermining the 
existing ‘common code’ of British subject status by legislating that British subjecthood 
would instead be derived through the possession of Canadian citizenship.75 The BNA 
was a response to this legislation, drawing on the Canadian framework to provide for 
British subject status on the basis of a ‘local’ citizenship. That is, British subject status 
would be derived through the ‘gateway’ of ‘Citizenship of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies’ (CUKC) or the Citizenship of Independent Commonwealth Countries – 
effectively attempting to provide a legal basis for nationality and citizenship through 
which the British empire and Commonwealth would be united in one framework. India 
called for the introduction of the term ‘Commonwealth citizen’ as an alternative to the 
term ‘British subject’: wary of being termed British subjects after independence at a time 
when they deliberated over their formal membership of the Commonwealth, this was 
seen as  ‘more acceptable to public opinion’.76  While the latter term could not be 
dropped entirely, given the old Commonwealth’s preference for it, British officials settled 
for a compromise wherein the BNA permitted individual countries to use the term they 
preferred.77  
 
For India, the provisions of the BNA meant that once Indian citizenship legislation had 
been passed – thus providing ‘local citizenship’ as a gateway to British subject status – 
Indian citizens would thereby also become Commonwealth citizens, to use India’s 
preferred term. The BNA also provided for a temporary status of ‘British subjects 
without citizenship’ until ‘local citizenship’ legislation was passed. This however meant 
that such temporary British subjects without citizenship would become Citizens of the 
United Kingdom and Colonies if not covered by the provisions of local citizenship 
legislation. The BNA also recognized ‘British Protected Persons’, a provision which 
sought to cover those in territories over which Britain held Paramountcy (much like the 	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princely states of India), although they were not automatically given the status of 
Commonwealth citizenship.78 The legislative complexities opened up by the BNA were 
particularly complicated in the case of overseas Indians resident in the entangled realm of 
British colonial territories and Commonwealth countries. They could potentially be 
Indian citizens, citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies, citizens of the country in 
which they resided, or temporary British subjects without citizenship. As we shall see in 
detail in Chapter 2, these overseas Indians were eligible for multiple, entangled claims to 
citizenship and yet were often viewed as a burden by all countries involved.  
 
It is worth noting that these discussions over the British Nationality Act and its 
provisions of citizenship were taking place at much the same time that India was 
deliberating over its membership of the Commonwealth. Thus, India’s proposal to 
change the BNA’s terminology of ‘British subject’ status to ‘Commonwealth citizenship’ 
went hand in hand with its demand for ‘reciprocity of citizenship’ – rather than allegiance 
to the Crown – as an essential criteria for its formal entry into the Commonwealth. While 
fully aware of the limitations of calling for ‘reciprocity’ at the imperial conferences, 
independent India nevertheless pushed for ‘reciprocity of citizenship’ in the 
Commonwealth – attempting once again to address the status of its overseas 
communities at a time when they were facing crises of citizenship and statelessness in 
many regions. Perhaps viewing their achievement of sovereignty as likely to alter the 
effectiveness of reciprocity this time around, India’s demand was nevertheless also 
essential to calling the bluff of a ‘new’ multiracial Commonwealth and justifying the 
decision to join an organisation of which South Africa was a member. India’s decision to 
continue its membership of the Commonwealth was a subject of considerable debate, 
not least at the Indian Constituent Assembly: 
 
Sir, many of the speakers before me have described this Commonwealth more or 
less like the old pandits who describe Brahman- "Neti," "Neti," "it is not this," "it 
is not this," "it is not this." I would humbly submit that the Commonwealth has a 
positive advantage … it is an indispensable alliance which is needed not only in 
the interest of India, but in the interest of world peace.79 
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K. M. Munshi’s invocation of metaphysical discourses on the Brahman – the all 
pervasive, ultimate reality in Hindu philosophy, defined far easier in terms of what it is 
not, rather than what it is – was a perceptive if unusual metaphor for opposing narratives 
of India’s membership of the Commonwealth. These narratives were nevertheless united 
in their ambiguity over the form this membership would take. Nehru himself exemplified 
this amorphous narrative in his speech calling on the Indian constituent assembly to 
ratify the 1949 London declaration reconciling India’s ‘continuing membership’ of the 
Commonwealth of Nations with its march towards republican status.80 Analysing the text 
of the declaration, he argued 
 
In this particular Declaration nothing very much is said about the position of the 
King except that he will be a symbol, but it has been made perfectly clear … that 
the King has no functions at all. He has a certain status. The Commonwealth itself, as 
such, is no body, if I may say so; it has no organisation to function and the King also can 
have no functions.81 
 
Critics decried the paradoxical, incomprehensible nature of India’s Commonwealth 
membership: in the words of Maulana Hasrat Mohani, member of the Constituent 
Assembly, ‘When you accept full partnership in the Commonwealth, how can you escape 
accepting the King as the Head of the Commonwealth? ... I do not want any monster of 
this kind which is at once a Republic and a Dominion.’82 The assembly’s vigorous debate 
on Commonwealth membership touched upon a number of issues ranging from 
allegations that India had joined the imperialist and ‘Anglo-American’ power bloc to 
discussions of the limitations and possibilities of a Commonwealth that had no binding 
rules or rights.  Yet no topic cut across the spectrum of opposing views as much as the 
emotive issue of overseas Indians. While critics argued that the Commonwealth was ‘a 
house divided against itself (that) cannot stand … a group of nations half-slave and half-
free (that) cannot endure’, some supporters of India’s membership suggested an 
amendment that India’s membership would be ratified by the assembly ‘provided the 
Commonwealth does not allow discrimination of Indians in South Africa and Australia 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 India’s republican constitution was still being formulated and would come into effect on 26 January 
1950.   
81  Italics added. See Nehru’s statement, CAI debates, Vol. 8, 16 May 1949. 
http://cadindia.clpr.org.in/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/8/1949-05-16   
82 Maulana Hasrat Mohani, CAI debates, Vol 8, 17 May 1949.  
http://cadindia.clpr.org.in/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/8/1949-05-17  
	   48	  
and also metes out equal justice.’83 While South Africa was no doubt the most vivid 
example of the discrimination faced by overseas Indians, the Commonwealth as a whole 
was regarded as comprising countries that ‘still regard Indians as an inferior race and 
enforce (sic) colour bar against them and deny them even the most elementary rights of 
citizenship.’84  
 
At the time of its membership of the Commonwealth and until 26 January 1950  when 
the constitution of India was adopted, India was a Dominion: a legal status rarely 
acknowledged in much of the literature, yet one that held considerable significance for 
the nascent Indian state, as Kumarasingham has pointed out.85 Asserting that dominion 
status was only a ‘temporary phase for an interim period’ that would not get in the way 
of India’s republican ideal, Nehru had argued that this would nevertheless enable the 
interim Indian government to inherit all the administrative, political structures and 
powers of the British Raj.86 Not too long before Nehru’s acceptance of temporary 
dominion status, Sir Benegal Narsing Rau – the famed jurist and civil servant who was 
later appointed adviser to the Indian Constituent Assembly – had prepared a draft ‘Indo-
British’ treaty in 1945 with dominion sovereignty as its basis.87 Temporary dominion 
status also by default placed India within the ambit of the Commonwealth, even as its 
political leadership sought to reconcile long-held Republican ideals with continuing 
Commonwealth membership. Despite the fact that the idea of a treaty between India and 
Britain as part of the transfer of power was eventually dropped, Rau’s draft offers 
valuable insight into themes that would come to shape many an aspect of India’s 
relationship with the Commonwealth.88  
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First, it reiterated ‘reciprocity’ as a framework for diplomatic relations between India and 
Britain (and other foreign states), calling for reciprocity of ‘any privileges regarding entry 
or residence or trading or holding of office’ for individuals. Significantly, it also called on 
the British government to reciprocate permission for diplomatic appointments by 
allowing the appointment of Indian High Commissioners, Trade Commissioners or 
Agents not just in the United Kingdom but in ‘all territories directly administered by  the 
British government like colonies, mandated territories etc.’89 This was a rather prescient 
suggestion: as we will see in Chapter 3, India’s quest to appoint diplomatic 
representatives in British colonial territories would be far from easy. Second, it identified 
the status of overseas Indians as important to the future ‘conduct of foreign relations’, 
arguing that the British government ought to ensure the ‘equality of treatment’ and 
‘equality of citizenship’ of those it had sent as indentured labourers to colonial territories 
and at the very least ‘stay neutral’ in the case of disputes between India and South 
Africa.90 These ideas of reciprocity and ‘equality of citizenship’ were further reinforced 
during Rau’s travel to the United States, Canada, Ireland and Britain from October to 
December 1947 – authorized by the Constituent Assembly of India to consult with 
experts in relation to framing India’s constitution. Rau was particularly interested in 
Ireland’s approach to its relationship with Britain: 
 
Apparently in future, Irish citizens will not be British subjects, even outside 
Ireland, as they are at present; but they will have most of the privileges of British 
subjects. Reciprocally, British subjects will be granted similar privileges in Ireland, 
although they may not be Irish citizens. This indicates a possible mode of 
evolving a common citizenship – or something almost equivalent thereto – even 
as between countries that do not acknowledge a common allegiance, e.g, between 
any two members of the U.N on a basis of reciprocity. Thus, citizens of State ‘A’ 
will not be automatically citizens of State ‘B’; but ‘A’ may grant, within its own 
boundaries, all or any of the privileges of citizenship to the citizens of ‘B’, 
provided ‘B’ does the same to the citizens of ‘A’.91 
 
Rau was not the only one considering ideas of common or ‘reciprocal’ citizenship and 
nationality. Indeed, citizenship was an underlying if sometimes paradoxical theme in 	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India’s diplomatic engagements at the cusp of independence and after – international 
relations shaped by and in turn shaping the status of overseas Indians. Taking the issue 
of Indians in South Africa to the United Nations in 1946 – ‘a most auspicious beginning’ 
for India’s foreign policy, as Nehru remarked – India recognized their status as South 
African nationals and yet regarded it as India’s ‘moral’ responsibility to intervene, given 
the denial of citizenship rights and equal treatment by the government of South Africa.92 
India’s success at the General Assembly provided the mechanisms of the UN with ‘a 
mandate to think beyond the limits of national sovereignty’ when it came to issues of 
human rights violations and – more importantly for our analysis – indicated India’s 
engagement with overseas Indians well beyond the limits of their citizenship or 
nationality status. 93 The Asian Relations Conference that followed, a few months later in 
March 1947, is seen in the academic literature as exemplifying a rather different reading 
of India’s relationship with its overseas nationals. Itty Abraham has argued that the 
conference facilitated an an ‘overnight’ policy change in which the Indian state 
reterritorialised itself ‘… turning away from its diaspora, India’s national boundaries were 
being redrawn to exclude any Indians who did not already live within its new territorial 
borders.’94 According to him, this was in large part due to concerns raised by delegates at 
the conference about the numerical strength of Indian communities in their countries 
and the fear of an expansionist Indian state aided by this Indian diaspora that would 
function as a ‘fifth column’. While there is no doubt that the Indian state had increasingly 
called on its overseas communities to identify with their countries of residence (even 
before independence), I argue that this was anything but a clear cut instance of the state 
cutting off ties with its diaspora. Indeed the disentanglement of overseas communities 
from the Indian state was drawn-out, messy and often paradoxical.  
 
First, it is essential to complicate the narrative that marks the end of India’s diplomatic 
engagement with overseas communities at the stroke of independence – the making of 
citizenship legislations in many countries where Indian communities had settled was 
often deeply contested and involved the considerable involvement of the Government of 
India in the months and years following 1947. Second, it is crucial to reiterate the  	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heterogeneity of the Indian diaspora and the fact that Indians settled across the entangled 
realm of British colonial territories and Commonwealth countries had a distinct 
‘common status’ as British subjects under the 1948 BNA. Indeed an Indian delegate at 
the Asian Relations Conference had flagged this aspect: ‘If for example the problem of 
Indians in Ceylon is to be tackled on the basis of nationality and citizenship, so long as 
Indians share British nationality with Ceylon their claims arise from two different sources 
– first from the fact of Indian migration and second, on the basis of being in possession 
of British nationality. This duality prevented satisfactory solutions of the problem of 
Indians.’95  
 
Examining India’s contribution to the making of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) as an integral part of India’s vision of world community, Manu 
Bhagavan has pointed to a fascinating note written by Nehru in January 1947 regarding 
the value of the UDHR for overseas Indians.96 Quoting his seemingly paradoxical 
suggestion that ‘the rights of nationals must necessarily differ from those of non-
nationals … in either event there should be no discrimination i.e. non-nationals should 
be treated alike,‘ Bhagavan draws on Abraham to argue that the ‘non-nationals’ referred 
to are the ‘external populations’ that India ‘gave up all claims on’, while ensuring that 
their fundamental rights were protected by the UDHR.97 While this hardly meant that 
India did not engage with the status of its ‘external populations’ well after 1947, 
Bhagavan’s larger point about the United Nations as a diplomatic framework for India’s 
engagement with overseas Indians is well taken. Nehru’s note, however, also addresses a 
particular context of the nationality question that Bhagavan does not refer to: 
 
We have recently had to face discrimination in South Africa, and in Ceylon and 
East Africa we are having difficulties … The question of nationality is a difficult 
one, more specially in the countries which have so far belonged to the British 
Empire or Commonwealth of Nations. I do not suppose that we need to go into 
this question at the Human Rights Commission.98 
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This is essential context not just since Nehru reiterates the continuing relevance of 
overseas Indians to Indian foreign policy objectives, but also in his special focus on the 
‘difficult’, entangled nature of nationality – spurred by common British subject status – 
within the particular realm of British colonial territories and Commonwealth countries. 
This was an especially significant concern for Nehru at a time when India was beginning 
to negotiate its membership of the Commonwealth. In February 1947, the British 
Commonwealth Conference on Nationality and Citizenship deliberated on a draft of the 
BNA – although India had been invited to the conference, it had not been much 
involved with the proceedings. Strangely enough, the Indian High Commissioner, 
Samuel Runganadhan, was ‘supposed to be present as observer but disappeared after the 
formal, opening session.’99  
At any rate, this was a rather unfortunate conference to miss, given its focus on finding 
some sort of common approach to citizenship and the fact that its proceedings reiterated 
some of the concerns that had long defined India’s negotiation of the Commonwealth 
connection. That is, while the White Dominions agreed in principle to guarantee equality 
between their citizens and all British subjects, there was no commitment to the fact that 
this would extend to non-white British subjects. As Karatani points out, ‘all the 
participants, except the British delegates, were eager to make the common status as 
limited as possible.’100 More worryingly for India, Ceylon and Burma too would delineate 
Indians as distinct from other British subjects. Burma noted that it would  ‘differentiate 
between two classes of British subjects – Indian nationals, and nationals of other 
Commonwealth countries’, wherein the latter would be treated on par with Burmese 
citizens. 101 Ceylon asserted that there would be ‘two classes of British subjects – Ceylon 
citizens and non-citizens who were British subjects by reason of birth there’, with the 
latter including Indian immigrants, who would have to be accomodated by Indian 
citizenship or left stateless if they could not be covered by some provision of the BNA.102   
Speaking to Lord Mountbatten in March 1947, a month after this conference, Nehru 
suggested that India’s membership of the Commonwealth could be on the basis of ‘some 
form of common nationality.’103 While the question of what such a ‘common nationality’ 
might entail remained unclear and indeed Nehru was still unsure of whether India would 	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join the Commonwealth, ‘reciprocity’ was nevertheless again a persistent narrative from 
Indian officials. As Krishna Menon too argued in his letter to Mountbatten, ‘Reciprocity 
of citizenship rather than a common Crown is frankly the hard core of Indo-British 
relations.’104  
Even as the events of independence and Partition occupied the central focus of the 
Government of India, answers to the lingering question of Commonwealth membership 
were progressively more negative. In March 1948, the British Prime Minister Clement 
Attlee had written to Nehru to initiate talks on India’s relationship with the 
Commonwealth, rejoicing that ‘the family circle … (had) been enlarged … The British 
Commonwealth of Nations is now in effect the Commonwealth of British and Asiatic 
nations.’105 The diversity of membership of the Commonwealth however meant, in 
Attlee’s view, that the only link binding them together was their allegiance to the Crown. 
Arguing that India had no ‘native tradition’ of republicanism, he noted the benefits of 
having as head of state someone like the King ‘who does not belong to any section of the 
community and therefore is neutral.’106 For Nehru – who had not been keen on retaining 
the Commonwealth link – this was particularly disheartening. Writing to Krishna Menon, 
Nehru argued that while he did not wish to take a decision regarding this in a  hurry,  
‘general public opinion will certainly favour our going out of the Commonwealth. In the 
balance I am myself inclined to think that this would be best.’107 Mountbatten, for his 
part, had been dissuading Nehru from adopting the term ‘Republic’ in the Indian 
constitution, preferring instead ‘Commonwealth or State’.108 Despite Mountbatten and 
Attlee’s efforts to wean India away from Republic status, Nehru would not consider such 
a prospect. As he would argue, ‘If we use the word ‘Republic’, it may be possible to have 
a closer relationship with the UK than others … There is no chance at all for us to go 
back on this and I do not think we should.’109  
Even as India prevaricated over the Commonwealth question, the balance was gently 
tilting towards the prospect of continued membership: indeed Nehru had begun to 
reiterate the Irish example to assure members of the Constituent Assembly that joining 	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the Commonwealth would not be at the cost of giving up on Republican status. While 
geopolitical concerns no doubt played a role110, indeed particularly the question of the 
strategic disadvantages of India staying out of the Commonwealth while Pakistan joined, 
it is important to recognize that the status of overseas Indians in British colonies and the 
Commonwealth was intimately tied to India’s decision regarding Commonwealth 
membership. At much the same time as the Government of India was pondering over 
this question, they were also negotiating with the governments of Burma and Ceylon, 
who had both framed citizenship legislation explicitly designed to exclude Indians.111 
These crises of citizenship and potential statelessness faced by  overseas Indians are 
crucial to understanding both India’s increasing inclination towards Commonwealth 
membership and its call for ‘reciprocity of citizenship’ as the basis.  
While Kumarasingham considers the debate over India’s proposal for Commonwealth 
citizenship and the status of the King as ‘First Citizen of the Commonwealth’, his focus 
is more on the question of reconciling the role of the monarchy with Indian membership 
of the Commonwealth as a Republic. Yet it is clear that the very proposal for reciprocity 
of Citizenship or Commonwealth citizenship stemmed from the status of overseas 
Indians. Indeed, as Nehru argued in the Constituent Assembly, India’s decision vis-à-vis 
the Commonwealth would have a significant impact on these Indians: 
That is not merely a theoretical question, but a very practical question again in 
regard to citizenship … it affects the citizenship of all Indians abroad. In the 
various British colonies exactly what type of relationship we should have which 
might affect that citizenship; they may not become aliens; all these must be 
considered.112 
These issues were being considered by other officials such as Sir B. N. Rau, now 
Constitutional Adviser to the Constituent Assembly, and Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, 
Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. Rau 
and Bajpai focused on the ways in which the British Nationality bill’s provisions 
regarding citizenship would impact Indians and the notion of citizenship within the 
Commonwealth – discussions that shaped a paper titled  ‘Citizenship in the British 	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Commonwealth of Nations’ that Rau presented at the International Bar Association’s 
conference of the legal profession in August 1948.113 Even as it raised concerns regarding 
some of the features of the bill, particularly the status of Indian residents of the princely 
states as ‘British protected persons’, the paper nevertheless articulated a hope that the 
‘Commonwealth will … strive for the federal ideal of having a common citizenship with 
no arbitrary discrimination between the citizens of one unit and those of another’ and 
facilitate ‘a sense of genuine equality among the members’. Rau was even more 
ambitious, drawing on the example of the Commonwealth’s unique relationship with 
Ireland to suggest that many other states that did not belong to the Commonwealth and 
had no historical connection to Britain could become ‘associate states’. That is, they 
could ‘come to an agreement with the countries of the Commonwealth whereby on the 
one hand, the citizens of the associate state would be treated as citizens of the 
Commonwealth in those countries and on the other, citizens of the Commonwealth 
would be given a corresponding status in the associate state.’114 Such an arrangement 
would allow the states to protect their sovereignty and be ‘completely independent in 
every other respect’, while benefiting from the ‘common citizenship’ link. The 
conference went on to adopt this suggestion in a rather remarkable resolution:  
That in order to promote tolerance and good neighbourliness among the people 
of different countries, as many of these as possible should secure by mutual 
agreement and other appropriate means that the citizens of one country shall, 
while residing or sojourning in another, have the incidents of citizenship of the 
latter and that this Conference would welcome as an example any arrangement 
whereby the incidents of Commonwealth citizenship under the British 
Nationality Act could become available, on a reciprocal basis and under agreed 
conditions, to the citizens of countries outside the Commonwealth.115 
As Rau pointed out, this was very much in tune with the preamble of the UN charter and 
could only be accomplished if ‘as many countries as possible in the world could agree 
that they would not treat each other’s citizens as foreigners.’116 This was, in many ways, 
India’s main objective in putting forth ‘reciprocity of citizenship’ or ‘common 
citizenship’ as the basis of its Commonwealth membership, thereby seeking to ensure 	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that Indians in colonial territories and Commonwealth nations would not be treated as 
foreigners. Krishna Menon would reiterate these themes in his letter to Nehru ahead of 
his visit to London to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference of October 
1948 – incidentally the first Commonwealth conference where the Prime Ministers of 
India, Pakistan and Ceylon were represented.117      Considering the options available for 
India’s ‘organic’ relationship with Britain and the Commonwealth in future, Menon 
argued against any suggestions of a treaty: ‘until India is in reality a great power … on 
level with the other party to a treaty, the equality of status of the two parties will not 
necessarily mean equality in action.’ Menon’s suggestion was instead a comparatively less 
binding relationship that would take advantage of the ‘family arrangement’, even as he 
acknowledged that this phrase ‘obviously does not suit us and cannot be used in public 
discussion … but is the right approach in negotiation.’118 Menon’s interpretation of the 
family metaphor as a terminology best reiterated among Anglicised bureaucrats and 
politicians but unspeakable in public, points to the notion that certain elite Indians were 
far more capable of understanding and belonging to the ‘Commonwealth family’ than 
others – a narrative that permeates the Indian state’s regulation of ‘unskilled’ Indian 
mobility and migration to Britain, as we will see in Chapters 4 and 5 in particular. 
Defining this ‘family’ relationship in legal terms while avoiding allegiance to the 
traditional common basis of the Commonwealth family – the Crown – was however the 
immediate challenge. Menon’s solution lay in the conception of ‘common citizenship’ as 
the definitive link within the family, which would ‘ease the Crown problem too, if we 
agree not to argue it much at present but leave it to students of jurisprudence for future 
speculation!’. This common citizenship could take the form of ‘Commonwealth 
Citizenship’ as defined by the BNA ‘to which we at present subscribe and indeed in the 
passing of which in its present form we materially contributed’ and could be 
incorporated in Indian ‘nationality law.’119 Menon even envisioned a relationship where 
the Crown would make the President of India his representative to ‘assume the 
protection’ of other Commonwealth citizens when in India, and reciprocally, the 
President would request the Crown to guarantee the protection of Indian nationals in 
Commonwealth countries, ‘again by virtue of the Commonwealth citizenship.’ 120 
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Crucially, he was crystal clear in spelling out the reason for this suggestion of reciprocal 
citizenship: 
To us, apart from the defence and political considerations set forth; there is the 
problem of some 9 million Indians in the British colonial areas. They present a 
great problem. Their only future is in identifying themselves with the lands that 
gave them birth or gave them a home and to join with all the rest that do the 
same. They can do this only on the basis of a common citizenship. The 
arrangement proposed alone can give them the common citizenship without 
making them aliens in India or without other complications. 121 
At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference, meanwhile, Nehru informally 
discussed India’s impending decision regarding its membership with British ministers and 
other Premiers. Ideas of a ‘vague bond’122 were by then taking clearer shape: as Nehru 
wrote to Patel, ‘this link might be on basis of Commonwealth nationality on reciprocal 
footing. This would involve India in dual nationality which is rather novel.’123 Indeed, the 
very consideration of this option was a rather remarkable shift from India’s stand thus 
far against dual nationality – largely due to grave concerns expressed by countries like 
Burma, Malaya and Ceylon about the ‘loyalty’ of Indian communities settled there –  and 
served to reiterate the unique character of the British colonial and Commonwealth realm. 
Indian officials were  positive about the discussions at the conference: as Sir G. S. Bajpai 
pointed out, the public statement of the conference spoke of a ‘Commonwealth of 
Nations’ rather than the ‘British Commonwealth’ and was a ‘concession to the 
sentiments of members like India … a recognition of the fact that the Community of 
Nations is no longer British in tradition, civilisation and race.’124 Upon their return to 
India, Nehru, Bajpai and Rau put together the first major draft memo stipulating the 
terms of India’s membership of the Commonwealth, sending it to Attlee on 28 October 
1948.125 
This draft memo is striking in its overriding emphasis on citizenship and reciprocity as 
the basis of India’s new relationship with the Commonwealth – perhaps unsurprisingly 	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so given the longstanding resonance of these themes in Indian diplomatic discourse, as 
we have seen. The memo noted that India could provide the legal basis for 
Commonwealth citizenship by adopting either in its Constitution or a ‘separate 
nationality act passed contemporaneously’ the relevant provisions of the BNA ‘which 
will have the effect of making Indian nationals Commonwealth citizens, and the 
nationals of any Commonwealth country Commonwealth citizens when they are in India 
… on a reciprocal basis.’126 Commonwealth countries would not be treated as foreign 
states and their citizens would not be treated as foreigners. In effect, particularly in the 
case of commercial treaties, this would mean that ‘for the purposes of the ‘Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) clause, the Commonwealth countries are in a special position 
and are not regarded as Foreign states.’127 The assertion of ‘un-foreignness’ therefore had 
considerable economic consequences, enabling Commonwealth nations to evade the 
prospect of being included within the MFN framework for ‘foreign’ nations that would 
potentially extend the advantages of imperial preference to those beyond the 
Commonwealth.128  
Moreover, the Indian memo argued that the complexity over the status of the King could 
be resolved by making the King the ‘First Citizen’ who would be the ‘fountain of the 
honour’ of the Commonwealth as a whole. Drawing on Menon’s version, it envisioned 
that the President of India would act on behalf of the King to fulfil the obligations of the 
Crown towards non-Indian Commonwealth citizens in India. Equally fascinating are the 
memo’s plans for reciprocity of diplomatic representation: ‘In foreign states where the 
Indian govt has no representation, it will be at liberty to make use of any other 
Commonwealth country’s Ambassador or Minister; and the Indian govt will be willing to 
provide reciprocal facilities for any other Commonwealth govt that so desires.’129 
Having heard of India’s new terms of membership, Dominion representatives 
communicated ‘in friendliest spirit’ the ‘strength of sentiment’ in their countries for the 
King which could not be assuaged by naming him ‘First Citizen’. As a compromise, they 
urged Nehru to consider the possibility that the authority to appoint Heads of Missions 
be derived from the King.130 Nehru, who now faced the task of presenting India’s case 	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for membership of the Commonwealth to the Congress party, Cabinet and Constituent 
Assembly, doubted that this proposal would be accepted. ‘Even reference to King being 
Fountain of Honour is not liked’ by the cabinet, he noted.131 Nehru argued that while 
India would not pledge allegiance to the Crown, he saw ‘no reason why other Dominions 
should eliminate King as link … As King of Commonwealth he would remain as King of 
particular Dominions and at the same time First citizen of Commonwealth.’132 In the 
cabinet discussions, criticism was directed even at the slightest infringements on India’s 
sovereignty: there were suggestions that there be no reference to the King or the Indian 
independence act, and that provisions about Commonwealth citizenship be contained in 
a separate nationality act and not the Constitution. There was also fear that ‘this new 
arrangement might lead to some discrimination in favour of Britishers etc, in regard to 
commercial and economic relations..’ and there ‘appeared to be some hesitation and 
suspicion as to what all these might lead us to.’133  
Even as Nehru dealt with criticism from his colleagues about what they perceived as the 
excessive concessions given to the Commonwealth, Attlee informed Nehru that his Law 
Officers viewed the memo as insufficient.  While the British were keen to assist them in 
‘every way’, they found the memo inadequate from a ‘purely legal point of view.’134 In 
their view, while the consideration of the King ‘as the fountain of honour … would be 
of assistance’, only a common allegiance to the Crown was a legally sound basis for 
Britain to recognise a country as ‘not foreign.’135 Britain, they claimed, would not be able 
to justify giving India MFN treatment on the basis outlined in the Indian memo and if 
they did, this might lead to claims from ‘entirely foreign countries’ for the privileges of 
MFN status. Moreover, they did not view India’s preferred term of ‘First Citizen’ as 
appropriate for the King, citing that Dominion representatives did not prefer this term 
since they considered the Prime Minister to be the first citizen of each Commonwealth 
country.136 Attlee was not keen on the terminology of ‘First Citizen’ either: as Menon 
recalled later, he apparently exclaimed, ‘Oh no! First Citizen, that sounds like 
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Robespierre … and it would not go down.’137 Many Indian politicians too had expressed 
their reservations about recognising the King as First Citizen, albeit for completely 
different reasons. Their objections to the terminology of First Citizen was based on their 
‘deeprooted objections … to anything which even remotely indicates some kind of 
subordinate status of India or India’s President.’138  
India’s call for a common citizenship as the basis of membership was also considered 
insufficient from the UK perspective, since the ‘practical differences’ between 
Commonwealth countries meant that the treatment of Commonwealth citizens varied 
from one country to another. 139 Attlee suggested that India overcome these legal hurdles 
by issuing a declaration that they are ‘bound in a special form of association within the 
Commonwealth’ and supplementing Commonwealth citizenship with a link of ‘real 
substance’ – that is, the King.140 Both Nehru and Menon reiterated that India would not 
accept the Crown as link, with the latter noting that ‘Attlee should regard this matter as a 
political and commonsense one as we do and not as a matter of legalisms.’141 In Menon’s 
view, the problem therefore stemmed from the fact that British legal opinion conceived 
of only two categories of relationships: Dominions and foreign states. As he recalled 
years later, Foreign Office lawyers had indeed argued that ‘there is no such thing as a 
Commonwealth Citizen.’142  India sought to redefine this binary by calling for the 
recognition of a third intermediate category: that of a Commonwealth state which was 
neither a Dominion nor a foreign state. Attlee meanwhile was still pressing India to 
recognize the ‘stability’ and ‘mystique’ of the Crown: a tired Nehru reiterated, ‘you will 
appreciate that the mystique you refer to would hardly be applicable to India.’143  
There was however increasing debate over words and phrases that would redefine the 
terms of membership of the Commonwealth. Given the widespread disapproval of the 
term ‘First Citizen’ from both British officials and Dominion representatives – not to 
mention criticism in India of this title – Nehru clarified that India had ‘no desire to retain 
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it.’ 144  Yet, Indian officials neither preferred the terminology of ‘Head of the 
Commonwealth’ or even the ‘British Commonwealth of Nations’. Nehru instead 
suggested drawing on the Statute of Westminster to describe the King as the ‘symbol of 
the free association of the members of the Commonwealth.’ 145  Preparing for the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference to be held from 22 April 1949, Indian 
officials compiled drafts of the points of agreement and a proposed declaration to be 
made at the conference. These drafts were closely based not just on the Statute of 
Westminster but also the report of the Imperial conference of 1946: as Nehru argued, 
‘using this language … has a certain advantage and points to continuity.’ The draft points 
of agreement referred to the King as ‘the symbol of this association’, called for a 
Commonwealth citizenship and suggested that the British Commonwealth of Nations be 
renamed the ‘Commonwealth of Free Nations.’146 India’s draft declaration, perhaps even 
more radically, spoke of a ‘Commonwealth of Free and independent nations, voluntarily 
associated, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic and 
external affairs.’ Most importantly, it identified ‘the King … (as) symbol of this free 
association, a common citizenship another mark of its uniqueness.’147  
The ‘London declaration’ eventually issued by the conference differed from these drafts 
in significant ways, although it did include some of India’s preferred terminology. The 
declaration recognized the King as the ‘symbol of the free association of its independent 
member nations and as such the Head of the Commonwealth', with Nehru giving in and 
accepting the term ‘Head of the Commonwealth’ even as India’s preferred phrase 
identifying him as the ‘symbol of the free association’ was adopted. There was much 
disagreement over the terminology to refer to the King before they had settled on the 
words ‘as such’ – allegedly Menon’s suggestion –  so as to dilute the perceived allegiance 
pledged to the King by this declaration. As Menon would later recall, ‘the King at one 
time said to me in jest, ‘What am I now – As Such’?’148  
In a neat compromise, the declaration used the designation of the ‘British 
Commonwealth of Nations’ in the first instance referring to the existing situation, while 
every subsequent reference termed it ‘Commonwealth of Nations’ instead. Conspicuous 	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by its absence, however, was any reference to Commonwealth citizenship in the 
declaration itself,  although this was mentioned in the minutes of the conference – 
perhaps unsurprising in some ways given the immigration policies of the white 
Dominions.149 However, the minutes called on each member of the Commonwealth to 
ensure ‘that nationals of other member nations are not treated as foreigners.’150 Despite 
its exclusion from the declaration, the principle of reciprocity was nominally accepted – 
as we shall see in Chapter 2, debates over reciprocal or Commonwealth citizenship for 
Indians would long continue. Tinker has perceptively argued that this essentially 
cemented the fact that while there would be ‘full-equality of status’ for the nation-states 
as members of the Commonwealth, this would not extend to the black and brown 
peoples of these member-states.151 India had essentially called the bluff of equality in the 
Commonwealth, and had been met with a nominal status of citizenship. Moreover, as the 
British noted, ‘it was also never clear how far the Indian govt itself would give 
preferential treatment to Commonwealth citizens from other member countries over 
foreigners in terms of right of entry and deportation.’ 152  Indeed there had been 
considerable criticism in India against the idea of ‘Commonwealth citizenship’. Perhaps 
its most famous critic was Dr B. R.  Ambedkar, Chairman of the drafting committee of 
the Indian Constitution. Ambedkar had argued not just that a Republican India was 
incompatible with the Commonwealth, but also that accepting allegiance to the King 
would be a comparatively ‘less dangerous’ course of action than the notion of 
Commonwealth citizenship which could  hamper the ‘economic independence of India 
… taking away the liberty of India to protect her nationals against Commonwealth 
citizens.’153 
The dawn of a ‘new’ Commonwealth was met with a range of reactions. Stafford Cripps 
wrote to Nehru in emotional, glowing terms: ‘I am very happy and believe that you have 
done something really big in world history … We have been given this chance to work 
together – not always seeing eye to eye – but always working heart to heart.’154 Menon 
later recalled that Churchill had been greatly moved too: ‘tears rolled from his eyes … To 
him, India remaining in was as if the prodigal had come home or something of that 
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kind.’155 B. N. Rau meanwhile noted that India had not changed its stance or abandoned 
Republican status: instead, ‘it is rather the Commonwealth that has changed.’156  
CONCLUSION 
We have explored the range of responses and critiques that Nehru encountered at the 
Constituent Assembly upon his return, particularly regarding the impact of India’s 
membership of the Commonwealth on the status of overseas Indians. This was hardly 
unexpected: indeed Nehru had long prepared to counter such assertions with the 
narrative of ‘Commonwealth citizenship’ as the basis of India’s Commonwealth 
membership. Yet this was not a framework that lent itself to easy definition: seeking to 
describe ‘Commonwealth citizenship’, Nehru admitted that it was perhaps better to talk 
of it in vague terms.  That is, it would mean that the peoples of Commonwealth 
countries ‘were not completely foreign to one another … that un-foreignness remains.’157 
This vagueness had its own benefits in assuaging the concerns of those who worried that 
such frameworks of ‘common’ citizenship would infringe on the sovereignty of India. 
Indeed as Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, member of the Constituent Assembly, noted: 
When there were some rumours that there would be a common or dual 
citizenship established, I felt a little nervous. What kind of citizenship would it 
be, and what commitments and obligations would be put on our country, these 
we could not envisage. But now I have a sense of relief. There is no such dual 
citizenship, and no commitment whatsoever. We are absolutely free.158 
This conflict between sovereignty and wider conceptions of citizenship would be a 
definitive theme in India’s drafting of its own citizenship framework, as we shall see in 
the next chapter. While it may be tempting to view ‘reciprocity’ as a cynical, largely 
terminological tool employed by Indian officials in order to mollify criticism back  home, 
the persistence of ‘reciprocity’ from the imperial conference’s reciprocity resolutions to 
the Commonwealth conception of reciprocity of citizenship suggests a different 
narrative. The widespread discrimination encountered by Indians in the international 
realm both before and after 1947 made it by default an issue that Indian diplomacy could 	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not ignore – indeed, as one writer had noted in 1945, ‘the very mention of the subject of 
"Indians abroad" raises in India a unique resentment, for it affects the self-respect and 
dignity of India as a nation.’159  
Far from just the emotional salience of the issue, India’s calls for overseas Indians to 
identify themselves with their country of residence were considerably complicated by the 
fact that many of these nations were drafting citizenship legislation explicitly aimed at 
excluding Indians. In this context, ‘reciprocity of citizenship’ – with all its limitations – 
was a significant means of drawing on India’s sovereign status to call on other sovereign 
nations, particularly those within the Commonwealth ‘family’, to protect the rights of 
Indian nationals and ensure their ‘un-foreignness’. In so doing, it therefore attempted to 
provide the rights of citizenship without infringing on sovereignty: indeed, as Menon 
later recalled, this idea for a common citizenship was not ‘in the sense of a United States 
but that we should not be alien to each other … there should be a distinction between 
aliens and Commonwealth citizens.’160 In other words, Nehru’s longstanding concern 
about the treatment of Indians who were ‘non-nationals’ could not be left to chance, in 
the hope that other countries would freely embrace the sanctity of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 161  ‘Reciprocity of citizenship’ within the ‘new’ 
Commonwealth was the other alternative that India pursued – with considerable 
consequences for its overseas communities, as we shall see in the coming chapters. 
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2 
ENTANGLED CITIZENS 
 OVERSEAS INDIANS AND THE MAKING OF INDIAN 
CITIZENSHIP 
 
‘Is a man born in India a British subject?’ 
‘How is such a man a ‘subject’ if India is a Republic?’ 
‘Is such a man treated as an Alien in the United Kingdom?’ 
 
In June 1954, an exasperated official from the British embassy in Washington D.C 
sought clarification regarding three questions that were frequently asked by several 
bureaucrats ranging from State Department officials to staff at the New Zealand 
embassy. Forwarding the message to officials at the Commonwealth Relations Office, D. 
J. C. Crawley ventured his guesses: ‘The answers to the three questions … are probably 
‘yes’, ‘just one of those illogical things’ and ‘no’.’1 This deceptively succinct exchange is 
an important indicator of both the complexity of negotiating identities shaped by Empire 
and the bureaucratic haze of interpreting overlapping citizenship frameworks. Indian 
officials for their part were concerned with defining the answer to another succinct 
question: ‘Who is an Indian citizen?’ This seemingly simple question was a great dilemma 
for Indian officials as they set out to draft a framework for Indian citizenship, a process 
that took more than eight years to complete and remained a subject of debate long 
afterwards. The making of this ‘eternal file’2 was in no small part due to the intricacies of 
reconciling Indian citizenship legislation with the provisions of the 1948 British 
Nationality Act (BNA) which delineated Indians as British subjects or Commonwealth 
Citizens after independence.  
 
Departing from conventional understandings of Indian citizenship that view it either 
solely in terms of Partition or as a mechanism through which the Indian state distanced 
its diaspora, I read Indian citizenship as the product of a complex, even paradoxical 
negotiation of entangled identities shaped by Empire – a process informed by the  
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widespread crises of citizenship encountered by overseas Indians. Indeed the BNA had 
longstanding consequences for those Indians resident in Commonwealth countries and 
British colonial territories, producing what I term ‘entangled citizens’: overseas Indians 
who were potentially eligible for multiple claims to citizenship and yet whose claims were 
often contested by all countries involved. The difficulty of unraveling these claims was 
exemplified by the pervasive confusion over what terminologies to use to describe these 
persons: were they ‘Indians’, ‘overseas Indians’, ‘British subjects’, ‘Commonwealth 
citizens’ or ‘citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies’ – or indeed perhaps 
something else altogether? As one British official noted, the complexity of defining such 
a legal status and implementing unwieldy citizenship frameworks was akin to opening a 
Pandora’s box.3   
 
My focus on the centrality of overseas Indians to the making of Indian citizenship is an 
effort to go beyond binary narratives of the Indian state’s inclusion or exclusion of its 
diaspora at the stroke of independence. I argue instead that there is more to be gained by 
interrogating the Indian state’s seemingly contradictory yet continual engagement with its 
overseas communities – for instance, calling on them to identify with their countries of 
residence, while still enabling provisions to register them as Indian citizens in India’s 
diplomatic missions. I will show that these seemingly paradoxical actions can be best 
understood as a process through which India sought to ensure that its overseas 
communities had citizenship rights – not necessarily Indian citizenship. That is, while 
Indian citizenship would be available for those of whom this was the only option, Indian 
officials firmly regarded the acquisition of ‘local’ citizenship of their countries of domicile 
– if available – to be a far more effective guarantor against discrimination. Indeed, as we 
have seen in chapter one, this was very much in line with India’s call for reciprocal rights 
and citizenship within the Commonwealth – precisely aimed at ensuring the availability 
of some form of citizenship framework for its overseas communities. This did not 
however always take effective shape, particularly given the bureaucratic complexities of 
interpreting and implementing overlapping citizenship frameworks and indeed the fact 
that the process of registering citizens often empowered the biases of individual officials. 
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THE CENTRALITY OF OVERSEAS INDIANS 
A diverse literature has explored the legislation, everyday practice and performance of 
postcolonial Indian citizenship after Partition. 4  Examining the ways in which the 
‘relationship of individuals to the state’5 and the ‘terms of membership’6 of the new 
Indian union were delineated, scholars have focused on the centrality of Partition to 
shaping uneven discourses on citizenship: producing ‘minority-citizens’ as the integral 
‘others’ to notions of the Hindu upper caste male as the ‘natural citizen’.7 Going beyond 
the high politics of Constituent Assembly and Parliamentary debates on citizenship, a 
strand of this scholarship has also focused on the spectacular and banal ways in which 
the ‘everyday’ state was encountered by the citizen in the aftermath of Partition.8 While 
there is no doubt that ideas of nationhood, sovereignty and citizenship were significantly 
shaped by Partition9, there is also a need to recognise the fact that drafting Indian 
citizenship legislation necessarily meant engaging with the multiple possibilities of 
citizenship and nationality shaped by the BNA. 
 
Innovative recent scholarship has also departed from conventional interpretations of 
citizenship-making as a largely domestic process, focusing instead on how ‘foreign policy 
becomes central to our understanding of modern citizenship.’10 The relationship of the 
postcolonial Indian state to ‘overseas Indians’ is crucial to this debate: a dynamic often 
explained through a somewhat linear narrative where the ‘expansive transnationalism’11 	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Nationhood (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 
11 Latha Varadarajan, The Domestic Abroad: Diasporas in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 52. 
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of a ‘global’ Indian nation12 was replaced by the territorializing postcolonial state’s 
exclusion of the diaspora after independence – until the neoliberal state’s rapprochement 
of sorts much later on in the 1990s, spurred by the economic successes of the Indian 
diaspora.13 For Abraham, India’s ‘volte-face’ vis-à-vis the diaspora happened ‘overnight’, 
a decision taken ‘at the moment of independence’ to mollify concerns expressed by 
neighbouring countries about an expansionist India aided by its diaspora acting as a ‘fifth 
column’.14Varadarajan too argues that the territorialization of the Indian state after 
independence and the ‘ideological commitment of the new Indian leadership to 
anticolonial struggle’ shaped its lackadaisical response to the crises faced by overseas 
Indians in Ceylon and Burma after 1947.15 Most importantly however, she makes a brief 
mention of the seeming oddities that contradict widespread notions of a clean break 
between the Indian state and its overseas populations: 
 
 Strangely enough, India continued negotiations with Ceylon and Burma over 
decades … set up rehabilitation schemes for those Indians who did come back, 
and consistently raised the issue of the treatment of Indians in places like South 
Africa and Fiji in fora like the UN and the Commonwealth. To that extent, the 
postindependence Indian state was still concerned with the status of overseas 
Indians.16  
 
I argue that these seemingly inexplicable instances are more than exceptions to the clear 
cut norm of the Indian state’s distance from its diaspora; indeed they exemplify the 
complex, paradoxical, even messy yet continual engagement between the Indian state and 
overseas Indians. First, it is essential to reiterate the fact that ‘overseas Indians’ were not 
a homogenous category. Indian officials were highly aware of the fact that ‘the number 
of Indians resident in Commonwealth countries, particularly Ceylon, Federation of 
Malaya, UK and its colonies, is much larger than in other countries.’17 This was, as we 
have seen in Chapter 1, an important factor in India’s negotiation of Commonwealth 
membership through terms of ‘reciprocity of citizenship’ as a means of pushing for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Abraham, How India Became Territorial, 74. 
13 See Abraham, How India Became Territorial, 70. While their interpretation of the class and caste dynamics 
of diaspora and Indian foreign policy is probing and insightful, Abraham and Varadarajan exemplify this 
somewhat linear narrative. 
14 Abraham, How India Became Territorial, 70 and 74. 
15 Varadarajan, The Domestic Abroad, 69. 
16 Varadarajan, The Domestic Abroad, 69. Italics added.  
17 Note from Fateh Singh, 16.11.59, File 21(26) – PVI/60 ‘Reacquisition of Indian citizenship by Indians in 
Malaya’, MEA (PVI Section), NAI  
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rights of overseas Indians within the realm of British colonies and Commonwealth 
nations. This realm was also integral to the making of postcolonial Indian diplomacy, 
wherein India articulated its claim to diplomatic status on the basis of ‘representing’ 
significant Indian populations in colonial territories – again in stark contrast to notions 
of ‘distance’ from the diaspora.18  
 
Second, the focus on moments of crisis in the 1970s and 1980s as proof of India’s 
exclusion of the diaspora after independence hides more than it reveals. While Abraham 
points to India’s response to the Ugandan Asian crisis as exemplifying the ‘practice of 
bracketing the diaspora from territorial India’ that defined foreign policy, right down to 
the 1990s, this ignores the long prelude to such moments of upheaval that involved 
considerable diplomatic negotiations over the question of citizenship. 19 Third, these 
works focusing on the exclusion of overseas Indians from Indian citizenship pay 
surprisingly minimal attention to the making of the first full-fledged framework for 
Indian citizenship: the Indian Citizenship Act of 1955. 20 Finally, the oft-used explanation 
that India called on overseas Indians to identify themselves with their countries of 
residence neither meant that citizenship of these countries was easily available to 
overseas Indians nor that the Indian government did not engage with this issue any 
further.  As I will show, the Indian Citizenship Act’s negotiation of the BNA’s expansive 
citizenship provisions offers valuable insights into the Indian state and its relationship 
vis-à-vis its overseas communities in British colonies and Commonwealth nations. 
 
The 1948 British Nationality Act provided for British subject or Commonwealth citizen 
status through the ‘gateway’ of local citizenship, making Indians ‘British subjects without 
citizenship’ until the 1955 Indian act was passed. This was far more complicated in the 
case of overseas Indians who could potentially fall into any of the following categories: 
Indian citizens, citizens of the newly-minted category of ‘United Kingdom and colonies’ 
(UKC) or temporary British subjects without citizenship. This last option was the 
definitive problem in the case of overseas Indians: if they, as ‘temporary British subjects 
without citizenship’, were not included in India’s citizenship framework, they would have 
to be either automatically included into the framework of UKC citizens – a possibility 
that British officials dreaded – or left stateless. While there is a vast literature on the 1948 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 I explore this in detail in Chapter 3 
19 Abraham, How India Became Territorial, 75. 
20 While the Indian constitution of 1950 had certain provisions regarding citizenship, these were widely 
regarded as a temporary measure until a citizenship act was framed. 
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BNA, there is comparatively less focus on its impact on Indian citizenship or the fact 
that the BNA guaranteed Indians the right to travel to, live and work in the United 
Kingdom – a remarkable contrast to the widespread discrimination and immigration 
restrictions encountered by Indians in virtually every other part of the world.21 
 
The BNA’s provision to open the floodgates for immigration from across the Empire – 
hard to believe in hindsight – has been the subject of much debate.  As Hansen points 
out, British subject status had existed long before the BNA and given the historically low 
rates of colonial migration to Britain itself, policymakers were not given to expect the 
influx that followed after 1948.22 Moreover, the legislation was less about the question of 
migration and more about British attempts to wrest back the initiative after Canada’s 
radical changes to the common code through its citizenship legislation.23 That is, this 
attempt to reaffirm British subject status as ‘a globally intertwined fellowship’24 while 
recognizing national frameworks of citizenship was a means ‘to redress the fading image 
of Britain’s imperial legacy through the institutionalization of a transracial, transregional 
citizenship category that bolstered the perception of imperial and Commonwealth 
uniformity.’25  
 
With the exception of Hugh Tinker’s work, the BNA’s far-ranging consequences for the 
contours of South Asian citizenship frameworks have only recently received some 
attention. 26 In her nuanced work on the ways in which Indian diplomats sought to – in 
effect – perform Partition vis-à-vis Indian communities in British colonial territories, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 A range of fascinating perspectives on the 1948 BNA include Andrew Mycock, ‘British Citizenship and 
the Legacy of Empires,’ Parliamentary Affairs, 63, no. 2 (2010): 339 – 355, Kathleen Paul, ‘“British Subjects” 
and “British Stock”: Labour’s Postwar Imperialism,’ Journal of British Studies, 34, no. 2 (1995): 233 – 276, 
Randall Hansen, ‘The politics of citizenship in 1940s Britain: the British nationality act,’ Twentieth Century 
British History, 10 (1999): 67–95, Sarah Ansari, ‘Subjects or Citizens? India, Pakistan and the 1948 British 
Nationality Act,’ Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 41, no. 2 (2013): 285–312, Rieko Karatani, 
Defining British Citizenship: Empire, Commonwealth and Modern Britain (London: Frank Cass, 2003), Kennetta 
Hammond Perry, London is the Place for Me: Black Britons, Citizenship and the Politics of Race (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016)  
22 Hansen, ‘The Politics of Citizenship in 1940s Britain’, 88-90. Hugh Tinker also makes a similar point- 
See Hugh Tinker, Separate and Unequal: India and Indians in the British Commonwealth, 1920-1950, (London: C. 
Hurst & Co, 1976), 356. 
23 See Jatinder Mann, ‘The evolution of Commonwealth citizenship, 1945 – 48 in Canada, Britain and 
Australia,’ Comparative Politics, 50, no. 3 (2012): 293 – 313. 
24 See Stuart James Ward, Untied Kingdom: A World History of the End of Britain (forthcoming, Cambridge 
University Press, 2020). 
25 Perry, London is the Place for Me, 58.  
26 While Tinker’s account offers valuable material regarding the status of Indians in British colonies 
between 1920-1950 and the significance of the BNA, it only briefly refers to the 1955 Indian Citizenship 
Act. 
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Deborah Sutton has shown the strict criteria utilised by officials such as Apa Pant, Indian 
Commissioner in East Africa to separate what he termed ‘the wheat … from the chaff’ 
and register the ‘right’ kind of overseas Indian as an Indian citizen.27 This was a process 
through which Indian officials found these overseas communities wanting in many ways, 
be it in terms of asserting their secular credentials, deemed mandatory for Indian 
citizenship, or their anticolonial spirit. 28  Joya Chatterji has argued that the Indian 
government’s increasing push for overseas Indians obtaining the citizenship of their 
countries of residence was due also to the fact that ‘this would allow India to sidestep the 
sticky question of who, among these 3 million-odd people abroad, was entitled to Indian 
citizenship; who among them was a ‘closet’ Pakistani and whom it was safe to allow back 
to India.’29 While Sutton and Chatterji briefly mention both the 1948 British Nationality 
Act and the 1955 Indian citizenship act, they do not focus on the ways in which drafting 
Indian citizenship legislation in lieu of the provisions of the BNA impacted the 
citizenship status of overseas Indians.   
 
It is Sarah Ansari’s work that clearly showcases the ‘bureaucratic tangle’ of reconciling 
the BNA with citizenship legislation formulated in India and Pakistan.30 While her focus 
is more on Pakistani citizenship legislation (which preceded the 1955 Indian citizenship 
act by four years) and the complexities encountered by the British missions in dealing 
with ‘potential Pakistani’ citizens abroad, she demonstrates the ways in which the British 
sought to avoid being what they called ‘a dustbin for the refuse discarded by’ India and 
Pakistan.31 Drawing on this work, I explore the making of the 1955 Indian Citizenship 
Act and its negotiation of the BNA, showing the ways in which widespread crises of 
citizenship and statelessness encountered by overseas Indian communities in regions 
such as Ceylon, Burma etc impacted the making of Indian citizenship.  
 
DELIBERATING CITIZENSHIP IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 
While a legal framework pertaining to citizenship in detail would take much longer to 
come into effect, draft provisions regarding citizenship were to be included in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Deborah Sutton, ‘Divided and Uncertain Loyalties,’ Interventions, 9, no. 2 (2007): 282. 
28 Sutton, ‘Divided and Uncertain Loyalties’. Also see Sutton, ‘Imagined sovereignty and the Indian subject: 
Partition and politics beyond the nation, 1948–1960,’ Contemporary South Asia, 19, no. 4 (2011): 409-425. 
29 Joya Chatterji, ‘From Imperial Subjects to National Citizens: South Asians and the International 
Migration Regime since 1947,’ in Routledge Handbook of the South Asian Diaspora, eds, Joya Chatterji and 
David Washbrook (New York: Routledge, 2013), 183-197. Also see Chatterji, ‘South Asian Histories of 
Citizenship’, 1049-1071. 
30 Ansari, ‘Subjects or Citizens?,’ 292. 
31 Ansari, ‘Subjects or Citizens?,’ 295. 
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Constitution and were discussed by the Indian Constituent Assembly in April 1947.32 
These debates touched on the fundamental question of granting citizenship by virtue of 
birth within the Union (jus solis), as opposed to the basis of descent (jus sanguinis). This 
was essentially framed as a clash between a racialised idea of citizenship (jus sanguinis) and 
a more ‘civilised’, ‘democratic’ one (jus solis). The preference for jus solis has been 
variously identified as an ‘inheritance’ from British law reflective of ‘the legacy of British 
subjecthood and imperial citizenship’ 33  and as a successor of protoconstitutional 
documents such as the Motilal Nehru Committee Report of 1928 that had similarly 
provided for citizenship based on the place of birth.34 Yet it was not without controversy: 
the fact that citizenship would be granted to all those born in India, regardless of the 
nationality of their parents, raised considerable concerns in the pre-Partition Constituent 
Assembly. 35  Members worried that ‘European born sons and daughters will seek 
occupation in state and private services and later they can turn as aliens,’36 while those 
born in territories like Sindh that could potentially be a part of Pakistan would not be 
deemed Indian citizens.37 For proponents of the jus soli conception of citizenship such as 
Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyyar and Sardar Patel however, such a framework was more 
suited to the international context within which Indian citizenship was being formulated. 
That is, such expansive notions were considerably shaped by the position of overseas 
Indians who were waging many an uphill battle vis-a-vis citizenship. Indeed, Aiyyar 
pointed this out in as many words: 
I cannot altogether forget the fact that citizenship will carry with it protection in 
the international field. In dealing with citizenship we have to remember we are 
fighting against discrimination and all that against South Africa and other States. 
It is for you to consider whether our conception of citizenship should be 
universal, or should be racial or should be sectarian. 38 
These stark binaries were repeated by Patel too, who cautioned that ‘the provision about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 For these debates, see Constituent Assembly of India (CAI hereafter), Vol. 3, 28 April-2 May, 1947 
http://cadindia.clpr.org.in/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/3  
33 See Chatterji, ‘South Asian Histories of Citizenship,’ 1053. 
34 Jayal, Citizenship and its Discontents, 57. 
35 This excluded the children of foreign diplomats who were not under ‘Indian jurisdiction’, 
36 Statement by B. Das, 29 April 1947, CAI, Vol. 3.  
http://cadindia.clpr.org.in/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/3/1947-04-29  
37 Statement by R. K. Sidhwa, 2 May 1947, CAI, Vol. 3. 
http://cadindia.clpr.org.in/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/3/1947-05-02  
38 Statement by Alladi Krishnaswamy Aiyar, 29 April 1947, CAI, Vol 3  
http://cadindia.clpr.org.in/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/3/1947-04-29  
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citizenship will be scrutinised all over the world.’39 The status of Indians in South Africa 
– an issue that India had taken to the UN General Assembly less than a year ago – was 
seen as exemplifying the stakes in this debate. As Patel argued, given that ‘we claim for 
Indians born there South African nationality … it is not right for us to take a narrow 
view.’40 The status of overseas Indians was central even to those sceptical of jus solis 
frameworks: as K. N. Katju noted, the citizenship of children born outside India to 
Indian parents had to be accounted for. Mediating the citizenship of these children 
beyond the borders of India ought to be, in Katju’s view, a significant responsibility of 
Indian diplomats: ‘We are now sending a number of Ambassadors abroad in order to 
establish contacts with all foreign countries. It would be lamentable if Indian people … 
go there and (find that) a child born to them (is) … not … treated as an Indian subject.’41  
A lack of consensus over the citizenship provisions led to the postponement of the 
debate: by the time the Constituent Assembly reconvened, Partition had been formally 
announced. This was a definitive event in the making of Indian citizenship: in the words 
of Jayal, ‘the Partition legacy continues to inflect this body of law and jurisprudence … 
the imprint of this event has become more, rather than less, deeply entrenched with the 
passage of time.’42 Indeed discussions regarding the provisions for citizenship at the 
commencement of the Constitution were now far more volatile, centring around the 
figures of the ‘refugee’ and the ‘migrant’.43 While these categories were encoded with 
problematic religious connotations, they were nevertheless crucial to the ‘affirmation of 
the sovereign identity of the nation.’44 Even as the context of Partition clearly informed 
the new amendments to the draft citizenship provisions presented in August 1949, one 
change in particular was aimed at addressing the complex status of overseas Indians. 
Extending Indian citizenship to those ‘persons who or whose parents or whose 
grandparents were born in India as defined in the Government of India Act, 1935, who 
are ordinarily residing in any territory outside India’, this provision did not enable 
automatic access to citizenship but required that overseas Indians register themselves as 
Indian citizens through the diplomatic and consular representatives of India – a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Statement by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, 29 April 1947, CAI, Vol 3 
http://cadindia.clpr.org.in/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/3/1947-04-29  
40 Statement by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, 29 April 1947, CAI, Vol 3 
http://cadindia.clpr.org.in/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/3/1947-04-29.  
41 Statement by Kailash Nath Katju, 29 April 1947, CAI, Vol. 3.  
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42 Jayal, ‘Citizenship,’ 163.  
43 Jayal, Citizenship and its Discontents, 58 
44 Roy, ‘Between encompassment and closure,’ 225. See also Jayal, Citizenship and its Discontents, 58 
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provision more or less in line with Katju’s suggestion. 45 As Nehru asserted in the 
Constituent Assembly, this was an attempt to address the prickly issue of the exact status 
and nationality of overseas Indians: 
We have millions of people in foreign parts and other countries. Some of those 
may be taken to be foreign nationals, although they are Indians in origin. Others 
still consider themselves to some extent as Indians and yet they have also got 
some kind of local nationality too, like for instance, in Malaya, Singapore, Fiji and 
Mauritius. If you deprive them of their local nationality, they become aliens there. 
So all these difficulties arise and you will see that in this resolution we have tried 
to provide for them for the time being, leaving the choice to them and also 
leaving it to our Consul Generals there to register their names.46 
Yezdezard Dinshaw Gundevia, the Indian diplomat posted in Burma at the time, writes 
in his memoirs that the inclusion of this new clause was in a significant part due to his 
intervention to address the potential statelessness of Indians in Burma.47 Gundevia 
describes the several contradictions that plagued his attempts to address this question. In 
his reading, provisions for citizenship based solely on domicile ‘could result in a gigantic 
tragedy’ for overseas Indians who were denied ‘local’ citizenship. And yet, others like B. 
N. Rau argued that the citizenship claims of Indians in South Africa rested on their 
domicile and therefore overseas Indians in other regions – those domiciled in Burma, for 
instance – could not seek to derive (Indian) citizenship on the exact opposite basis. 
According to Gundevia, the compromise enabling overseas Indians to register as citizens 
through diplomatic missions was achieved by the efforts of Nehru and Pandit Hriday 
Nath Kunzru, another politician deeply interested in the status of overseas Indians.48 
While one can quibble with Gundevia’s version of his role in initiating the ‘inconvenient 
correspondence’ between Rau and Nehru that enabled this provision to be adopted in 
the Constitution, it is nevertheless clear that negotiating the citizenship status of overseas 
Indians was of considerable concern to Indian diplomacy and essential to the making of 
Indian citizenship.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 See B. R. Ambedkar, Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol 13 (New Delhi: Dr. Ambedkar 
Foundation, 2014), 808 
46 Speech in the Constituent Assembly, 12 August 1949, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (SWJN hereafter), 
Second Series, Vol 12 (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1991), 165 
47 Y. D. Gundevia, Outside the Archives, (Hyderabad: Sangam Books, 2012), Chapter 4, Kindle. Gundevia 
will be a familiar fixture in this thesis: we encounter him in chapter 5 too, managing the status of Indian 
immigrants as India’s Deputy High Commissioner in the UK. 
48 Gundevia, Outside the Archives, Chapter 4. 
	   75	  
Meanwhile, India’s provisions of citizenship by birth were greeted with panic by a 
number of white Britons born in India who feared that this would make them Indian 
citizens at the cost of their British citizenship. The Commonwealth Relations Office 
(CRO) and the Indian High Commission in London received dozens of letters ranging 
from the anxious to the angry, with enquiries from these white Britons about their 
citizenship status or that of their children born in India. Often affirming that they were 
of ‘pure British blood’ untouched by their birth and/or stay in India, or describing their 
military service for Empire, these letter writers enquired about the procedures that would 
have to be followed to ‘regain’ British nationality.  
One angry letter would note: ‘I fought in the First World War. I gather in spite of this 
that I am now an enemy alien or something approaching it because I was born in India. I 
should like this blot on my escutcheon removed as soon as possible.’49 There were also 
frequent enquiries as to the steps to be taken ‘to ensure that for all purposes, especially in 
connection with passports, my wife and children would be treated as English and not as 
Hindus.’50 
DECOLONIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP-MAKING  
It is imperative to read Indian debates on citizenship within the wider crises of 
citizenship-making in Asia that marked decolonization. Scholars have only recently 
begun to highlight the ways in which constitution-making in Asia was significantly 
shaped by British constitutional legacies, creating what Kumarasingham calls 
‘Eastminsters’: systems with ‘clear institutional and political resemblances to Britain’s 
system, but with cultural and constitutional deviations from Westminster.’ 51  More 
importantly, the flurry of constitution-making across south and south east Asian 
countries often drew on the experiences of each other – to the extent that Indian legal 
experts were involved in the making of Burma and Malaya’s constitutions. B. Malik, a 
former Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court, had been part of the commission of 
Commonwealth legal experts involved in framing Malaya’s constitution from 1956-57, 
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while B. N. Rau had been a constitutional advisor to the Burmese government in 1947.52  
While these perspectives placing Asian histories of constitution-making in conversation 
with one another are highly useful, they do not ask what this meant in terms of drafting 
parallel citizenship legislations in highly diverse societies with long, controversial histories 
of migration. Indeed, B. N. Rau’s example typifies these intersections: at much the same 
time as he was involved in the making of the Indian constitution and articulating ideas of 
reciprocal citizenship, he was also advising the Burmese government regarding their 
constitution which included largely jus sanguinis-based citizenship provisions that were, he 
admitted, ‘somewhat complicated’ in the case of Indians settled in Burma.53 Accusing 
Rau of legislating from the secure confines of his ivory tower, Gundevia argued that the 
clause for Indians to gain Burmese citizenship by registration if they had resided in 
Burma ‘for a period of at least eight years in the ten years immediately preceding the 
commencement of the constitution’ was gravely insufficient.54 Indeed, the process of 
applying for citizenship under these provisions, armed with the ‘right’ paper trail as 
proof, was complicated: ‘many Indian residents failed to realize the importance that 
pieces of paper would hold.’55  
Burma’s Union Citizenship Act and Land Nationalisation Act of 1948 – legislations 
directly aimed at Indians and delineating them as neither ‘indigenous’ nor a ‘national 
minority’ – were a long time coming, given the steady rise in anti-Indian sentiments and 
move towards legal ‘Burmanisation’ after separation from India in 1937.56 This spurred 
significant waves of Indian exodus from Burma, also prompting reluctant initiatives by 
the Government of India towards repatriation.57 1948 also marked the year when a 
newly-independent Ceylon passed the Ceylon Citizenship Act no. 18 in great haste, even 	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as negotiations with the Indian government regarding the status of Indians in Ceylon 
were ongoing.58 This framework provided for citizenship only on the basis of descent: 
that is, on the condition that three generations of the paternal line had been Ceylonese. 
This stark rule was no doubt aimed at disqualifying most if not all Indian Tamils from 
citizenship.59 Following several discussions with Nehru and other Indian officials, a new 
citizenship framework called the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act was 
introduced in 1949, ostensibly to provide citizenship by registration for Indians.  
This was nevertheless little better than the previous legislation: its incredibly strict 
provisions asking Indians to prove a ‘minimum period of uninterrupted residence’ (seven 
years for married persons and ten years for unmarried persons immediately prior to 1 
January 1946), an ‘assured income’ and loyalty to Ceylon.60 Nehru had contested many of 
the provisions of this legislation, writing to the Prime Minister of Ceylon D. S. 
Senanayake that the latter’s view of Indian emigrants to Ceylon as a ‘temporary’ presence 
was ‘contrary to the facts of history’. He reiterated that India had long allowed its 
nationals to emigrate only on the condition that ‘an emigrant labourer should be given 
facilities to settle in the country to which he emigrates, on equal terms with members of 
the indigenous population.’61 Even as Nehru appealed to Senanayake’s ‘sense of justice 
… and desire for friendship with India’ to ask for an ‘assurance that in future there will 
be no administrative or legislative discrimination against Indians who become citizens by 
registration’, his protestations were not fruitful.62 
 These issues of statelessness, citizenship and repatriation of overseas Indians in Ceylon, 
Burma and beyond would continue to resonate in Indian diplomacy for decades. More 
immediately, they provided the overarching framework within which Indian citizenship 
was to be drafted. This was so even as much of the initial attention was focused on the 
mass movement of populations and geopolitical ramifications caused by Partition – 	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indeed, Gundevia recalls his hesitation to bring up the subject of Indians in Burma given 
the impression that ‘nobody in Delhi has time for … (this) … problem. You will not get 
them to talk about anything but Kashmir, Pakistan and the UN for a long time.’63 This 
wasn’t to be the case. Indeed, the year 1948 alone marked the framing of three 
nationality and citizenship laws that would have significant repercussions on overseas 
Indians: while Ceylon and Burma both legislated citizenship acts designed to exclude 
Indian communities, the 1948 BNA was perhaps the only legislation providing Indians 
with some semblance of an equal status by recognizing them as British subjects or 
Commonwealth citizens.64 The making of Indian citizenship thus necessarily meant that 
Indian officials had to engage with these provisions of the BNA that impacted both 
overseas Indians and those domiciled in India. Indeed, the BNA would affect the case of 
Indians in Burma and Ceylon too, shaping their status as entangled citizens caught 
between various possibilities of citizenship while staring down the barrel of statelessness. 
The Ceylon citizenship act was also responding to the BNA by providing ‘local 
citizenship’ for its citizens who would thereby also be eligible for ‘Commonwealth 
citizenship’. Indians who did not qualify for local citizenship would thus be rendered 
stateless if provisions were not made for their inclusion as Indian citizens or, as British 
officials feared, citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies. On the other hand, the 
citizenship status of Indians in Burma was further complicated by Burma’s exit from the 
Commonwealth in 1947 – making these Indians ‘foreigners’ who were ineligible for 
Commonwealth citizenship status. 65  Thus, as we shall see, the making of Indian 
citizenship legislation by default meant negotiating the simultaneous unravelling and 
entanglement of identities and nationalities during decolonization.  
DRAFTING THE 1955 INDIAN CITIZENSHIP ACT 
While there is a significant literature on Indian citizenship frameworks, particularly in 
terms of the making of the Constitution after Partition, the 1955 Indian Citizenship Act 
itself is not the subject of much study. Indeed, while scholars have dealt with the 
provisions of the act, this is almost always in comparison to the later amendments made 
in the context of ‘illegal immigrants’ in the 1980s.66 This literature sees the amendments 	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to the 1955 act as indicative of the transition from jus solis to jus sanguinis in India’s 
citizenship regime, although as Jayal has argued, ‘the tension between these two 
conceptions was present from the founding moment of the republic.’67 While Anupama 
Roy recognizes the period between 1950, when the constitutional provisions regarding 
citizenship came into effect, and 1955, when the citizenship act was adopted, as a ‘liminal 
space’ creating ‘awkward’, ‘transitional’ and ‘aspiring’ citizens, she views this solely from 
the lens of Partition and movement across the India-Pakistan borders.68 Moreover, she 
does not ask why it was that such a liminal space was created – why did the Indian 
Citizenship Act (ICA) take so long to come into effect? As I will show, this delay was 
very much due to the struggle to reconcile the ICA with the provisions of the BNA.  
On 18 August 1949, K. V. K. Sundaram, Secretary of the Ministry of Law, circulated a 
draft Indian citizenship bill to the Ministries of External Affairs, Home, and Law, urging 
that ‘no time should be lost in finalizing’ such an important piece of legislation.69 
Sundaram’s draft was faithful in its reiteration of ‘reciprocity of citizenship’ that 
underpinned India’s membership of the Commonwealth. Closely following the 
‘important provisions of the British Nationality Act 1948’, his draft declared that every 
person who ‘under this act is a citizen of India or who under the citizenship law in force 
in any Commonwealth country is a citizen of that country’ would be recognised in India 
as having the status of a Commonwealth citizen. Provision was also made for the 
Government of India to recognize the citizenship law of any Commonwealth country, 
through a declaration in the Gazette of India, as suitable for terms of ‘reciprocity’ – a 
clause mainly aimed at South Africa and Pakistan. 70  
These provisions of the draft bill received a guarded response from the Ministries of 
External Affairs and Home Affairs who were sceptical about the extent to which ideas of 
Commonwealth citizenship could be accommodated in Indian citizenship legislation. 
Indeed while P. N. Haksar of the MEA pointed out that there was ‘no formal bond 
binding us’ nor was there a ‘statute defining Commonwealth citizenship’71, Sir G. S. 
Bajpai, Secretary General of the MEA who had travelled with Nehru to the 1949 
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Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference, argued somewhat incredibly that the 
subject of Commonwealth citizenship had never been discussed in any of the meetings.72 
The flurry of notes, memos and letters in the file on Indian citizenship were all united in 
their confusion about what exactly the conveniently hazy term ‘Commonwealth 
citizenship’ meant and what, if anything, it might have to do with ‘reciprocity’. Was 
Commonwealth citizenship nothing more than a synonym for the common British 
subject status shared by countries of the Commonwealth, as per the BNA? Or could it be 
a means through which each Commonwealth nation offered the other citizenship 
through terms of reciprocity? As we will see, Indian officials defined the terms of 
Commonwealth citizenship in various ways: placing citizens of Commonwealth countries 
on par with ‘nationals’, granting them Indian citizenship itself, or, at the very least, not 
regarding them as foreigners. While Sundaram’s draft was more on the lines of the first 
option, further deliberations with MEA and MHA officials led to a rather different 
conception.  
These officials railed against the hollow promises of ‘reciprocity’ within the 
Commonwealth, arguing that ‘excepting in the UK, in no other dominion or colony of 
the Commonwealth are Indians treated with complete equality or treated on par with 
nationals.’73 As Bajpai argued, this had not only created public ‘resentment in India 
against the concept of a Commonwealth citizenship ... such citizenship would, to Indian 
citizens, be of no value.’74 By 1951, the draft citizenship bill was more thorough in 
defining ‘Commonwealth citizens’ as neither aliens nor on par with Indian citizens: 
indeed as an internal note pointed out, India could ‘hardly be expected to accord national 
treatment in respect of entry into this country to persons belonging to territories from 
which Indians have been excluded in view of migration regulations.’75 Most importantly, 
in contrast to Sundaram’s draft, the new version did not recognize the status of Indians 
themselves as ‘Commonwealth citizens’, arguing that ‘even the nominal recognition’ of 
Indians as possessing a ‘common’ British subject or Commonwealth citizen status might 
‘make it difficult for Government to restrict the entry of British business … without 
raising a cry of unfair discrimination.’76 
Even as Indian bureaucrats prevaricated over these provisions of Commonwealth 	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citizenship, the delay in passing legislation – further compounded by the fact that 
Parliament was not in session – had a tremendous impact on the status of Indians across 
the world. 77 Thus Nehru pondered over ways to address the numerous citizenship 
applications received, in the absence of a citizenship law.78 For his part, Commonwealth 
Secretary Subimal Dutt also wondered if some interim provision could be made to 
enable the few Indians registered as Ceylon citizens under the new Indian and Pakistani 
Residents Act to renounce their Indian citizenship and thereby avoid the accusation of 
dual nationality, prohibited in Ceylon’s law.79 Arguing that this was in essence ‘the 
impinging of Indian citizenship law on Indians abroad’, one official called for the draft 
bill to be circulated for comments from diplomatic representatives in countries with large 
Indian populations.80 The draft bill was therefore circulated to the Indian missions in 
British colonies and Dominions, notably East Africa, Malaya, Fiji, Ceylon, South Africa, 
Burma, West Indies, and Mauritius.  
The representative in South Africa noted that they had ‘discouraged’ Indians from 
registering as Indian citizens, given that there was no time limit to register as Indian 
citizens and it would be to their advantage to do so later on when they settled in India or 
gave up domicile in South Africa.81 R. T. Chari, the High Commissioner in Ceylon noted 
his concern that if Indians in Ceylon registered for Indian citizenship, this might result in 
the host country denying its citizenship to them, leading to ‘a large number of them 
seeking registration as Indian citizens for the sole object of obtaining passport facilities 
and without any intention of reverting to Indian domicile.’82 There was also some 
concern expressed by Apa Pant, the High Commissioner in East Africa, that those 
Indians ‘disloyal to India’ might register themselves as citizens of the UKC by claiming 
to be stateless. 83   
By 1951, a draft incorporating some of these insights was circulated to British officials 
who had long been enquiring about the status of the Indian Citizenship Act. The 
Commonwealth Relations Office’s response was on expected lines: writing to Menon, 
the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Patrick Gordon-Walker noted that 
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India’s bill neither recognized Indians as Commonwealth citizens nor recognized citizens 
of Commonwealth countries as Commonwealth citizens for ‘all purposes in Indian law’.84 
Gordon-Walker argued that it was due to India’s suggestion that the term 
‘Commonwealth citizen’ had been adopted in the BNA and it was therefore curious that 
India had not recognized her own citizens as such. A chastened Menon wrote to Nehru 
in agreement – there was ‘nothing to object’ to in Gordon-Walker’s note, he argued, 
calling on Nehru to ‘agree to the arrangement which does not give the impression that 
we are running away.’85 Chiding his bureaucrats rather belatedly for claiming that there 
had been no dialogue regarding Commonwealth citizenship, Nehru pointed out that this 
had indeed been discussed in the Commonwealth meetings of 1948 and 1949: 
I am concerned … because of certain rather vague understandings arrived at 
between me and the UK govt. They were not binding in any way but they cannot 
be brushed aside. The understanding was that there should be some kind of 
Commonwealth citizenship (to which India should be a party) … that this should 
be on a reciprocal basis with each Commonwealth country. Thus South Africa 
would get no privileges in India and Commonwealth countries could only get the 
privileges which they give to Indians. Commonwealth citizenship (sic) to be 
something between nationality and the status of an alien.86  
This intervention led to a revised draft with a clause providing that the ‘Central 
Government may, by order notified in the Official Gazette, make provisions on basis of 
reciprocity for the conferment of all or any of the rights of a citizen of India on the citizens of a 
Commonwealth country’– a clause modeled after the BNA and moving somewhat closer 
to Sundaram’s initial draft. 87  Indian citizens were however still not recognized as 
Commonwealth citizens: Subimal Dutt argued that in suggesting the change from ‘British 
subject’ to ‘Commonwealth citizen’, India had merely called for a change in terminology 
more suited to a postcolonial context, rather than make a ‘permanent commitment’ for 
formal Commonwealth citizenship status.88 The dissonance between the bureaucratic 
apparatus in Delhi and the Indian High Commission in London was palpable in Menon’s 
consistent arguments for broadening the scope of Commonwealth citizenship, ‘not 
merely to confer any or all the rights of a citizen of India but also (Indian) citizenship 	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itself.’89 This was unacceptable back in Delhi, with officials asserting that the revised draft 
would nevertheless ‘enable a Commonwealth citizen without being a “citizen of India” to 
enjoy all or any of the rights of a citizen of India on a reciprocal basis.’90 The Indian 
citizenship act thus reiterated the status of the Commonwealth citizen as an intermediate 
category: neither foreign nor Indian, although they could on a reciprocal basis obtain the 
rights of a citizen of India. Unlike Pakistan, India would not acknowledge its citizens as 
‘Commonwealth citizens’ in its citizenship act, even though other countries recognized 
them as such. Indeed, ‘implicit’ recognition of this condition was regarded as sufficient; 
after all, ‘for us, Indian citizenship is the highest imaginable status’.91  
BRITAIN, INDIA AND THE HAZE OF ENTANGLEMENT 
In June 1954, S. N. Chaudhuri was traveling back to India on the S.S United States: as 
the ship neared Southampton, the port of disembarkation, passengers on board were 
asked to line up in two queues. Seeing that the queues were for ‘British subjects’ and 
‘other nationalities’, Chaudhuri dutifully joined the latter. When asked by an officer of 
the ship to move to the queue for British subjects, he refused, noting that he was an 
Indian citizen. In the altercation that followed, the officer too stood his ground, asserting 
that Chaudhuri was indeed a British subject and would be better off doing as he was 
told.92 This minor incident was nonetheless the subject of diplomatic correspondence 
between Indian, British and American officials: a testament to both the pervasive haze 
over Chaudhuri’s entangled legal status and the difficulties of negotiating changing 
terminologies of citizenship and subject status within the Commonwealth. Even as CRO 
officials noted that the officer was only trying to help Chaudhuri avail himself of the 
advantages of a British subject, entitling him, ‘to land without visas or other restrictive 
documents’, to stay as long as he wished, and to take up employment without 
restrictions’, they conceded that the term ‘Commonwealth citizen’ should be used widely 
in order to avoid such misunderstandings. 93  
This was not the first time that there had been protests about the continual usage of the 
term ‘British subject’ at immigration ports in particular. Nor were Indians the only ones 
bringing up such cases: officials recounted many an instance of such issues raised by 	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citizens of Ceylon, Ireland and South Africa. Yet CRO officials seeking to popularize the 
term ‘Commonwealth citizens’ were waging a losing battle. When the issue of replacing 
the term ‘British subject’ in notices displayed at ports was taken to Southampton, the 
same port where Chaudhury had protested, ‘the reactions of the official were so 
explosive (his actual remarks are unmentionable) that the matter was dropped.’94 More 
mentionably, Home Office officials nevertheless refused to change the notices at 
immigration points, stating that there was ‘no reason why an Indian citizen, if he insists, 
should not join the ‘non-British’ queue and assert his independence at the cost of being 
delayed’.95 Given the extent to which ‘our own house is so patently not in order’, Harold 
Davies of the CRO pointed out that they could hardly ask Indian officials to ‘change 
some of their immigration procedures (where) travellers are classified into only two 
categories as “Indians” and “foreigners”.’96  
The unease that came with abandoning old imperial standards no doubt manifested itself 
in an increasing reluctance to adopt often confusing new terminologies: as E. L. Sykes of 
the British High Commission in Delhi signed off in a letter about Chaudhuri’s case: ‘how 
much simpler life must have been when the “British Empire” constituted of Colonies 
whose occupants were ‘British subjects!’97 Sykes also complained that the ‘powers that 
be’ in Britain seemed befuddled by the new terms pertaining to citizenship, suggesting 
that making the term ‘Commonwealth citizen’ more widespread might ‘make their 
pronouncements more accurate and easy to understand’.98 British officials were however 
not the only ones caught in this haze of complex new citizenship frameworks. Indeed, 
the Indian diplomat Apa Pant’s response to Chaudhuri’s case is telling: when British and 
American officials assured him that Indians would henceforth be called ‘Commonwealth 
citizens’, Pant retorted somewhat incredibly that this terminology was not correct either 
– ‘the appropriate term that should be used in such cases is “Nationals of 
Commonwealth countries.”’99 For Indian officials seeking to disentangle identities shaped 
by Empire, confusion over the terminologies and legal status of Indians, even the very 
question of defining an ‘Indian’, and the ‘vague’ nature of the Commonwealth 
relationship, was all-pervasive. This uncertainty was reflected in the various, often-
contradictory statements regarding India’s relationship with its overseas community and 	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would also be especially evident in diplomatic negotiations with Britain to declare and 
reciprocally ‘recognize’ each other’s citizenship legislations. This was essential to 
delineate the responsibility of Britain and India over ‘Indians’ who could be Indian 
citizens or Citizens of the UKC. 
Even the most vociferous critics of the discrimination encountered by Indians across 
British colonies and Dominions were in agreement that the situation in Britain itself was 
entirely different. As Sir G. S. Bajpai noted, there was ‘complete equality’ in the legal 
status and treatment of Indians in Britain, on par with citizens of the United Kingdom 
and Colonies as per the BNA.100 Indeed in November 1949, the British government had 
passed the India Consequential Provision Act, a law popularly termed the ‘holding act’ 
since it ensured the continuation of all laws in force vis-à-vis India until the Indian 
government enacted new legislation to replace them. As the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, Philip Noel-Baker pointed out in Parliament, this also meant 
that Indians in Britain would ‘continue to have in this country the same rights and 
privileges as they have today.’101 Yet, terms of reciprocity with Britain were very much a 
double-edged sword: while Indian officials worried that reciprocity would open the 
floodgates for British capital into India,102 they were nonetheless also concerned that 
refusing reciprocal treatment may adversely affect the status of Indians in the UK.103 
Moreover, how could there be ‘reciprocity of citizenship’ when there was no ‘British 
citizenship’ as such but a more cumbersome ‘Citizenship of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies’, conjoining the metropole and the colonies (where Indians were often 
discriminated against)? 104 Most importantly however, the BNA – in combination with 
the holding act – provided the overarching framework within which the identity of 
Indians was being negotiated: both in the case of overseas Indians settled in colonial 
territories who were temporary ‘British subjects without citizenship’ and domiciled 
Indians who had the free right of entry and equal status in Britain as British subjects.  
Reconciling the citizenship frameworks of the BNA and ICA was thus essential to 
delineating the status of Indians, especially those in British colonial territories, and the 
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‘moral responsibility’ of India or Britain over them. This was not going to be an easy 
process, given that British officials were still providing passports and other consular 
facilities for Indians in regions where India did not as yet have diplomatic representation. 
Indeed, as one internal British memo caustically noted, this was an extraordinary 
circumstance where Indian officials themselves reiterated the status of Indians as ‘British 
subjects’ in UK law, asking them to ‘ensure that British consular officers protect them as 
such.’105 British officials were, however, increasingly reluctant to perform such work, 
given the delay in finalizing Indian citizenship legislation that would demarcate their 
responsibility over these functions. Indian diplomats interpreted this as ‘their indirect 
pressure on us to pass our law… (otherwise)… the Indian community in British colonies 
will be put to considerable inconvenience.’106  
Such pressure was not so much due to India’s limited provision for Commonwealth 
citizenship as it was a result of what the British regarded as the inadequacy of the draft 
citizenship legislation in accounting for overseas Indians.107 British concerns stemmed 
from the fact that the draft legislation did not permit the automatic acquisition of Indian 
citizenship by ‘persons of Indian origin or birth resident outside India’, and asked instead 
that overseas Indians register for citizenship at Indian consulates and diplomatic 
missions in their countries of residence. Moreover, the draft did not confer citizenship 
on those born before 26 Jan 1950, leaving these persons under the purview of existing 
provisions for citizenship in the Indian constitution –  provisions that British officials 
had long regarded as insufficient for the purposes of ‘declaring’ the Indian legislation 
under the BNA.108 That is, officials feared that ‘declaring’ or recognizing the Indian act 
‘to be an enactment making provision for citizenship’ by order of the Secretary of State 
under Article 32(8) of the BNA, would mean that all ‘potential Indians’ resident in 
British colonial territories and Commonwealth regions who were not included in India’s 
citizenship legislation, would automatically have to be ‘mopped up’ as UKC citizens.109 A 
similar clause had been included in India’s draft citizenship law in order to provide 
‘reciprocal’ recognition of citizenship frameworks.  
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British officials viewed the Indian legislation’s provision of citizenship by registration as a 
calculated move through which Indian officials could only choose those ‘regarded as 
likely to make good citizens’, and to ‘take those people they want and reject those they 
don’t.’110 Yet, this provision of registration served other important purposes for overseas 
Indians too: as H. E. Davies presciently noted, this was also ‘intended to warn the 
Ceylon government that there would not be an automatic incorporation of masses of 
overseas Indians as citizens of India.’111 This was therefore a careful clause drafted at a 
time when repatriation had been increasingly propagated by governments in Burma, 
Ceylon, Malaya and South Africa as a means of permanently excluding long-resident 
Indian populations.112 Thus while it is indeed the case that the clause of registration 
allowed Indian officials to carefully discriminate in choosing the ‘right kind’ of Indian 
citizen – ensuring that the individual showed no sign of pro-Pakistan sentiment was 
crucial, for instance – this was only one aspect of the state’s nuanced engagement with 
overseas Indians. 113 Urging these Indians to take up the citizenship of the countries of 
residence if available to them, Indian officials nevertheless assured them that doing so 
would not harm their right to acquire Indian citizenship in the future, if they so 
desired.114 In fact, worried officials at the MEA issued circulars to Indian missions in 
Commonwealth countries and British colonial territories asking them to stop preparing 
registers of those that had registered as Indian citizens. As Dutt pointed out, 
 
It is appreciated that ordinarily it would be an advantage to have a full register of 
Indian citizens in each country abroad so that the Indian representative would 
know which persons would be entitled to his protection. It has, however, been 
presented ... that in some of the territories the act of registration as an Indian 
citizen by a person of Indian origin might be taken by the authorities of the 
country where he is resident as an indication by such person of not having 
identified himself completely with the life of that country.115 
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Concerned that this would be taken as a sign of the unfaithfulness of the Indian 
community as a whole and invite reprisals, Dutt also warned against issuing any public 
notifications regarding the registration of Indian citizens. The Indian state’s relationship 
with its overseas communities thus involved walking a very fine line and taking even 
seemingly contradictory positions. Indeed, this was evident in India’s response to the 
Malayan government over its decision to ‘banish’ certain ‘undesirable Indians’. Claiming 
that these persons were not Indian citizens, the Indian government refused to 
acknowledge their alleged right to ‘return’ to India. And yet, as Jean Walker, a British 
High Commission official in New Delhi noted angrily, ‘While refusing to acknowledge 
these ‘banishees’ as Indian citizens, the Indian authorities are nevertheless demanding 
certain things – transfer to more suitable gaols – on their behalf!’116 Walker reiterated that 
this was fairly typical of the Indian government’s engagement with overseas Indians: ‘this 
… serves as an example of the trouble we and the authorities in any colony where there 
is a large number of Indians, have when it comes to attempting to determine Indian 
citizenship.’117 Such seemingly paradoxical actions can be better explained if we view the 
Indian state’s actions as attempts to ensure that Indians across the world had citizenship rights. 
The goal was not necessarily to grant them Indian citizenship – although that option 
could be available in the future, at least on paper, if they were denied citizenship 
elsewhere. The Indian state’s frequent exhortations calling on overseas Indians to 
identify with their countries of residence must therefore be understood in this context, in 
a scenario deeply impacted by the crises of citizenship and statelessness encountered by 
Indians who were often forcibly repatriated from countries such as Ceylon, Malaya, 
Burma etc where they had long resided.  Indeed, as Nehru haltingly phrased it in 1953: 
 
We are concerned with the fate of hundreds and thousands of these people who, 
though no longer citizens and nationals of India, were in the past connected with 
India, about whom we have various agreements and assurances and the like, and 
therefore we have a certain responsibility with regard to them, although they are 
not our nationals.118 
 
The question of India’s and Britain’s responsibility over Indian communities in British 
colonial territories and the Commonwealth was the subject of considerable discussion 
between British and Indian officials deliberating over the Indian citizenship legislation. In 	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a meeting with Davies in August 1955, Fateh Singh of the MHA admitted that while 
there were many who might be left without citizenship by the Constitution, the ‘Indian 
government’s policy was to enable as many as possible of those who were India’s 
responsibility to be registered.’119 In Singh’s view, those excluded from Indian citizenship 
for a variety of reasons would nevertheless have the option of being eligible for UKC 
and other citizenships. Of the three main categories of overseas Indians without 
citizenship – those living in British colonies, those living in foreign countries, and those 
living in Commonwealth countries such as Pakistan, South Africa and Ceylon – Singh 
argued that the first category was ‘obviously’ the responsibility of the British. Davies 
concurred, even as he was somewhat more sceptical of Singh’s suggestion that while 
most overseas Indians living in foreign countries would register as Indian citizens, Britain 
‘ought not to mind accepting the few who are left over.’120  
 
Yet it was the prospect of becoming responsible for those in the third category that most 
worried the British. The stark position of Indians in Commonwealth countries like 
Ceylon was becoming illustrative of British fears that they might be considered 
responsible for the ‘left over’ Indians not covered by the citizenship provisions of India. 
This was especially so since the British had somewhat inexplicably declared the 1948 
Ceylon Citizenship Act as a citizenship law for the purposes of the BNA – in contrast to 
their grave reluctance regarding declaring both India’s and Pakistan’s legislations.121 
Despite the 1954 Nehru-Kotelawala pact’s attempt to reduce the magnitude of this 
situation, there were nearly 975,000 persons deemed ‘stateless’ by India and viewed as 
‘Indian citizens’ by Ceylon by the time all these citizenship applications had been 
processed in 1962.122  
 
This was so even as India sought to provide some options for those not included in 
Ceylon’s citizenship framework to register as Indian citizens, while still resisting 
compulsory repatriation123 British officials watched this situation warily, worrying that as 
British subjects without citizenship, these ‘stateless’ persons might qualify to become 	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UKC citizens if the Indian act was declared.124 Even as they resisted declaring the Indian 
act due to these concerns, British officials nevertheless reiterated that this should not 
impact India’s recognition of the BNA for the purposes of reciprocity. That is, while 
India would have to declare the BNA in order to provide for equal rights to UKC 
citizens, Indian citizens in Britain – owing to their status as British subjects under the 
BNA – would receive equal rights regardless of the Indian act being declared as a 
citizenship legislation for the purposes of the BNA. As D. W. H. Wickson of the CRO 
angrily noted, Singh did not seem to realize that ‘registration (as Indian citizens) does not 
appeal to many persons of Indian race for whom India should morally be responsible.’ 
Wickson anticipated this to be a great problem for British officials: 
 
… in the majority of cases Indians in foreign countries seem to prefer to remain 
British subjects without citizenship (and hold a UK passport) rather than register 
as Indian citizens. There will certainly be more than a few left over … The glib 
suggestion that we should mop up all the Indians who fail to acquire Indian 
citizenship as a quid pro quo for Indian declaration of the British Nationality Act, 
is staggering.125 
 
The Indian citizenship act and relevant citizenship provisions in the Constitution 
therefore faced much the same fate as Pakistan’s citizenship legislation – British officials 
fearing responsibility for ‘left over’ citizens did not move to declare these citizenship 
acts.126 This of course meant that India would not recognize the BNA and refused 
reciprocity for UKC citizens, arguing additionally that while Indians did not face 
discrimination within the UK itself, they faced considerable inequities in British colonial 
territories.127Indeed, as F. A. K. Harrison acknowledged in an internal memo, ‘This 
would appear to be a weakness in our case for claiming that full reciprocity already 
exists.’ 128  
 
Britain and India’s decision to not declare each other’s citizenship law had several 
consequences, especially for Indians who had acquired UKC citizenship and later also 
wanted to register for Indian citizenship. Such a possibility for dual nationality would 	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have existed if the Indian act had been recognised by Britain. In one instance in 1959, A. 
K. Ray of the MEA regretfully informed Mr Pritam Singh, and Mr and Mrs Menon – 
Indian-origin UKC citizens who had applied for Indian citizenship – that they could not 
be treated differently from other non-Indian UKC citizens who were not allowed to 
register as Indian citizens, since the Indian act was not  yet recognized under British law.  
Instead, Ray reiterated that Indians with access to citizenship in their countries of 
residence ought to identify themselves with these countries. He also argued that any 
preferential treatment shown by India vis-à-vis registering Indian-origin UKC citizens 
would lead Commonwealth countries to ‘doubt our sincerity and misunderstand our 
motives.’129 There was a lot more at stake, as he pointed out:  
 
... if persons of Indian origin were allowed to change their citizenship as and 
when they chose even after taking up the citizenship of the commonwealth 
country where they are resident it might create the impression that persons of 
Indian origin who take up the citizenship of other commonwealth countries 
merely do so for their own interest and are not genuine about identifying 
themselves with that country. Such an impression would ultimately be 
detrimental to their own interests. 130 
 
Reassuring Singh and the Menons that as UKC citizens they would nevertheless not face 
any hardships if they decided to settle down in India, he offered the hope that they could 
reapply once the Indian act was recognized by the British government. This was, of 
course, not meant to be. With the Indian Citizenship Act coming into effect in 
December 1955, a flurry of applications and requests made their way to British and 
Indian officials. Bureaucrats had to interpret these cases not just in the context of the 
new legislation, but in terms of the makeshift arrangements that had defined the 
entangled status of many Indians across the world until then. This was exemplified in the 
case of British subject passports that had been issued to many Indians by British officials 
during this interim period. Some Indian officials interpreted the possession of these 
passports as voluntary acquisition of UKC citizenship, thereby making the person 
concerned ineligible for Indian citizenship. Alarmed officials in the UK High 
Commission in Delhi rushed to assert that the granting of a British subject passport had 
been a temporary measure that had no significance in terms of citizenship in British law. 
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Arguing that these individuals had always been regarded as ‘potential citizens of India’, E. 
G. Norris of the UKHC wrote to Fateh Singh that the only purpose of the passport had 
been to enable their travel and mobility at a time when they had ‘been unable to establish 
their citizenship status but have had clear rights to be regarded as British subjects’.131 
 
After conferring with bureaucrats from the External Affairs and Law ministries, Singh 
reassured British officials that the possession of a British subject passport – obtained in 
the interim period until Indian citizenship legislation was passed – did not count as 
‘voluntarily’ acquiring a foreign citizenship and therefore would not disqualify these 
persons from Indian citizenship. There was however considerable debate between Indian 
officials about continuing this practice of Indians obtaining British subject passports. 
Home Ministry officials argued that this practice should be discouraged if these Indians 
wanted to register for Indian citizenship and pointed out, rather tellingly, that ‘there was 
a good deal of feeling in Parliament when the Citizenship bill was under discussion that 
we in India should not do anything to give an impression to Indians or potential Indians 
abroad that they are still British subjects, whatever the position in British law.’132 They 
instead recommended that India set up more consulates and missions to provide for 
Indian passports – a suggestion that MEA officials were quick to shoot down, given 
financial considerations. In contrast, they reiterated that overseas Indians had long relied 
on travel documents issued by British officials and there were considerable benefits in 
letting this practice continue. Indeed, as they noted, ‘while we have no objection to the 
officials of our missions personally and orally advising actual and potential Indian 
citizens about the provisions of the citizenship act, it would be most untactful for them 
to do so in writing.’133  
 
This secrecy is very much in line with the earlier instance of Indian missions being 
cautioned against creating registers of Indian citizens; that is, even as Indian officials 
provided citizenship provisions for overseas Indians, they were wary that this would be 
viewed by the host country as a sign of disloyalty and lead to discrimination. Law 
Ministry officials meanwhile put forth a more radical interpretation: they argued not just 
that British subject passport-holders were eligible for Indian citizenship, but that ‘even 
the acquisition of UKC citizenship by persons of Indian origin would not be a bar to 	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their acquisition of Indian citizenship by registration … our citizenship act recognizes 
dual nationality to that extent.’134  
 
These varying interpretations of Indian citizenship law would be put to the test in the 
case of determining the status of overseas Indians, whose incredible entangled personal 
lives and histories were mapped on to their applications. The case of Mr Kathilal 
Sankaran Krishnan, an Indian-origin UKC citizen resident in Singapore, is instructive in 
this regard.135 Approaching officials of the UK High Commission in Colombo during a 
visit to Ceylon, Krishnan sought their help in enabling his two sons – who had lived in 
Ceylon for some years – to join him in Singapore. The sons were born in British India in 
1945 and 1947 and were regarded by Indian officials in Colombo as having lost their 
claim to Indian citizenship when their father opted to register as a UKC citizen in 
Singapore in 1954. A. N. G. Bone, a sympathetic official in the High Commission in 
Colombo wrote to his counterpart in Singapore worrying that ‘it can be argued that by 
conferring UK citizenship on the father without warning him of the consequences, we 
have some responsibility for his minor children having become stateless.’136 Bone was 
well aware of the complexities of getting travel documents for the sons, given the 
concurrence required from officials in Singapore and London, as well as the near 
certainty that Ceylon officials would not provide such documents for boys of Indian 
origin.  Krishnan had gone so far as to tell Bone that he would make his own 
arrangements to get the boys into Singapore – ‘I suspect via Malaya by a somewhat 
devious route or dubious practice’, Bone noted  – as long as High Commission officials 
agreed to provide travel documents. Bone reluctantly suggested that the ‘possible cutting 
of the Gordian’s knot would perhaps be achieved by the registration of these boys as 
UKCs under 7(1).’137 This was however unacceptable for CRO officials who contested 
the Indian claim that these boys were ineligible for Indian citizenship. Officials in 
London argued that while Krishnan had indeed lost his Indian citizenship by registering 
as a citizen of the UKC, as per the 1955 Indian Citizenship Act, this loss of citizenship 
did not extend to his minor children born in India.138  
 
The archival paper trail on the Krishnans does not extend beyond this, although one can 
consider some of the entangled possibilities that remained. Perhaps Mr Krishnan’s sons 	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were granted some form of temporary travel document; perhaps Indian officials accepted 
the CRO interpretation, enabling the family to migrate to Singapore – the  father a UKC 
citizen and sons Indian citizens. Perhaps, more worryingly, the minors remained 
stateless.  Even in a clearly concerned letter in support of the case, Bone nevertheless 
signalled the oddity of Krishnan’s status as a UKC citizen: Krishnan, he pointed out, 
‘speaks little, if any, English through the medium of a friend of his who speaks far too 
much!’. Bone couldn’t resist gesturing to the peculiarity of Krishnan’s vocabulary (and 
indeed his status as UKC citizen) in describing his full name: ‘Mr Kathilal Sankaran 
Krishnan (Kazhimbram) … the latter is his “native place”.’139 One can only imagine the 
poignancy of this ‘native place’ in rural Kerala for a man whose life crisscrossed India, 
Ceylon, Singapore, the United Kingdom and still stared at the prospect of statelessness 
for his children. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The ‘eternal’ making of Indian citizenship legislation was perhaps inevitable, given the 
enormous scale of the task undertaken to unravel multiple claims of identity and 
citizenship shaped by Empire. Indeed even as officials frequently flagged concerns that 
the general public might find it difficult to understand these provisions for citizenship, 
their internal correspondence makes it amply clear that these bureaucrats were 
themselves often befuddled by the vast scale and complexities of implementing the law 
on citizenship. Divergent understandings of the law’s practical application to different 
cases persisted not just between British and Indian officials, but just as much between 
Indian officials – in some ways facilitating the convenient suggestion that individual 
bureaucrats should decide each case ‘by its merits’ as a means of reconciling contrasting 
interpretations of the citizenship law. The haze within which these issues were mired is 
most clearly evident in the widespread confusion over the status of Indians as British 
subjects after independence – in part due to the deliberate policy of Indian officials to 
avoid any focus on this emotive topic but very much also due to the overwhelming 
complexity of the numerous provisions of the BNA. In parliamentary debates especially, 
many prominent ministers frequently denied that Indians were British subjects. When 
asked during a debate on the citizenship bill if the BNA conferred British subject status 
to Indians, B. N. Datar, deputy Home Minister, claimed that the BNA was not applicable 
to India and there was ‘no question of Indians being British subjects or citizens of the 
United Kingdom and Colonies’, while the Home Minister Govind Ballabh Pant claimed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 A. N. G. Bone to E. R. G. Kidd, DO 35/10294, TNA 
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that Indians were not British subjects since they did not take any oath of allegiance to the 
Crown.140 Responding to an uproar in Parliament about a junior UK minister’s reference 
to Indians as ‘British subjects’, Nehru himself claimed that this ‘was not correct of course 
… nobody in the wide world who has any knowledge of the facts considers any Indian as 
a British subject’.141 Yet this was, of course, not the case.  
 
The fact that Indians were British subjects under the BNA considerably impacted their 
status and produced entangled citizens: Indians navigating overlapping citizenship 
frameworks variously found that they were eligible for Indian citizenship, potentially 
even qualifying for dual nationality, but were almost just as likely to be told that they did 
not qualify within any citizenship rubric. Far from being a decisive strategy whereby the 
Government of India defined Indian citizenship as territorially-bounded with no space 
for its diaspora, I have shown that the drafting of Indian citizenship was a messy, even 
paradoxical process that was anything but a clean break between the Indian state and its 
overseas Indian communities. Not only were overseas Indians eligible to register for 
Indian citizenship, the Indian state was closely involved in engaging with the British 
government and other Commonwealth countries regarding their legal status. The Indian 
state’s seemingly contradictory stance towards its overseas communities can be better 
understood in the context of the widespread crises of citizenship encountered by Indians 
in countries such as Ceylon, Burma and Malaya immediately after Indian independence. 
Framed within this scenario, India’s citizenship policy was more concerned with 
preventing the statelessness, discrimination and forced repatriation of overseas Indians 
from their countries of settlement than necessarily with granting them Indian citizenship. 
That is, Indian citizenship would be provided as a last resort if Indians were denied 
citizenship of their ‘host countries’ – the latter more likely to protect them against 
discrimination.  As the Home Secretary pointed out in a letter: 
 
I agree that persons of Indian origin residing in other countries should be 
encouraged to acquire Indian citizenship by registration. If however they have 
permanently settled in other countries and there is no bar to their being 
recognized as citizens of such countries, it would be in their interest to acquire 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140Quoted in ‘Citizenship Bill referred to joint select body: Special treatment for refugees,’ Hindustan Times, 
10 Aug 1955.  
141 Ward, Untied Kingdom. 
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the status of citizenship there so that they may enjoy full rights and privileges 
available to other citizens of such countries.142  
 
But as the imprint of Empire producing these entanglements of citizenship vividly 
illustrates, the task of differentiating between ‘origins’, ‘interests’ and ‘citizens’ was rarely 
so clear cut.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Note by Home Secretary, 14.8.57, ‘The Citizenship Rules, 1956’, NAI 
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3 
PERFORMING POSTCOLONIAL DIPLOMACY 
OVERSEAS INDIANS AND THE AFTERLIVES OF 
INDENTURE 
 
The mobility of Indian indentured labourers and other emigrants produced a distinct yet 
entangled realm of overseas Indians across British colonial territories. This chapter 
examines this unique realm as integral to the making and practice of postcolonial Indian 
diplomacy, imbued with the afterlives of indenture that shaped Indian ideas of the 
international and claims to diplomatic status. As we will see, the contested creation of a 
diplomatic infrastructure in colonial territories ranging from British Guiana to East 
Africa was an articulation of India’s diplomatic stature derived from its potential to 
know, mediate and represent significant overseas Indian populations. The quest for 
Indian diplomatic representation was inseparable from attempts to define the status of 
these overseas Indians, trapped in limbo between multiple possibilities of nationality and 
citizenship. In theory, the Government of India’s jurisdiction over Indian communities 
was demarcated using the criterion of domicile as a temporary measure until Indian 
citizenship legislation was enacted in 1955. This was, however, rarely well defined, 
providing Indian representatives considerable scope for interpretation and enabling 
British paranoia about their political motives. Indeed, as this chapter will show, Indian 
diplomatic representation was accepted only on the precondition of strict adherence to 
instructions formulated by British officials: a diplomatic procedure without precedence 
for a Commonwealth Dominion. Yet Indian officials sought to navigate these 
restrictions through a range of narratives utilising the colonial Indian state’s 
interventionist role in governing migration as historical precedent and leveraging the 
unique diplomatic space provided within the ‘Commonwealth family’.  
 
The establishment of an Indian diplomatic network in colonial territories was a process 
that reiterated Indian exceptionalism in both British and Indian eyes. For the British, 
Indian diplomatic initiatives in these regions were reflective of a plucky upstart 
capitalizing on a sub-imperial legacy, at best overstepping diplomatic limits in immature 
ways and at worst potentially harbouring expansionist agendas. For the Indians, this was 
an opportunity to realize their sovereign status and perform postcolonial diplomacy as 
the preeminent diplomatic actor in colonial regions: befitting their self-perception as the 
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‘leader of the Third World’, vastly superior to both the African native and the much-
maligned Indian ‘coolie’ who had long been regarded as bringing shame to India’s 
international reputation. This chapter is thereby concerned with the complex relationship 
between the Indian state and its overseas communities – a dynamic that had great 
consequences for both the status of these overseas Indians, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, and the international status of India as a diplomatic actor. The 
Government of India’s stance calling on overseas Indians to identify with their countries 
of residence has been taken to imply a ‘distance’ from the diaspora constructed by a 
territorializing state at the brink of independence.1 Yet, at very much the same time, as 
we shall see, India articulated its claim to diplomatic status on the basis of ‘representing’ 
Indian populations in colonial territories. This was a complex, even contradictory process 
wherein the government of India engaged with its overseas communities in ways that 
were defined by India’s perception of the civilizational and political status of their 
territories of residence. Drawing on vocabularies of indenture by representing these 
Indian communities as poor, illiterate and in need of the Government of India’s 
expertise, India established diplomatic networks in far-flung colonial territories.  
 
This was a unique accomplishment for a postcolonial state that proclaimed its 
responsibility to spread political consciousness in what it perceived as the backward and 
naïve regions of British colonies in Africa and the Caribbean. While they called upon 
overseas Indians to integrate with native populations in their countries of residence – a 
strategy essential to guaranteeing the political rights that came with the citizenship of the 
country in question – they did not stop making representations on their behalf until such 
rights were guaranteed. Indeed even as strongly-worded statements from Nehru warned 
Indians that they could not expect to get ‘any protection from us as against the people of 
that country … i.e. the Africans,’2 British officials complained that they were ‘bombarded 
by bitter and ill-natured protests about the alleged maltreatment of Indians in British 
colonies.’3   
 
I argue that India’s seemingly paradoxical actions can be best understood in terms of the 
very realities and limits of performing postcolonial diplomacy. While India was keen to 
draw on a diplomatic status derived from vast populations who required Indian advice 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Itty Abraham, How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics (Stanford:  Stanford University 
Press, 2014). 
2 Speech by Jawaharlal Nehru, 30.9.54, Quoted in file DO 35/5306, ‘Government of India’s interest in UK 
policy towards Indians in colonial territories’, The National Archives at Kew (TNA hereafter) 
3 Note by F. S. Miles, 12.3.53, DO 35/5306, TNA 
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on how to become postcolonial, it was well aware of the limits of Indian influence and 
leverage to push for effective change. The Government of India was also disillusioned in 
some part by the dynamics of overseas Indian communities – seen as either poor, aging 
post-indenture communities embarrassingly in need of assistance, or merchants and 
traders accused of exploiting African natives and seemingly getting in the way of Indian 
proclamations of ‘Afro-Asian solidarity’. This chapter will therefore highlight the need to 
go beyond notions of a ‘break’ between the Indian state and its diaspora in 1947 to 
explore the messy entanglements of diplomatic engagement with overseas Indians and its 
significant consequences. In so doing, it also widens the scope of British-Indian relations 
beyond the metropoles of London and Delhi to consider the realm of indenture and 
emigration in colonial territories as integral to postcolonial diplomacy.  
 
INDENTURE, EMIGRATION AND THE MAKING OF INDIAN 
DIPLOMACY 
A growing scholarship has sought to break away from the fixation with 1947 as the 
originary moment of Indian foreign policy. Drawing inspiration from histories of the 
Indian Ocean, scholars have focused on the sub-imperial, quasi-sovereign status of the 
British Raj and the ways in which the status of overseas Indians was central to the 
making of Indian diplomacy. Thus for Itty Abraham, the colonial state’s decision to send 
officials to intervene in British colonies on behalf of indentured labourers in the early 
twentieth century was ‘one of the first material signs of a foreign policy not subordinated 
to imperial needs and demands.’4 Vineet Thakur meanwhile locates the presence and 
performance of Indian representatives Satyendra Sinha, V. S. Srinivasa Sastri and Tej 
Bahadur Sapru at imperial conferences, seeking to guarantee equal rights for all British 
subjects, as ‘the inaugural moment of modern Indian diplomacy.’5 Indeed, by seeking to 
act as a guardian for overseas Indians, ‘the Raj was able to assert itself as a distinct 
diplomatic unit – a state, if not quite a sovereign one – within the British Empire-
Commonwealth.’6  
 
Much of this scholarship also focuses on South Africa, omnipresent in political discourse 
both before and after 1947 and seen as exemplifying both the precarious lives of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Abraham, How India Became Territorial, 83. 
5 Vineet Thakur, ‘Liberal, Liminal and Lost: India’s First Diplomats and the Narrative of Foreign Policy,’ 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 45, no. 2 (2017): 251 
6 Cees Heere, ‘Among the Nations of the Empire: Migration Diplomacy and the Making of Indian 
Statehood, 1900-1923,’ Paper presented at the ‘Britain and the World’ conference, University of Exeter, 
2018.  
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overseas Indians and the origin of India’s anticolonial, ‘antiracial’ foreign policy. Indian 
representatives raised concerns about the treatment of Indians in South Africa as early as 
the 1923 Imperial conference, much before the famous decision of the interim 
government to place this issue on the UN agenda in 1946: making it the first ever dispute 
to be taken to the General Assembly, wherein ‘India inscribed racial discrimination onto 
the international agenda.’ 7  As Varadarajan argues, this was widely seen as India 
announcing ‘its presence on the international stage.’8 While this literature refers to the 
history of indenture, it does so either in terms of its brief relevance for more easily 
recognizable moments of diplomatic action at imperial conferences and the UN, or in 
terms of the newly-independent Indian state’s decision to ‘exclude’ overseas Indians in 
1947.9 I argue instead that Indian diplomacy was replete with the afterlives of indenture 
well after independence: these histories of indenture and the ‘shame’ of being associated 
with the ‘coolie’ shaped Indian ideas of the ‘international’ and permeated Indian 
diplomatic discourse long after 1947. I do so by emphasizing the ways in which this 
shaped India’s quest to gain diplomatic representation in the British colonial territories.  
 
The dominant focus on South Africa in scholarship and public discourse has 
unfortunately led to the relative neglect of India’s longstanding interest in British colonial 
territories with significant Indian populations, relegating these to the periphery of India’s 
diplomatic history.  While it is indeed clear that South Africa was a significant focus for 
Indian diplomacy, it is perhaps worth examining the ways in which South Africa was a 
metonym for India’s larger stance towards the status of overseas Indians. Unlike South 
Africa, the colonial territories represented a particular realm that could be directly 
negotiated with Britain, especially given that they were part of the ‘Commonwealth 
family’, and carried with it the legacies of indenture. Drawing on inspiring scholarship 
highlighting the stories, memories and histories of indenture, often by descendants of 
indentured labourers, I am therefore interested in recovering this realm of indenture as 
integral to Indian diplomacy.10  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Lorna Lloyd, ‘”A Most Auspicious Beginning”: The 1946 United Nations General Assembly and the 
Question of the Treatment of Indians in South Africa,’ Review of International Studies, 16, no. 2 (1990):132 
8 Latha Varadarajan, The Domestic Abroad: Diasporas in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 62 
9 The work of Hugh Tinker remains the most important exception to this. See Hugh Tinker, Separate and 
Unequal: India and Indians in the British Commonwealth, 1920-1950, (London: C. Hurst & Co, 1976) 
10 Notable examples of this vast scholarship include Brij V. Lal, ‘Understanding the Indian indenture 
experience,’ South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 21, no. s1 (1998): 215-237, Brij V. Lal, Chalo Jahaji: On a 
journey through indenture in Fiji (ANU E Press: 2012), Marina Carter and Khal Torabully, Coolitude, 
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While Radhika Mongia has skilfully highlighted the bureaucratic apparatus set up by the 
colonial state to ‘micro-manage’ and produce a ‘system or regime of state control of 
Indian migration’, I examine this regime as an early prototype of diplomatic 
representation – derived from the presence of Indian populations abroad and 
underpinned by the notion of ‘protecting’ indentured labourers.11 The emigration of 
Indians to far-flung British colonial territories not just as indentured labourers, but 
increasingly also as traders, sojourners, settlers, and later ‘skilled’ and ‘unskilled’ workers, 
created multiple discourses of Indianness in the international realm. This produced 
‘British India and its indentured peripheries … as one integrated space’, creating a 
distinct realm of overseas Indians in British colonial territories that would have 
longstanding consequences for Indian diplomacy.12 Most importantly, the identity of the 
Indian state and other ‘free' migrants were defined in relation to the status of the much-
maligned ‘coolies’ – indentured labourers reduced to a term imbued with derogatory 
meanings of race, caste, and class, and thereby regarded as deeply harmful for India’s 
reputation.13  
 
Scholars has excavated the transnational histories of indenture and the legacies of the 
word ‘coolie’ – likely derived from the Tamil word for wages, but taking a life of its own 
as a deeply offensive racial slur used by Europeans to refer to Indian (and Chinese) 
labourers. 14  Descendants of indentured labourers have sought to reclaim the word 
‘coolie’ while emphasising the ways in which the term carries with it the ‘baggage of 
colonialism … the burdens of history’.15 Drawing on their powerful scholarship, I argue 
that Indian diplomacy was irrevocably shaped by the experience of indenture. India’s 
diplomatic status and ideas of the international realm were informed by the histories and 
afterlives of indenture, and the widely perceived shame of being associated with the 
‘coolie’. These indentured labourers were ‘the first group of Indians abroad in any 
significant numbers’: they were therefore India’s first international representatives of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(London: Anthem Press, 2002), Gaiutra Bahadur, Coolie Woman: The odyssey of indenture (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2013) 
11  Radhika Viyas Mongia, Indian Migration and Empire: A Colonial Genealogy of the Modern State. (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2018), 58 and 61  
12 Isabel Hofmeyr, ‘The Complicating Sea: The Indian Ocean as Method,’ Comparative Studies of South Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East, 32, no. 3, (2012): 584-590 
13 In Chapter 4, I focus in detail on the intersections of caste, class and race that exemplified the afterlives 
of indenture in Indian diplomacy.  
14 The term ‘coolie’ was also used by Africans during a period of increasing tensions. See Bahadur, Coolie 
Woman, and Carter and Torabully, Coolitude.  
15 Bahadur, Coolie Woman, xxi 
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sorts, shaping the production of India as a diplomatic actor, creating a locus standi for 
Indian diplomacy in diverse parts of the world, and facilitating Indian diplomatic 
knowledge about these regions.16 This was so even as India sought to erase the ‘resilient 
coolie stain’ on its reputation: as we shall see in detail in Chapters 4 and 5, this was a 
narrative that had longstanding consequences for the ways in which India defined the 
‘ideal’ Indian eligible to travel abroad, shaping the postcolonial state’s emigration and 
passport policies.17  
 
The Indian state therefore sought to reconcile the diplomatic status derived from the 
vast spread of Indian communities across the world with the infamy and ‘humiliation’ of 
being identified with the coolie.18 As Ashutosh Kumar has convincingly demonstrated, 
the ‘overall exploitative nature of the indenture system was a secondary concern’ for 
Indian nationalists whose anti-indenture campaigns were more concerned with the 
problem of indentured labourers as ‘shameful’ representatives of India in the 
international realm.19 Indeed British supporters of the Indian cause such as Charles Freer 
Andrews and William Pearson stressed ‘the relation of the Fiji Indian population to the 
place which India itself holds in the eyes of the civilized world’, arguing that the selection 
of Indian indentured labour emigrants was therefore a question of shaping ‘the world’s 
attitude towards India.’20 Reporting on the conditions of indentured labourers in Fiji in 
1917, Andrews and Pearson noted the improvements in the colony and argued that the 
Indian community most needed ‘a body of responsible and educated Indians, of good 
position in the Islands, who will be able to represent their community when fuller rights 
of citizenship are given.’ 21  This, they hoped, would be aided by the transformed 
perceptions of India in the South Pacific: 
 
This change began … when (Rabindranath Tagore’s) 'Gitanjali' was first 
published. We were often told in Australia how unique was the appeal which that 
one small volume made to thoughtful Australian men and women … The war 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Bahadur, Coolie Woman, xx 
17 Heena Mistry, ‘Settler Citizenship and Indigeneity: Indians Overseas and the Claim to British Imperial 
Citizenship, 1918-1940,’ Paper presented at the Global Conference on Indian Diaspora, The Hague, 2017  
18 Mistry, ‘Settler Citizenship and Indigeneity’. 
19 Ashutosh Kumar, Coolies of the Empire: Indentured Indians in the Sugar Colonies, 1830-1920 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 205 
20 Fiona Paisley, ‘Sexuality, Nationalism, and “Race”: Humanitarian Debate about Indian Indenture in Fiji, 
1910–18,’ Labour History, 113 (2017), 195 
21 C. F. Andrews and W. W. Pearson, Report on Indentured Labour in Fiji: An Independent Enquiry (Calcutta: 
Star Printing Works, 1916), 57 
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had carried forward this change of outlook towards India in quite a different 
direction ... Gallipoli had touched the masses … Stories of the bravery of the 
Gurkhas were on everybody's lips. The man in the street had 'discovered' India. 
He had found out that India was not a land of downtrodden coolies, but a land of bravery and 
romance.22  
 
The anticolonial revolutionaries of the Ghadar movement too bristled at being racialised 
as ‘coolies’: ‘The world calls us coolie. Why doesn’t our flag fly anywhere?’23 Indian 
nationalists campaigning to put an end to indenture sought to transcend the identity of 
‘coolies’ – long regarded as weak, illiterate and immoral – by transforming the attacks 
against Indian women in plantations as ‘an attack on the very pride of the newly 
emerging nation.’24  By virtue of their status in the indentured system and their often-
lower caste origins, these women had been earlier viewed in Indian nationalist discourse 
as morally bankrupt women best left in the fringes of overseas Indian populations. They 
were thus the very antithesis of the ideal Indian woman expected to participate in the 
nationalist struggle, a figure constructed in opposition to the ‘coolie woman.’25 
 
A wide-ranging scholarship has emphasized the agency and diverse social backgrounds of 
indentured labourers in order to go beyond widespread stereotypes of the ‘coolie’ as 
illiterate, gullible, passive Indians of the lowest class, caste origins. 26  These deeply 
problematic notions nevertheless had a longstanding resonance in Indian diplomacy – its 
vocabularies and practice were imbued with the afterlives of indenture, with the very 
presence of elite Indian diplomats seen as going a long way to confront notions of India 
as a land of coolies.27 Thus even as the presence of indentured labourers across the world 
shaped perceptions of Indian identity, they also facilitated the creation of Indian 
diplomatic infrastructure – a process intertwined with the discourse on the coolie.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Andrews and Pearson, Report on Indentured Labour, 57. Italics added. 
23 Maia Ramnath, Haj to Utopia: How the Ghadar Movement Charted Global Radicalism and Attempted to Overthrow 
the British Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 45 
24 Kumar, Coolies of the Empire, 218. For a moving exploration of the status of Indian women in the 
indenture system, see Gaiutra Bahadur’s Coolie Woman and Brij V. Lal, ‘Kunti's cry: Indentured women on 
Fiji plantations.’ Indian Economic & Social History Review, 22, no. 1 (1985): 55-71. 
25 See Tejaswini Niranjana, Mobilizing India: Women, music, and migration between India and Trinidad (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2006) 
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The growing numbers of Indian labourers in British colonies and the widespread critique 
of indenture as a ‘new system of slavery’ resulted in the increasing intervention of the 
state to control emigration and ‘protect’ these labourers. 28  This took many forms, 
including the appointment of ‘Coolie Agents’ – later known as ‘Protectors of Indian 
Immigrants.’ The history of this terminological transition is itself quite telling: the 1872 
‘Coolie Commission’ in Natal noted that Indians ‘found the term Coolie ‘‘galling and a 
source of annoyance’’ and suggested that ‘‘Indian Immigrant’’ be the term used in place 
of Coolie and that ‘‘Protector of Indian Immigrants’’ replace Coolie Agent.’29 While there 
is some debate on the effectiveness of the posts of Protector of Emigrants in Indian 
ports and the Protector of Indian Immigrants in areas of indenture (first manned by 
British officials), I view their very appointment and potential to be ‘quasi-consuls’ as 
significant.30  
 
When unskilled labour emigration was formally banned with the Indian Emigration Act 
of 1922, this process of diplomatic representation for India – drawing on the presence of 
overseas Indians – was further codified. The legislation provided for the appointment of 
Agents for ‘the purpose of safeguarding the interests of emigrants in any place outside 
British India.’31 Sir V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, India’s famed negotiator at the 1921 imperial 
conference who had been long concerned with the status of overseas Indians, was named 
the first Agent of the Government of India in South Africa in 1927.32 Following Sastri, 
Indian Agents were appointed in Ceylon, Burma and Malaya: these officials were acting 
‘increasingly as consular officers in foreign lands, even though they remained within the 
British Asian empire.’33 These three regions across the Bay of Bengal were at the heart of 
longstanding histories of migration and sojourning: as Sunil Amrith notes, ‘from the 
beginning of organized Indian emigration in 1834 until 1940, well over 90 percent of all 	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Indian emigrants went to Ceylon, Burma, and Malaya.’34 Geographical proximity had 
thus shaped a ‘habit’ of circular migration where ‘in a sense, Malaya, Burma, and Ceylon 
became a more permanent part of the South Indian rural landscape’, while reiterating the 
unique status of this region as a space where both British India and its postcolonial 
successor state viewed themselves as ‘naturally’ dominant.35   
 
This was especially so given Burma’s unique position until 1937 as a province of the 
larger ‘empire of the Raj’ whose ‘spheres of influence’ extended as far as Aden.36 This 
was the other side of India’s international status, an ‘India-centred web’ that was a far cry 
from the servitude of the coolie in far-flung corners of the world. 37 This ‘sub-imperial’ 
status of India involved transplanting governing strategies and legal codes formulated in 
the Raj to other colonies, and relied on Indian military contribution and presence in 
colonial police forces across Malaya, Hong Kong, and Chinese treaty ports where ‘British 
power had an Indian face’.38 Thus other categories of overseas Indians were viewed in 
considerable contrast to the ‘coolie’ and seen as narrating very different, albeit still 
problematic discourses of Indian international identity. As Nehru pointed out in an 
important early conceptualization of Indian foreign policy in 1927: 
 
What is the position of the Indian in foreign countries today? Apart from a few 
students and others, he has gone either as a coolie or as a mercenary soldier on 
behalf of England. As a coolie he is looked down upon with contempt and as a 
hireling of the exploiters he is hated.39 
 
Indeed versions of this coolie-mercenary binary of overseas Indians as representatives of 
different degrees of ‘undesirability’ would continue to haunt Indian diplomacy in various 
parts of the world. Indian Chettiar moneylenders in Burma, for instance, were regarded 
as usurpers of native land and held ‘responsible for the present impoverishment in the 
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land.’40 By the 1930s, violence broke out against them and other Indian immigrants seen 
as exemplifying India’s own hegemonic position in the region: thus for Burmese 
nationalists, ‘separation from India’ was more crucial than ‘freedom from British 
colonialism.’41 In East Africa – famously referred to as ‘an America for the Hindu’, 
exceptional and distinct from any other colony where Indians had settled – Indian 
merchants stressed their ‘pioneer work’ in enabling British rule and ‘positioned 
themselves as sub imperialist colonizers, asserting their rights as imperial citizens to gain 
parity with European settlers in political representation and land ownership.’ 42 The 
intersections of race and class meant that while Indian labourers were central to the 
construction of the Ugandan railway, it was the potential of ‘more proper’ classes of 
Indian agriculturalists and merchants to be ideal settlers that received most emphasis. 43  
 
British officials too were instrumental in reiterating ideas of a ‘better class’ of Indians as 
ideal settlers in Africa: these arguments ranged from considerations of climatic 
conditions that they viewed as perfectly suited for Indian settlers, to the civilizational 
superiority of certain Indians who had the potential to share in the ‘white man’s burden’ 
and act as ‘valuable teachers of the Negro.’44 In the words of Frederick Lugard, a colonial 
administrator in East Africa: ‘It is not as imported coolie labour that I advocate the 
introduction of the Indian but as colonist and settler.’45 In both East Africa and British 
Guiana, the claim of being a proficient settler was utilized to assert parity with European 
settlers and white Dominions and as an ‘avenue for legitimizing the Indian aspirational 
claim to British Imperial citizenship.’46 Perhaps the most famous scheme for Indian 
colonization was the British proposal for an Indian colony in Tanganyika after the First 
World War ‘in exchange for India giving up its rights to free movement and settlement in 
the Dominions and across the empire.’47 Though these colonization schemes did not 
materialize and often divided Indian opinion, despite support from influential leaders 
such as the Aga Khan and the nationalist leader Sarojini Naidu, they point to the 
persistence of attempts to produce new narratives of Indian identity that went past the 	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infamy of the coolie. This ambiguous position for India as both colonized and colonizer 
and, drawing on discourses of Indian civilizational exceptionalism, as intermediary 
between black and white had continuing resonance in India’s self-perception of its role as 
a ‘leader’ of the third world.48  
 
INDENTURE, IDENTITY AND THE SEARCH FOR ‘GREATER INDIA’ 
At much the same time in the early twentieth century, Indian intellectuals were keen to 
recover what they viewed as the long-suppressed history of India’s dominance as an 
international actor: as a virile colonial power spreading Indian civilisation in regions of 
South East Asia and producing ‘Greater India.’ 49  The leading proponent of such 
theorisations was the ‘Greater India Society’ in Calcutta that comprised leading historians 
and intellectuals of the time who drew on the scholarship of French Indologists such as 
Sylvain Lévi, while departing from their work in significant ways.  The term itself no 
doubt borrows from the term ‘Greater Britain’ coined by Charles Dilke in 1868 to refer 
to Britain and its settler colonies, an Anglo-Saxon conception that had little space for 
other parts of the Empire.50 India was a significant point of reference for John Seeley, 
another famous exponent of Greater Britain, if only to delineate its once-great 
civilisation as now ‘inorganic’, hopelessly left behind, and unsuited for inclusion on par 
with the white settler colonies.51  
 
In stark contrast, the Indian intellectual rediscovery of ‘Greater India’ and their reading 
of Asian history as one dominated by the creation of ‘Indic culture colonies’ aimed to 
dispel widespread notions of Indians as docile, effeminate coolies, seemingly afraid to 
cross the kaala paani and engage with the world. This was an exercise very much shaped 
by the expediencies of the times: India’s glorious supranational past was thereby seen as 
‘pre-figuring … the presence of South Asian migrants in other Eastern and also Western 
lands.’52 The meanings of Greater India were evolved to suit both Hindu nationalist and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Both Aiyar and Metcalf point to India’s curious dual position. See Aiyar, Indians in Kenya and Metcalf, 
Imperial Connections. 
49 Susan Bayly, ‘Imagining “Greater India”: French and Indian visions of colonialism in the Indic mode,’ 
Modern Asian Studies, 38, no. 3 (2004): 703-744. For a more recent analysis of the various interpretations of 
‘Greater India’, see Jayashree Vivekanandan, ‘Indianisation or indigenisation? Greater India and the politics 
of cultural diffusionism,’ Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 56, no. 1 (2018):  1-21, 
DOI:10.1080/14662043.2018.1411232  
50 James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 457 
51 Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 172 
52 Bayly, ‘Imagining “Greater India’’’, 713 
	   108	  
more secular versions, evident from both Rabindranath Tagore and Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
engagement with its history.  
 
Tagore, who was the mentor of many of the intellectuals who founded the Greater India 
Society, set off on a journey to Java in 1927 to ‘see the signs of the history of India’s 
entry into the universal.’53 While the moving poems he composed during his trip are a 
clear indication of the impact of this voyage ‘in search of Greater India’, Sugata Bose 
convincingly argues that Tagore made ‘a rather self-conscious attempt to downplay the 
episodes of Indian military aggression against Southeast Asia in an attempt to highlight 
the theme of cultural exchange.’54 This is evident, although perhaps to a somewhat lesser 
degree, in Nehru’s enthusiastic reading of India’s past in his seminal book The Discovery of 
India, written while in prison between 1942 and 1946.55 While its breathless prose details 
the several ‘waves of colonization’ from India to South East Asia and the fact that ‘even 
as far as Madagascar the current language is Indonesian with a mixture of Sanskrit 
words’, Nehru’s exploration of ‘Greater India’ nevertheless sought to reconcile two 
somewhat competing impulses.56 Even as Nehru established that the early Indians were 
powerful colonizers with a strong military history, he sought to temper this by asserting 
the largely cultural and civilizational nature of this past of ‘peaceful penetration’.57  
Indeed while he argued that ‘the military exploits of these early Indian colonists are 
important … throwing light on certain aspects of the Indian character and genius which 
have hitherto not been appreciated’, he also pointed out that their true greatness lay in 
‘the rich civilization they built up in their colonies and which endured for over a 
thousand years.’58 Yet it is amply clear in his text that the great value of these ‘discoveries’ 
about Indian history lay in the possibilities it offered an India inching towards 
independence. The engagement with  histories of ‘Greater India’ relied on reassuring 
evidence of a glorious expansionist past at a time of great weakness: ‘to know and 
understand India one has to travel far in time and space, to forget for a while her present 
condition with all its misery and narrowness and horror, and to have glimpses of what 
she was and what she did.’59 This was especially important since these achievements did 
not pertain only to the intellectual realm, but was proof that ‘if India was great in thought 	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and philosophy, she was equally great in action.’60 Most importantly, the recovery of this 
history was central to Nehru’s ideas of India’s future as an international actor: 
 
I remember when I first read, about fifteen years ago ... how amazed I was and 
how excited I became. New panoramas opened out before me, new perspectives 
of history, new conceptions of India’s past, and I had to adjust all my thinking 
and previous notions to them. Champa, Cambodia and Angkor, Srivijaya and 
Majapahit suddenly rose out of the void, took living shape, vibrant with that 
instinctive feeling which makes the past touch the present.61 
 
These excited imaginations of ‘Greater India’ both drew on and in turn inspired the 
prevalence of this term in regions across the world that comprised of significant overseas 
Indian populations. In his autobiography titled Life in Greater India published in 1984, the 
Mauritian writer and political activist Basdeo Bissoondoyal argued that it was the 
emigration of Indian labourers to colonial territories that inspired the articulations of the 
Greater India society: ‘when labourers were sent from India to Bourbon or La Reunion, 
Mauritius, several parts of Africa, the Fiji Islands, British Guiana (Guyana), Trinidad and 
some other countries, it did not occur to anyone that the countries of their adoption 
would remind some scholars in Calcutta of the countries of East Asia.’62 While drawing 
on a very different history of Indian expansionism in South East Asia, his reading relied 
on the presence of overseas Indian communities as carriers of Indianness, creating new 
spaces of Greater India. This pointed to the continued existence of a ‘Further India’ or 
‘Greater India’ stretching across the colonial territories where Indian labourers had 
settled: Mauritius, Fiji and Guiana were therefore, in his words, newer ‘countries of 
Greater India’. 63  For Bissoondoyal, far-flung colonies with diverse histories were 
nevertheless all united within this rubric: indeed there was a ‘striking resemblance 
between one family and another so far as Greater India goes.’64  
 
South Africa too was conceptualized as an important part of the realm of ‘Greater India’, 
central to the making of Indianness. As Hofmeyr has argued in the case of Gandhi’s 
‘experiments’ in South Africa, the cosmopolitan world of Johannesburg enabled the 
production of his idea of India ‘in a way that was not possible on the vast sub-continent 	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itself’. 65 Gandhi united disparate groups by identifying them all as ‘Indian’, while still 
placing some categories of Indians – especially the colonial-born descendants of 
indentured labourers – at the very margins of this Indian identity.66 Meanwhile, many 
Indo-Caribbeans of the time saw little dissonance in reiterating their attachment to India, 
while articulating their contributions to Caribbean society and the advantages gained by 
emigrating from India. As Peter Ruhomon, writing about the ‘Building of Greater India’, 
noted, ‘What contributions may not Colonial Indians make to the Motherland, with their 
wealth of experience, born of contact with Western influence and Western civilization!’67 
Indeed even as these overseas Indians sought to overcome the history of indenture 
‘which had emasculated the character of our fathers and weakened the fibres of their 
national manhood’ by drawing strength from ideas of India’s civilizational greatness, 
some were conscious of the rose-tinted glasses through which they harkened back to an 
imagined India. 68 Articulating the ‘diasporic experience … (as) an improvement on the 
original’, they nevertheless often deferred to the much-needed approval of 
‘subcontinental Indians’ regarding the progress made by overseas Indians.69 Even as they 
were assured that they had ‘done Mother India proud’, some delegates from India such 
as Maharaj Kunwar Singh warned them about the precarious realities of life in India. As 
Clem Seecharan notes: 
 
This India was not what most Indo-Guyanese wanted to know because it was 
what they or their parents or grandparents had fled from. It spoke of poverty, 
backwardness and caste bigotry; they preferred to cultivate an India of ancient 
glory and unimpeachable moral ascendancy, high learning and chivalry. Maharaj 
Singh’s India was too close to the bone; it reminded India-born Indians of their 
real India, which they had learnt to forget.70 
 
Discourses of ‘Greater India’ thus exemplified the ways in which the legacies of 
indenture and the status of overseas Indians was navigated. Excavating grand narratives 	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of Indian civilisation and cultural expansionism of the past – the military aspects were 
stressed as and when required – helped in drafting a long and glorious history of India’s 
international status and ‘entry into the universal’, as Tagore put it.71 In so doing, the 
reputation of the ‘coolie class’ could be replaced by an imagination of the ‘better class’ of 
Indians as legatees of a grand Indian dominance, ‘future agents of an Indian-led mission 
of pan-Asian cultural renewal.’72 Such notions however no doubt added ballast to the rise 
of anti-Indian sentiment in south East Asia in particular. Most importantly, notions of 
the colonies of indenture as constituent nations of a ‘Greater India’ served to intertwine 
overseas Indians with India itself, in complex and often problematic ways. 
 
THE QUEST FOR INDIAN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN THE 
COLONIES  
The Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ annual report for 1948-49 celebrated ‘the 
successful conclusion of twelve years' negotiations’ with the British government to 
establish Indian missions in British East Africa, Mauritius, Fiji and the British West 
Indies in 1948.73 Far from being a matter of bureaucratic formality, the establishment of 
Indian diplomatic representation in British colonial territories was a deeply contested 
process marked by the studied reluctance of British officials, especially the Colonial 
Office, to recognize India as a sovereign actor fully entitled to diplomatic status.74 
Moreover, the Government of India’s efforts to perform postcolonial diplomacy in these 
regions had to be reconciled with the limits of India’s locus standi over overseas Indians 
whose entangled nationality and citizenship status was, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, long debated.  
 
In November of 1946, A. V. Pai, Secretary to the interim Government of India wrote to 
the Commonwealth Relations Office about a topic that had been long discussed: the 
appointment of Indian Agents in the British colonial territories of East Africa, Fiji, 
Mauritius, the West Indies and British Guiana.75 As Pai noted, this subject had been 
debated at least since 1936 when a trade commissioner was appointed in East Africa, and 
reiterated in 1943 and 1945 in the context of requests to appoint an Indian agent in 	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British Guiana and the British West Indies respectively. Temporary compromises had 
been reached with the appointment of a British officer with ‘special Indian experience’ 
and knowledge of Indian languages in Fiji, and delegations sent to Mauritius to report on 
the problems of Indian labour.76 In these representations, Indian officials had outlined 
their ‘special responsibility’ vis-à-vis overseas communities in colonial regions as derived 
from the fact that Indians ‘had not always secured local representation and were 
politically helpless.’77 These narratives relied on a perception of the colonial realm and its 
indentured Indian populations as politically and socioculturally naïve, at best, and in need 
of expert Indian guidance on achieving political awareness. Pai argued that Indian agents 
would be ‘specially instructed to promote friendly relations and contacts with all other 
communities and to inculcate among Indians the constitutional principle that it was to 
the colonial government that they must look for ultimate relief.’78  
 
Pre-empting concerns by acknowledging the Colonial Office view that such 
appointments were ‘likely to encourage separatist tendencies among the Indian 
communities’, Pai noted that this was neither the intention of the Indian government nor 
an issue that should ‘be given weight’ any longer, given India’s changing political and 
diplomatic status. India was now charting its diplomatic networks both within and 
beyond the Commonwealth: in addition to some of its earliest representatives appointed 
in Malaya, Ceylon and Burma, India had exchanged High Commissioners with Australia 
and was to do so with Canada shortly. Pai noted that India was therefore anxious for 
‘even closer contacts’ with the countries and colonies of the Commonwealth, expressing 
interest in sending a delegation to prepare the groundwork for diplomatic representation 
in colonial territories.79 Drawing on the precedents set by the appointments of Indian 
‘agents’ and trade Commissioners before 1947 and the unique possibilities offered by 
Commonwealth membership, India articulated its claim to diplomatic status as merely 
following in this established, longstanding tradition. This nod to historical precedent was 
an attempt to assert Indian sovereignty without raising fears of undue influence. Seeking 
to circumvent strict restrictions over the category of people they could represent, Indian 
officials deftly argued that their locus standi was not necessarily based on the status of 
overseas Indians, but was derived from the legitimate concern of the people of India for 
their overseas counterparts. They argued that ‘public interest in the welfare of Indian 	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communities overseas was increasing … and the Government of India were finding 
themselves handicapped in discharging their responsibilities to the public in India’ 
without the appointment of Agents who would provide ‘authentic and up to date 
information.’80  
 
This was an argument utilised even in the case of politically active Indian communities 
who were represented in legislative councils in colonial territories and were regarded as 
nationals of the colonies in question – a category of Indians British officials were keen to 
position as outside the purview of Indian diplomacy. As Pai noted, the Government of 
India would ‘nevertheless …. like to appoint a representative there mainly with a view to 
maintaining general contacts with and keeping themselves informed of the conditions of 
the Indian community there, as well as to establish friendly relations with the 
government.’81 In its attempt to walk the thin line between India’s responsibility towards 
overseas Indians and the accusations of expansionism that came with it, the government 
of India constructed a narrative of its inherent right to diplomatic representation not just 
as a soon-to-be postcolonial nation but also, especially, as a part of the Commonwealth.  
  
For British officials, the Indian quest for diplomatic representation was an unpleasant 
exercise in dealing with a state that was viewed – to varying degrees – as a postcolonial 
nation unable to exercise restraint in its diplomatic practice, a former sub-imperial state 
harbouring highly political if not outright expansionist ambitions, and a former colony 
approaching Dominion status, thereby entitled to the privileges that came with it. India’s 
claim to diplomatic status was the cause of much internal debate and difference between 
the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as to the motives of Indian 
appointments in British colonial territories that comprised substantial Indian 
populations.  
 
India’s diplomatic presence in these colonial regions would be exceptional in significant 
ways – few Dominions had until then exercised their right to diplomatic representation 
in colonial territories and few countries could claim the kind of influence India derived 
from its widely dispersed populations in these areas.82 Moreover, as the first former 
colony to gain such diplomatic status, India’s presence was viewed by British officials as 	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‘particularly embarrassing in those colonies such as Fiji and Mauritius where the 
population of Indian race is in a majority.’83 Despite widespread discomfort about the 
appointment of Indian agents across the British colonial world, there was however 
grudging acknowledgement that a nation approaching Dominion status – regardless of 
doubts about India remaining in the Commonwealth – was entitled to diplomatic 
representation.84 Yet British officials attempted to stall over the question of Indian 
diplomatic appointments until there was more clarity over India’s political future and the 
date of drafting citizenship legislations that would address the status of Indians domiciled 
in British colonies.85  
 
A persistent lack of response from the British government over the issue soon rankled 
Indian officials, who were under increasing political pressure to act on behalf of overseas 
Indian communities. In February 1947, Pandit H. N. Kunzru moved a resolution in the 
Council of State recommending that immediate steps be taken to ‘a) secure the 
appointment of Agents of the Government of India in Trinidad, British Guiana and Fiji 
and b) promote the cultural and economic interests of the Indians living there.’ 86 
Responding to the resolution, Nehru bemoaned India’s weakness as an international 
actor, helpless in the face of silence from the British government despite several 
reminders: 
 
It does not matter if you send one letter to His Majesty’s Government in London 
about it or a hundred letters … One gets a little tired of repeating demands when 
they are not met … The fact of the matter is that this is governed largely by other 
considerations, not by the letters and telegrams we send to the British 
government but by the strong arm that India may possess at the moment. I hope 
the time may come – and that before long – when India’s strong arm will extend 
to all her children wherever they live in this world and protect and succour them 
there.87 
 
Pointing to India’s success against South Africa in the United Nations as a more hopeful 	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example, Nehru argued that this diplomatic attitude helped ‘Indians even in remote 
colonies, wherever they may be, in Fiji or Mauritius or British Guiana or other pars of 
the world.’ 88 Indeed many other Dominions, he noted, resolved to ‘remove’ anti-Indian 
discrimination lest ‘India became a nuisance again’ in international forums. 89 Nehru went 
on to address the crux of the issue regarding overseas Indians: their entangled legal status 
and myriad possibilities of nationality and citizenship. While they were British subjects at 
the moment, overseas Indians would have to choose between Indian nationality and the 
nationality of their colony of residence: 
 
They cannot have it both ways. Whether they are in Burma or Ceylon or Guiana 
or Fiji, they have to choose whether they will be Indian nationals with the rights 
of Indian nationals and the right to claim protection from India or they will 
choose, remaining Indians of course, another nationality … Though of course he 
… will be culturally connected with India.90 
 
Some scholars have understood these distinctions between political and cultural 
Indianness as clear-cut binaries. That is, the narrative that while India would continue to 
have ‘“cultural and humanitarian” interest in overseas Indians … if they wanted political 
voice, their best recourse was to become citizens of the countries they lived in.’91 
Highlighting the fault lines of intra-Asian solidarity made evident in the Asian Relations 
Conference of March 1947, Itty Abraham has pointed to the attitude of Indian delegates 
who ‘expressed little concern about cutting ties with their overseas compatriots 
permanently’ and the Indian state’s eventual decision to ‘distance’ itself from its diaspora 
at the brink of independence. 92  As I have shown in the previous chapter, such 
conceptions do not recognize the entangled nature of citizenship for overseas Indians 
and the Government of India’s continual engagement with these Indians well after 1947. 
Indeed at much the same time as the Asian Relations Conference, which Abraham reads 
as a moment marking the Indian state’s decisive break with the diaspora, Nehru was 
stressing India’s ‘keen and constant interest in Indians who are resident in East Africa, 
West Indies (including British Guiana), Fiji and Mauritius’ and its desire to appoint 
Indian agents in these areas.93 How does one reconcile these dissonances in India’s 	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attitude toward its overseas communities?  
 
First, it is essential to recognize the heterogeneity and geographical spread of the Indian 
diaspora. Indian diplomacy perceived the British colonial territories of Fiji, Mauritius, 
East Africa, British Guiana etc. in ways that were very different from their understanding 
of the more ‘politically advanced’ regions of south East Asia where significant Indian 
populations were present. Moreover, the shared civilizational linkages of Asian countries 
was a far cry from the entangled realm of indenture, a space that comprised of African 
colonies regarded by Indian diplomats as inferior both in terms of civilizational and 
socio-political standing. Indeed, in his speech at the plenary session of the Asian 
Relations Conference, Nehru sought to speak for ‘Asia’ in articulating its role towards 
‘our suffering brethren in Africa’. He argued that Asians, as pioneers of anti-colonialism, 
had a ‘special responsibility to the people of Africa’ and ‘must help them to take their 
rightful place in the human family.’94 This theme defined India’s policy towards African 
countries and their general perception that Africans were students who had much to 
learn from India’s political consciousness and civilizational history - exemplified by the 
Government of India’s scholarship schemes for Africans in the 1950s.  This narrative 
‘positioned the global south and emergent African nations within it as clients of Indian 
technological expertise and the cultural/civilizational improvement that ostensibly came 
with it.’95  
 
Moreover, the Indian communities in these colonial regions too were descendants of 
indentured labourers, the ‘original girmitiyas’ who, according to Abraham, were an 
‘embarrassing reminder of a time when India was weak and colonized’ and therefore easy 
for the Indian state to exclude.96 While Indian diplomatic discourse is indeed replete with 
narratives of indenture as a national shame, I depart from Abraham’s reading to argue 
that these perceptions of ‘backward’ Indian communities identified them instead as in 
great need of the Government of India’s expertise and facilitated increasing diplomatic 
engagement. As G. S. Bajpai noted while putting forth the case for Indian representatives in 
British colonies, ‘the large majority of Indians in some of the territories were of poor 
intelligence and education’ and the presence of Indian representatives who could engage 
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with them would benefit the colonial governments.97  
 
Second, while expansionist and hegemonic motives of the Indian state were a concern 
both in South East Asia and colonial territories in Africa and elsewhere, their salience in 
terms of India’s engagement with its overseas communities varied. Abraham argues that 
Indian officials sought to assuage fears of the Indian diaspora’s presence as a potential 
fifth column in Asia: ‘the political imperative of developing good relations with its Asian 
neighbors was the most direct reason for India’s repudiation of its diaspora after 
independence.’ 98  Similar concerns motivated British attempts to restrict Indian 
diplomatic involvement in the colonial territories – if not prohibit it altogether. This led 
to the negotiation of a strict set of rules governing the diplomatic activity of Indian 
representatives and attempting to delineate a small category of Indians that they could be 
responsible for. This was considered particularly necessary, given that India’s diplomatic 
influence and stature in these regions was derived from the presence of significant Indian 
populations. 
 
Finally, the entangled citizenship and nationality status of these Indians was central to 
these debates. As we have seen, Indians – both those in the colonies and in the territory 
of India – were British subjects under the British Nationality Act of 1948 and in the case 
of overseas Indian communities especially, their legal status was unclear until the Indian 
citizenship act came into effect in 1955 and even after. Indian diplomatic attempts to 
engage with these Indians in colonial territories was mediated by this limbo about their 
status – providing a narrow space for negotiation, even as British officials sought to reign 
in the Government of India’s jurisdiction over Indian communities. The fact that the 
government of India often called on these overseas Indians in colonies to identify with 
their countries of residence in order to access the full political rights they were entitled 
to, did not by itself preclude diplomatic engagement with the Indian state. It is worth 
highlighting Nehru’s reference to Indians in South Africa who were deemed South 
African nationals and yet considered the legitimate objects of India’s diplomatic 
initiatives: 
 
We did not claim them to be Indian nationals, but because of the discrimination 
against them, because of the ill-treatment given to them, we felt that certain 
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humanitarian standards were involved, India’s honour was involved; even though we 
did not consider them as Indian nationals in the strict sense of the word … we raised their 
question before the United Nations General Assembly99  
 
More than six months after the Government of India’s first request for establishing 
diplomatic representation, Nehru himself wrote to the Secretary of State for India, the 
Earl of Listowel, stressing India’s ‘keen and constant interest’ in Indians resident in the 
colonies and reiterating that India considered their diplomatic representation in these 
areas to be ‘of the highest importance to the future relations of India and the 
Commonwealth.’100 British officials hurriedly conveyed their agreement – in principle – 
to the appointment of Indian representatives in the colonies ‘subject to agreement being 
reached about their precise status and functions.’101 Defining these ‘precise’ rules to 
regulate Indian diplomatic appointments was a process with little in the way of 
precedent: indeed, the acknowledgement that ‘Indians were asking for something which 
is a normal and recognized prerequisite of dominion status’ did not tide over concerns 
unleashed by the potential of Indian diplomatic activity. Even as he ventured that a 
‘gentleman’s agreement’ was perhaps more ideal than a codified set of rules handed to 
India, J. S. Bennett of the Colonial Office noted the extent to which this would be a 
unique departure: 
 
I am informed that the functions of Dominion High Commissioners in London 
have never been defined and that this was quite deliberate ... Moreover, if there is 
to be any document defining the functions of a diplomatic or consular 
representative, this document must obviously emanate from the government 
which appoints him and not from the government which receives him. I do not 
think it would make a good impression on the Government of India or really 
assist the object we have in view ... but if we do not do this, I see no way of 
getting across the idea of a close definition of functions.102 
 
British officials thus had a plethora of fears about Indian diplomacy, worrying especially 
that they might be dealt with in much the same way as South Africa: this was likely to 
place the UK in an ‘extremely vulnerable’ position, their ‘“crime” magnified tenfold in 	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international eyes merely because the locus delicti was a colony and not a sovereign 
state.’103 The South Africa example found much resonance in other departments too with 
one official in the UN department arguing that India’s ‘politics and emotionalism (had) 
defeated the legally-correct view’ that as South African nationals, the status of Indians in 
South Africa was an internal ‘domestic’ issue.104 He therefore cautioned against a similar 
scenario in British colonial territories where ‘Indians both want to have their cake and eat 
it too, i.e. to be members of the British Commonwealth with full civic rights, including 
franchise, and to retain a right of appeal to India for support.’105 
 
Officials sought to justify the unprecedented drafting of rules for Indian representatives 
in colonies as essential for a non-white state whose diplomatic behaviour they regarded 
as emotional, immature and problematic. As A. Campbell of the Colonial Office argued, 
‘we who have had much more experience in these matters than the government of India 
should be entitled to state what functions these Commissioners should perform.’106 Thus 
India seemed to require a strict diplomatic lesson of sorts to prevent their overreach: 
unlike Britain’s exercise of ‘discretion as to the sort of things on which we see fit to make 
representations to the Indian government, the latter rarely seem to be deterred from 
claiming the right to interfere in even the most purely domestic matters involving 
Indians.’107  
  
There was considerable agreement among the often-sparring Colonial Office and 
Commonwealth Relations Office that the appointment of Indian Agents was a stark 
impediment to the assimilation of Indian communities – already regarded as distinct and 
resisting integration – and prone to encouraging the ‘local Indians to think of themselves 
as a self-contained national community.’108 The ghosts of indentured labour, one official 
argued, were long gone: 
 
Indians in the colonies are either born colonials or immigrants taking up their 
livelihood and settled life in the colonies ... The danger of an ‘Agent’ is to 
encourage the ‘communal’ life and discourage the assimilation and common life 
we have been trying to build … In the past many Indians have treated their life in 	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the colony as a sojourn for making money, have returned or remitted their gains 
to India. As they share in the common life with all political and social rights of 
the territory, special protection is not called for.109  
 
Moreover, the very terminology of ‘Agents’ troubled officials, even as they acknowledged 
the precedents of Indian agents appointed in the 1920s in Ceylon, Malaya and Burma and 
‘Protectors’ of immigrants even earlier. This was a relic of the past, they argued, and 
instead suggested that titles of ‘Consul’, as in the case of China, or ‘Commissioner’, as in 
the case of old Commonwealth representatives, were better suited. Indeed in their view, 
‘the whole implication of an Agent is that there is an immigrant population in need of 
special protection: while there was such a population we did have ‘Protectors’ but the 
time for that has gone by.’110 However, the historical status of Indian Agents in Malaya 
and Ceylon was a benchmark that both British and Indian officials would point to: as J. 
S. Bennett of the Colonial Office noted, the ‘Indian government … would not accept 
less than has already been conceded to them’ in these cases. 111 This was a particularly 
problematic precedent for the British given that ‘the Indian representative in Malaya has 
already been recognized as having the duty of establishing close liaison with the Malayan 
governments in all matters affecting Indian interests and Indians of all classes’ – not just 
those of persons ‘with roots in India’.112 It neither limited Indian representatives to 
consular functions nor necessarily guaranteed against the political interests of the 
Government of India.  
 
Yet the question that most troubled British officials in their attempt to delimit the 
jurisdiction of Indian representatives was the issue of the nationality or citizenship status 
of Indians in the colonies. Given that British and Indian citizenship legislations were 
unlikely to be in effect immediately, officials relied on the criteria of domicile to define 
those ‘permanently resident’ as beyond India’s locus standi.113 This was no clear-cut 
classification either, as the Colonial Office’s India committee noted: the distinction 
between those that were ‘permanently resident’ and ‘the rest’ who could be the 
Government of India’s responsibility was likely to ‘lead to some difficulty in interpreting 
it in practice ... there would be plenty of loopholes for an Indian representative who 
wanted to encourage genuine “local” Indians to look to Mother India while staying 	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within the letter of the agreement.’114 As the Indian Secretary General G. S. Bajpai argued 
when presented with a draft of instructions for Indian representatives, short of 
citizenship legislation cementing the status and definition of ‘permanent resident’, it 
would be ‘extremely difficult, if not impossible, to define with precision those for whose 
interests draft instructions contemplated that representatives should properly be 
responsible.’115 Moreover, the existing status of ‘British subject’ and India’s continued 
membership of the Commonwealth made these questions harder to resolve. As Colonial 
Secretary, Sir Arthur Creech Jones argued: 
 
So long as India remains a part of the British Commonwealth, there is no short 
way on nationality grounds of distinguishing those local Indians in a colony who 
are genuine local residents and part of the local community, and those Indians 
who may just be, so to speak, visiting the territory. On any normal understanding 
of consular functions, the Indian representative ought really to confine himself to 
intervening with the local government on behalf of the latter class only. But all 
Indians are British subjects and I fear it will be very difficult to draw an effective 
line.116 
 
These entanglements of identity and nationality shaped by Empire and reiterated within 
the Commonwealth framework provided India considerable leverage to engage with the 
status of overseas Indians in British colonial territories – not necessarily in terms of 
asserting their jurisdiction over these Indians but by recourse to India’s position within 
the ‘Commonwealth family’. Indeed British officials presciently noted that India staying 
in the Commonwealth would considerably complicate the question of citizenship more 
than a scenario of India’s exit wherein Indians in colonial territories would have to 
choose clearly between Indian or British nationality.117 Even as they were aware of these 
limitations, the need to create ‘some line of demarcation … so that both Indian 
Commissioners and colonial governments may know where they are’ led to a final set of 
rules drafted after much internal discussion between the Colonial Office and 
Commonwealth Relations Office.118   
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The formal set of instructions for Indian Commissioners were sent to the Government 
of India for approval in November 1947. These rules called on Indian representatives to 
limit themselves to consular, trade and administrative functions while not intervening in 
local politics.119 Their diplomatic focus was defined as a quasi-consular function, with 
British officials arguing that a wholly diplomatic representative could not be permitted in 
colonial territories. Directing all major political representations to be made to the British 
government rather than local colonial governments, the rules also required them to ‘take 
the greatest care’ that no separatist tendencies were fostered among Indians in colonial 
territories. Most importantly, the instructions defined the jurisdiction of Indian 
Commissioners as pertaining only to those Indians in the colonies who were there 
‘otherwise than for the purpose of permanent residence: you will not be the spokesman 
of Indians permanently resident’ in the colony in question. 120 These were to be the 
guidelines defining Indian diplomatic conduct until citizenship laws came into effect. 
British officials argued that while India could send their Commissioners with any 
instructions of their choice, ‘we will not recognize them as having functions wider than 
those defined in our draft.’ 121  
 
Colonial Office officials vehemently resisted the ‘unnecessarily weak’122 stance of the 
Commonwealth Relations Office that the Government of India had a right to define the 
functions of its representatives and ‘should be treated with every consideration’ as a 
Dominion.123 In a telling metaphor carrying with it the unflinching fury of Empire, 
deeply disdainful of the changing political circumstances, J. S. Bennett noted,  ‘we are not 
obliged to lie down flat under an Indian “diktat”. If anything, UK should have the whip 
hand.’124 Even the existence of these rules was of little comfort to these CO officials who 
argued that Indian diplomats were capable of bypassing them and it was only a matter of 
time before they sought to interfere in local politics. As Bennett argued, many of these 
diplomats were ‘first-class lawyers … adept at contravening the spirit of the law while 
staying just within the letter of it.’125 Despite the many questions about these rules and 
their vague definitions – ‘permanent residence’ would especially continue to rankle 
British officials, as we shall see – they provided useful grounds to insist on the recall of 	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any diplomats diverging from the regulations. This would come to good use later in the 
case of East Africa where two senior Indian diplomats, including the Commissioner Apa 
Pant, were recalled after allegations of interfering in local politics.126  
 
The agreement to enable the appointment of Indian Commissioners on the basis of a set 
of rules governing their functions was without precedent: British officials putting a 
positive spin on this noted that ‘the whole idea of defining the functions of Indian 
representatives in the colonies by agreement between the two governments will be a 
novel experiment in Commonwealth relations.’127 For Indian officials, the long-awaited 
approval of diplomatic representation was integral to its foreign policy objectives, despite 
being addled with rules they deemed excessive. By April 1948, the Indian government 
had selected its diplomatic representatives: Apa Pant was appointed Indian 
Commissioner to East Africa, Satya Charan Shastri to the West Indies, Dharam Yash 
Dev to Mauritius and Samuel Altaf Waiz to Fiji.128 As we shall see, these appointments 
soon facilitated India’s ‘official’, ‘unofficial’, cultural and indeed political engagement, 
crafting a preeminent diplomatic status for India in the colonial territories – much to the 
increasing paranoia of British officials and African nationalists. While cautiously toeing 
the line about the categories of Indians included in their jurisdiction, Indian diplomats 
made official representations to the British government on behalf of overseas Indians in 
the colonies, particularly regarding restrictive immigration legislations targeted against 
them. Their efforts were also complimented by ‘unofficial’ organizations working for the 
causes of overseas Indians such as the Brihad Bharatiya Samaj, whose delegations to 
colonial territories in Africa and South East Asia were sent under the auspices of the 
Indian government.  
 
LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF ‘REPRESENTING’ OVERSEAS INDIANS 
In the previous chapter, we explored the Government of India’s attempts to negotiate 
the entangled status of overseas Indians while drafting its 1955 Indian Citizenship Act. 
This process also had considerable consequences for the diplomatic activities of Indian 
representatives in colonial territories. By 1954, the Colonial Office had been making 
regular enquiries with their colonial governments regarding cases that had ‘arisen locally 
involving the interpretation of the criterion of ‘permanent resident’’ in the instructions of 	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Indian Commissioners’, seeking to understand the workings of Indian representatives 
and their ‘clientele’.129 Most colonial governments reported back that few cases had 
arisen. Indeed even in cases where Indian Commissioners had made representations 
about those Indians who could qualify as ‘permanently resident’ and were therefore 
outside the Government of India’s purview, these issues were often resolved with little 
problem.130 Moreover, colonial officials argued that they had sufficient legal definitions 
drawn from local laws on whose basis ‘permanent residence’ could be interpreted in ways 
that would best suit them.  
 
The workings of the Indian Commissioner and his engagement with Indian communities 
were closely monitored by CO officials who expressed great discomfort even at instances 
of Indian officials utilizing mobile cinema vans and libraries, or opening offices for their 
Information Services. Similar sentiments had been expressed by several officials who 
were keeping an eye on the profile of diplomats appointed as Agents, alleging that they 
were utilised to ‘distract the loyalties of the East Indians from G. B. to India.’131 E. M. 
West of the Colonial Office imaginatively proposed that the development of the Indian 
information services would aid the ‘probable desire of the Indians to wage their own 
Cold war, i.e against South Africa in the receptive north African setting.’132  While these 
activities did not sufficiently qualify as divergent from their stated instructions, West 
argued that ‘the mere presence of Indian Commissioners in such territories is an irritant 
to race relations and a disturbing political factor.’133 Ever the hardliner, he had long 
stressed that there was no need to treat the diplomatic status of Indians on par with 
other Commonwealth nations: the Indians were a special case, as the ‘existence of the 
standard instructions of Indian commissioners testifies.’134 From a narrative where the 
‘special’ position of India as a diplomatic actor – given its significant overseas 
populations and newly postcolonial status – had been cited as necessitating a set of 
instructions for Indian Commissioners, British officials were now arguing that it was the 
existence of these distinct instructions that in some ways caused their ‘special’ status. To 	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quote West: 
 
In practice there is very little consular work (except perhaps in the federation of 
Malaya) and very little trade-promotion by these Indian Commissioners. They 
spend most of their time establishing social, cultural and political (both legitimate 
and illegitimate) contacts in the territories to which they are appointed. The 
peculiar status of Indian commissioners in colonial territories is thus due not so 
much to their title but to the fact that they operate on these instructions.135 
 
Their most pressing concern however was the diplomatic pre-eminence of India in 
colonial territories, having appointed Commissioners in all colonial territories except 
Gibraltar. As anxious cabinet deliberations noted, no other country had such diplomatic 
dominance: Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and Pakistan had tended to 
appoint more junior Trade Commissioners in many of these territories, with the 
exception of East Africa and Singapore where some of them had Commissioners.136 J. S. 
Mernham of the Colonial Office summarised British concerns about India’s diplomatic 
stature thus: 
 
We have always advised Governors that in view of the representational element 
in their Instructions, Indian Commissioners should be granted the privileges and 
immunities and the precedence given to foreign Consuls-General de carrier, and 
that furthermore on account of their Commonwealth status they should be given 
precedence in advance of Consuls-General .... We feel, however, that the 
influence which these representatives of the Government of India are gaining in 
territories with large populations of Indian origin is being materially assisted by 
the prestige attaching to their privileged position and the precedence which is 
publicly accorded to them137 
 
India’s rising diplomatic status derived from its significant overseas populations and 
membership of the Commonwealth was increasingly daunting for British officials, 
particularly in the heightened Cold War context. Indeed while demoting the Indian 
Commissioners would be impossible, officials resolved to balance Indian dominance by 	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calling on other Commonwealth governments to promote some of their Trade 
Commissioners to Commissioner status. Specific instructions detailing their functions – 
of the kind given to Indian and Pakistani commissioners – were deemed unnecessary 
even though their functions ‘would in fact be similar.’ Mernham expressed surprise that 
it had not occurred to Indian officials to ask if their Commissioners ‘were the only ones 
with specific and restrictive instructions … the obvious answer is, of course, the special 
situation created by the existence of large communities of Indian origin in the territories 
concerned.’138  
 
Drawing on the work done by Indian Commissioners while navigating these restrictive 
guidelines, Indian officials in the High Commission in London made consistent 
representations to the British government regarding issues affecting Indian communities 
in the colonies. Spearheaded by Krishna Menon who took a particular interest in these 
regions, Indian officials sought to address a range of immigration restrictions targeting 
the mobility of Indians into colonial territories such as Aden, Kenya, the Gold Coast, 
Gibraltar and the rights of Indians to be recognized as ‘permanent residents’ in these 
regions.139 They also brought to the fore a range of issues of religious and cultural 
concern, such as the right of Hindus to cremate their dead in the West Indies and 
educational facilities for Indians in East Africa, while also objecting to anti-Indian 
propaganda in Aden.140  Deploring the tendency of the Aden press to distinguish 
between Hindu and Muslim Indians (the former being targeted as ‘aliens’), Indian 
officials successfully called on the British government to coordinate with the local 
government to put an end to such vicious activities.141  
 
As diplomatic representatives speaking for their overseas communities while walking the 
thin line defining their acceptable jurisdiction over these Indians, Indian officials were in 
constant correspondence with their British counterparts who often complained of being 
‘bombarded’ by aide memoires of protest in cases where the Indians had no locus standi. 
Menon – who had long been viewed with great suspicion in the context of the Cold War, 
due to his links with the Communist Party of Great Britain – was the focus of much of 	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the ire.142 Alleging that Menon ‘got much of his ammunition’ regarding the treatment of 
Indians in British colonies ‘not through the Indian government channels but from some 
of his extremist left wing contacts in London’, officials celebrated the end of his term as 
High Commissioner.143 While they anticipated a downturn in the barrage of complaints 
about the status of overseas Indians with his exit, they were nevertheless still negotiating 
representations from his replacement, P. N. Haksar, who made the most of India’s status 
as a Commonwealth nation to push for action vis-à-vis overseas Indians in the colonies. 
Indeed the framework and leverage offered by the Commonwealth was central to Indian 
diplomatic representations and also manifest in the frequent tussle between the Colonial 
Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office to reconcile India’s special status as a 
Commonwealth partner with the limits of its jurisdiction over ‘local’ or ‘domestic’ issues.  
 
While scholars such as Lorna Lloyd have stressed the particularities of ‘Commonwealth 
diplomacy’ as a diplomatic system of its own, largely focusing on the unique dynamics 
between the old Commonwealth nations, it is worth considering the Commonwealth as 
an underlying framework for India’s diplomacy with Britain.144 The diplomatic space 
provided by the Commonwealth had long been held by proponents as one of the 
benefits of India’s membership. This leverage was most evident when CRO officials 
sought to limit Indian interventions on behalf of overseas Indians by pointing out that 
other sovereign states like Italy, for example, would not seek to speak for its 
communities settled in Britain. 145 As Haksar skilfully retorted, the British government 
‘should presumably not want to treat the Indian government in the same way as a foreign 
government.’ 146 Chastened British officials noted that ‘we were all able to agree warmly 
that this was so, and that we are all in the Commonwealth family.’ Indeed in the report of 
the meeting that made its way into the file, a handwritten note draws attention to 
Haksar’s intervention while claiming ‘I was about to add this qualification myself, but Mr 
Haksar made it for me!’ Worried that they had missed a trick, CRO officials reiterated 
the ‘Commonwealth family’ phrase in a narrative more suited to their interests: 	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Although we intended to be firm over the point of principle, we had every desire 
to be helpful and cooperative towards another member of the Commonwealth 
family as long as they kept to the rules.147 
 
The framing of Indian and Pakistani citizenship legislations – the latter was adopted in 
1951 – brought with it the question of redefining the jurisdiction of Indian and Pakistani 
diplomatic representatives through citizenship rather than domicile as a term of 
reference. Even as they acknowledged the far more logical and clear basis provided by 
citizenship, British officials preferred the continuation of the existing definition until 
these countries themselves called for a change. Their predominant concern was the fact 
that the lure of Indian citizenship for Indians in the colonies would result in ‘crystallising 
out a section of the community at a time when we were trying to develop a multi-racial 
community.’148 This was so even as they acknowledged that there were several benefits 
for Indians who registered for citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies, even at 
the risk of losing Indian citizenship – UKC citizenship would, after all, guarantee their 
political rights in the colonies. This advantage, they gleefully noted, could cause ‘the 
Indian Commissioner’s sphere of influence … to contract’.149 
 
THE BRIHAD BHARATIYA SAMAJ AND ‘UNOFFICIAL’ DIPLOMACY  
Apart from diplomatic negotiations in London utilising the Commonwealth leverage and 
a diplomatic presence on the ground in the form of Commissioners, the Government of 
India also encouraged ‘unofficial’ delegations and organizations to engage with Indian 
communities in these regions. These were efforts to represent and speak for Indian 
communities in ways that the Commissioner was restricted from doing ‘officially’. The 
work of Shri Brihad Bharatiya Samaj is perhaps the most vivid example of such 
objectives: founded in 1950 under A. B. Patel, an influential Indian leader in Kenya, an 
ad-hoc committee of the organization operated out of Bombay with the high-ranking 
Congress politician S. K. Patil as president. While Patil described the organization in a 
private conversation with colonial officials as ‘a cross between Chatham House and the 
Overseas League,’150 its main stated objective was the ‘establishment of an organization 	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which would render assistance to Indians from overseas countries during their sojourn in 
India, particularly at the important ports of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta and which 
would also serve as a cultural centre and an information bureau.’151 The proposed centre 
– Brihad Bharatiya Bhavan  – was expected to provide cheap accommodation for 
overseas Indians visiting India, while also housing a research institute ‘to conduct 
research in the history, development and present conditions of Indian settlers abroad’ 
and an ‘international centre for the diffusion of Indian culture’.152 The Bhavan would 
therefore stand as a ‘monument to the abiding faith, perseverance and patriotism of the 
present Indian generation at home and abroad.’153 
 
This organization had sent delegations to Africa and South East Asia in 1955 to interact 
with overseas Indian communities and collect funds for the construction of the Brihad 
Bharatiya Bhavan, some portion of which was to be funded by the Indian government. 
Given its high-profile leadership, British officials kept a watchful eye on its activities and 
held the organization as likely ‘having the official backing of the Government of India’ 
and acting as an ‘unofficial intermediary’ between the Indian government and its overseas 
communities.154 While Patil and other members of his delegation were cautious to avoid 
controversial local topics and positioned themselves very much as ‘a visiting VIP on a 
goodwill mission’155, they stressed familiar themes: dispelling African notions of Indians 
as exploiters, urging the Indian community to be united politically while working towards 
a multiracial society, and emphasising India’s goodwill for all coloured peoples. 156   
 
In public speeches, Patil nevertheless claimed that Africans had lacked ‘anything in the 
way of civilization before the arrival of the Europeans and Indians … while in some 
areas they had made great advances, in others they were still very primitive.’157 Even as 
Nehru warned Indians against imagining ‘that everyone in Africa looks up to India with 
infinite gratitude as a kind of elder brother’ the patronizing Indian gaze that viewed 
Africans as in grave need of India’s advice and example to follow was widespread.158 The 	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Government of India’s perception of Indian communities in African colonies ranged 
from notions of ‘poor’ former indentured labourers in need of Indian diplomatic 
assistance, to the perception of merchants and traders as exploitative agents who needed 
to be warned. Indeed, the latter often received strict censure to the extent that Nehru 
would even assert that ‘we want them to remain there (in African countries) only so long 
as they have the goodwill of the people of the country … if they cannot retain that 
goodwill … the sooner they come back the better.’159 Indian officials had long viewed 
these overseas communities as deficient in many ways. As Sutton has shown, ‘these 
populations were deemed sufficiently Indian to justify the guidance of the Ministry and 
missions. They were simultaneously insufficiently Indian … both as actors within this 
broader political struggle and, therefore, as Indians.’160 
 
By the mid 1950s, India’s interest in Africa and pronouncements of Afro-Asian solidarity 
at the 1955 Bandung conference were increasingly complicated by rising anti-Indian 
sentiment in African colonies. Indeed, Antoinette Burton has advanced a thoughtful 
reading of Bandung that recognizes it ‘less as an emancipatory lesson than as a cautionary 
tale about the racial logics embedded in postcolonial states from the moment of their 
inception.’161 This was exemplified in the disillusionment of African students residing in 
India at much the same time, as part of a scholarship scheme aimed at creating solidarity. 
The scheme, as S. K. Patil confided to British officials during his African tour, had been 
a failure: ‘some of the Africans on their return to the colonies have become amongst the 
bitterest enemies of the Indian settled in Africa.’162 The response of Getonga Ngatia, an 
African student based in Delhi, to Patil’s speeches urging African-Indian unity, is telling: 
 
Mr Patil is wrong in stating that Indians in East Africa are ‘Africans first and 
Indians next.’ I wonder if any true African will accept it. This is the same as 
saying that the Europeans who were in India were Indians first and Europeans 
next.163 
 
British officials viewed the presence of Africans in India as a much-needed reality check 	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for Indian exceptionalism and anti-colonial diplomacy. As G. H. Middleton, acting High 
Commissioner in New Delhi, gleefully reported, ‘it is salutary for the Indians to discover 
that the former (Africans) have a legitimate pride in the achievements of their own 
territories and are by no means willing to accept without question Indian ideas about the 
way their affairs should be managed.’164 While Indians sent aide memoires seeking 
clarification about British policy in African colonies, especially in the case of violent 
police action to suppress the Mau Mau rebellion, this was tempered by the disclaimer 
that India – though ‘critically opposed’ to colonialism – did not seek to ‘make things 
difficult’ for the British. Neither did they harbour any expansionist agendas in the region, 
as Menon repeatedly sought to assure British officials.165 The question of anti-Indian 
immigration restrictions in African colonies, an issue constantly raised in Indian 
representations, had by then been framed as a nationalistic African response to prevent 
Indian hegemony. Indeed as Lord Reading, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, argued: 
 
It is ridiculous for Krishna Menon to talk as if the Africans were pining for the 
arrival of more Indians, that we were the only obstacles to the holding of a 
perpetual love fest between them. The row about the position of Indians in 
Africa is as old as my father's Viceroyalty.166 
 
Regardless of their belief in the actual capability of the Indians to achieve hegemonic 
goals, this was a narrative that found much resonance with the Colonial Office’s 
longstanding desire to limit India’s presence in these regions and to resist Indian 
diplomatic actions against colonialism in international fora like the Trusteeship Council. 
Henry Hopkinson of the Colonial Office argued that Indian immigration was not only a 
‘menace to the economic interest of Africans but also … a potential weapon in the cause 
of Indian penetration of Africa and substitution of Indian for British influence in the 
colonies.’167  The Colonial Office perceived a deliberate Indian policy to utilize the 
strength of the growing Indian populations in colonial regions in order to extend 
dominance over ‘all coloured peoples’, while paying ‘lip service’ by asking Indians to 
integrate. These Indian communities had long been viewed as especially problematic – 
resisting integration while wielding both an economic monopoly over colonies and a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Letter from G. H. Middleton to H. F. C. Crookshank, 12.9.55, DO 133/147, TNA 
165 Letter from Henry Hopkinson to the Viscount Swinton, 27.1.54, FO 371/112214, ‘Indian government 
policy towards British colonialism’, TNA. 
166 Handwritten note from Lord Reading, 28.1.54, FO 371/112214, TNA 
167 Henry Hopkinson to Lord Swinton, 18.2.54, FO 371/112214, TNA 
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demographic dominance, given their significant populations and high fertility rate.168 Fear 
of India’s vast populations and the notion that India sought to get rid of excess 
populations through immigration would continue to resonate in the context of Indian 
immigrants in Britain, as we shall see in Chapter 5.  
 
These varying degrees of paranoia about India’s diplomatic role came to the fore in 
complaints against Apa Pant, Indian Commissioner in East Africa, who was transferred 
in 1954 after allegations of intervening in local politics.169 Indian Foreign Secretary M. J. 
Desai later attempted to clarify Pant’s record, arguing that he had not intended to 
interfere and had ‘spent half his time resisting the pressures of one sort or another.’ In 
his reading, this was an unfortunate outcome of the delicate diplomatic balance India had 
to maintain in the colonies: 
 
 The position of any Indian Commissioner was a very difficult one in the present 
circumstances. The Indian community thought that they had only to go to the 
Commissioner for him to work things in their favour; and the Africans thought 
that India, now being free, should teach them how to be free also.170 
 
Such a narrative also positioned India’s diplomatic expertise as very much in demand 
among both indentured Indian and African communities, who apparently sought to 
achieve political consciousness by following India’s stellar example.   
 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen how India’s attempts to represent overseas Indian communities – 
navigating strict delineations of its claim over these Indians – provides a unique lens into 
the messy entanglements of nationality, citizenship, and the practice of postcolonial 
diplomacy. This is no more clearly illustrated than by overseas Indians’ vexed experiences 
of repatriation. This was a history that ranged from South Africa’s fixation with reducing 
its Indian population through compulsory repatriation in 1927, to countries such as 
Ceylon and Burma, where calls for repatriation were regarded as a solution to the crises 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Revised draft of joint memo by Secretary of State for Colonies and CRO (undated), FO 371/112214, 
TNA.  
169 For more on Pant’s stint in East Africa see Aiyar, Indians in Kenya and Gerard McCann, ‘From diaspora 
to third worldism and the United Nations: India and the politics of decolonizing Africa,’ Past & Present, 
218, no. supplement 8 (2013): 258-280.  
170 Quoted by A. Clutterbuck in his note about his conversation with M. J. Desai, 29 March 1954, FO 371 
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of citizenship faced by Indians in the 1940s.171 The story of repatriation in British 
colonial territories such as British Guiana was, however, quite different.  
 
In 1955, the M. V. Resurgent sailed from British Guiana, the last official ship chartered 
to carry ‘home’ former indentured labourers in fulfillment of a right of return stipulated 
in their contracts. This was no ordinary event since this was, after all, the last ship 
chartered by the British government in Guiana to transport former indentured labourers 
back to India: passengers wept as they began their voyage ‘back home.’ 172  These 
passengers – many of them elderly – had decided to travel ‘back’ to India despite 
repeated warnings from the Indian Commissioner in Trinidad and other officials of the 
British Guiana government that conditions in India were not suitable, particularly if they 
did not have financial resources for maintenance. While the Indian government had long 
resisted schemes of ‘voluntary repatriation’ owing to the fear that this would open the 
floodgates for forced repatriation of Indian populations resident across the world,173 it is 
worth examining the vocabularies they used to distance themselves from these former 
indentured labourers. Arguing that India was under considerable strain managing 
Partition refugees, they noted that ‘this would merely add to a problem … (that) the 
government of India are finding extremely difficult to solve.’174 In a remarkable aide 
memoire on the subject, the Government of India expressed its grave concern about the 
programme of ‘mass repatriation’ and argued that past experience had shown that most 
repatriates were psychologically, physically, and financially unsuited to life in India. As 
they pointed out: 
 
The majority of repatriates are … so poor that they have no means to make a 
fresh start in life … (being) of an advanced age …. (they are) too infirm to take 
up any job or vocation … Having remained out of the country for many decades 
these repatriates find themselves without any roots or real contact with their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 See Uma S. Dhupelia-Mesthrie, ‘Reducing the Indian Population to a “Manageable Compass”: A Study 
of the South African Assisted Emigration Scheme of 1927,’ Natalia, 15 (1985), 36–56 and Renaud 
Egreteau, ‘India’s Vanishing “Burma Colonies”. Repatriation, Urban Citizenship, and(De)Mobilization of 
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relations in India.175 
 
Calling on British officials to recognize the ‘human’ rather than legal aspect of the 
problem and offer an alternate enticement of land in lieu of repatriation rights, the 
Indian aide memoire stressed the moral responsibility of the government of British 
Guiana to help them ‘settle down in the country permanently and to contribute further 
to its development’.176 As British officials retorted, there was no ‘mass’ scheme of 
repatriation and there had been less than 300 repatriates on the MV Resurgent.177 Fuming 
at a note that was ‘wrong in its facts, more wrong in its deductions, and most wrong of 
all in the language in which it is couched’, E. L. Sykes of the Commonwealth Relations 
Office expanded on the ironies of the document: 
 
One can easily imagine the virtuous indignation with which the Indians would 
regard a decision by the UK or some colonial government to dishonor the 
obligation to repatriate Indians who are entitled to such repatriation. It is equally 
easy to imagine their indignation if UK or colonial authorities tried to impress on 
Indians in the colonial empire how beastly conditions are in India today. 
Nevertheless these last two actions are the very things which the Indians imply 
we ought to be doing.178 
 
Indeed, British officials noted the ‘pleasing logic’ of the fact that ‘the desire to return to 
India is no doubt due, in part at least, to the propaganda put about in recent years by the 
Indian Commission’.179 Stranded in Calcutta port and struggling to settle back in their 
‘homeland’, many of these repatriates sought to return to British Guiana, reaching out to 
the British High Commission in India in this regard. Chastened British diplomats railed 
against the ‘embarrassment’ of dealing with these repatriates, especially given the fact that 
most of them were registered as Citizens of the UKC and held British passports.  
 
The story of Mr Balgobin, lodged in the files of the MV Resurgent, perfectly exemplifies 
these dilemmas. A citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (UKC) by birth, 
Balgobin sailed on the MV Resurgent not as a ‘repatriate’ per se but in order to ‘see 
India’ for the first time in his life. Traveling therefore at his own expense, Balgobin set 	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177 Draft Savingram from London to British Guiana, 22 .9.55, DO 35/5320, TNA 
178 Letter from E. L. Sykes to J. V. Rob, 4.5.56, DO 35/5320, TNA 
179 Savingram dated 22.9.1955, DO 35/5320, TNA 
	   135	  
his sights on Uttar Pradesh to meet his father’s relatives and stay in India for a while 
before proceeding to the United Kingdom. Soon, however, Balgobin approached UK 
High Commission officials in India in desperation: he could not locate his relatives and 
had lost most of the money he was carrying. He had written to his family in British 
Guiana but had not heard from them and called on the High Commission to make 
contact. As the High Commission official noted in a letter to the CRO, ‘I understand 
that he has now started pestering people, both British and Indian, for money to maintain 
himself and to go towards the cost of a passage to British Guiana, or, preferably, the 
United Kingdom. He has tried, unsuccessfully, to sign on a ship going to the UK.’180 
Given that the British Guiana government for the most part rejected such requests for 
assisted passages, Mr Balgobin’s prospects were hardly auspicious. Carrying UKC 
passports while seeking to travel to India under a repatriation scheme sponsored by the 
British Guiana government, these ‘Indians’ embodied the unfortunate entanglements of 
citizenship, nationality and identity. Their journey was in many ways an ominous 
precursor to the crises of citizenship awaiting Kenyan and Ugandan Asians in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Indeed Nehru’s response to the arrival of the MV Resurgent is 
telling: ‘Thetar log agaye’ (‘The stubborn people have come’).181  
 
In tracing the complex history of Indian diplomacy and its engagement with overseas 
Indians well after 1947, I have questioned much of the existing scholarship by 
highlighting the advent of an Indian diplomatic posture imbued with the histories of 
indenture. The afterlives of indenture shaped both the vocabularies and geographies of 
Indian diplomatic representation and international status, facilitating a distinct realm of 
British colonial territories across Africa and the Caribbean where India could assert its 
unique diplomatic stature. This was so even as British officials sought to limit India’s 
unique diplomatic status, derived from the presence of significant numbers of Indian 
populations in these regions, through an unprecedented list of instructions for Indian 
Commissioners. Viewing this colonial terrain and its people as in grave need of Indian 
expertise about achieving postcolonial status and political consciousness, Indian 
diplomacy navigated these limits set by British officials – exemplifying the realities of 
performing postcolonial diplomacy. Yet, as the stories of entangled citizens like Balgobin 
indicate, India’s efforts to project diplomatic influence by drawing on the presence and 
status of overseas Indians brought with it many a painful consequence. 	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4 
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE INDIAN PASSPORT 
(1947-1967) 
CASTE AND CLASS IN THE INTERNATIONAL REALM 
 
 
The passport is a political document and one which the State may choose to give or 
withhold. Since a passport vouches for the respectability of the holder, it stands to 
reason that the Government need not vouch for a person it does not consider worth.1 
 
In 1967, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India held in a landmark judgement 
that the right to hold a passport and travel abroad was a fundamental right of every 
Indian. They noted, in a narrow 3:2 ruling, that by granting passports as per its discretion 
until then, the executive had ‘patently violate(d) the doctrine of equality’ of the Indian 
constitution. Yet as the remarks quoted above from the dissenting statement of two 
judges show, a passport was also considered a document of privilege that would offer its 
holder the recognition of the state – it could therefore only be offered to those deemed 
‘respectable’ or ‘worthy’ enough to represent India and uphold its honour abroad. 2 
 
This chapter explores the discretionary grant of Indian passports from 1947 to 1967 as a 
system through which the Indian state produced the ideal Indian citizen and migrant 
capable of representing India in the sanctified ‘international’ realm. This was a process 
imbued with the intersections of caste and class and shaped by the afterlives of 
indenture. The widespread narrative that India’s international reputation had been 
besmirched by the shame of the ‘coolie’ – a category of colonial Indian migrants widely 
regarded as belonging to the lowest class and caste backgrounds – pervaded endless 
assertions that ‘unskilled’, ‘undesirable’, ‘pedlar class’ Indians would similarly embarrass 
the postcolonial Indian nation abroad. This strict control over the grant of passports was 
an effort undertaken in collaboration with British officials who were keen on restricting 
the influx of Indian migrants into Britain – their entangled status as British subjects as 
per the British Nationality Act of 1948 enabling them to enter Britain freely. This was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Dissenting arguments of Judges M. Hidayatullah and R. S. Bachawat. Satwant Singh Sawhney  vs D. 
Ramarathnam, assistant Passport Officer, Government of India, 1967 AIR 1836. Available at 
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therefore an exercise in marking out a mutually-overlapping set of ‘undesirables.’ For the 
Indian authorities, this meant preventing the mobility of ‘unsuitable’ lower caste and 
class individuals – seemingly the legatees of the ‘coolie’, who were most likely to 
embarrass India in the West. For British officials, this was defined by grave concerns 
about increasing numbers of ‘coloured immigrants’ of ‘Indian race’ in general, and by the 
lowliest ‘pedlar class’ of Indians in particular. Indeed British anxieties were further 
compounded by the fact that large numbers of Indians also held United Kingdom and 
Colonies (UKC) or colonial passports and could migrate freely as British subjects. The 
oppressive control over the grant of Indian passports led to a proliferation of forged 
passports utilised to bypass the restrictions placed by the state, a crisis that both British 
and Indian officials viewed as proof of their notions of the lower class/caste migrant as 
an innately suspicious and shameful representative of Indianness. 
 
Mahmood Mamdani has thoughtfully argued that ‘a passport is essentially a class 
document.’3 I will show that the Indian passport was essentially a document embodying 
the intersections of caste and class. In so doing, I articulate a reading of the passport that 
is significantly different from the existing literature on the postcolonial Indian passport 
which largely focuses on its use in the context of Partition. By recovering the salience of 
caste in shaping Indian ideas of the international realm and those that were deemed 
eligible to traverse it, I seek to add to the nascent literature investigating the ways in 
which Indian diplomacy and international relations were imbued by the euphemisms and 
vocabularies of caste. In so doing, I also go beyond analyses that view the Indian state’s 
relationship with its migrants solely in terms of its relationship with its established 
‘diaspora’.4 Instead, I investigate India’s diplomatic mediation of the very process of 
migration and its discretionary grant of passports as a discourse where the Indian 
government perceived every passport issued as an act of inscribing national identity onto 
an international stage – a notion that had grave consequences for thousands of Indians 
deemed ‘unsuitable.’ The afterlives of indenture inform the postcolonial negotiation of 
identities and discourses shaped by Empire, an aspect further reinforced by the limits 
and prospects of migration enabled by the BNA.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  Mahmood Mamdani, From Citizen to Refugee: Uganda Asians come to Britain (Cape Town: 
Fahamu/Pambazuka, 2011), 29 
4 Notable examples include Itty Abraham, How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014) and Latha Varadarajan, The Domestic Abroad: Diasporas in 
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PASSPORT HISTORIES 
Much has been written about the role of the passport in identifying an individual as 
belonging to a nation-state and in so doing, providing the documentary basis for the 
state’s successful ‘monopolization of the legitimate means of movement.’5 As an identity 
document, the passport both translates the identity of an individual onto paper and acts 
as a ‘state artefact’ of citizenship. 6  As a document ostensibly meant for travel, it 
nevertheless reflects the sovereign control over mobility that marks out certain travellers 
as ‘undesirable’ and their movement to certain areas as illegitimate or ‘illegal’. In so 
doing, the passport intertwines national identity with the capacity for international travel; 
after all, it ‘connects the individual to the realm of the international.’7 It is this very 
potential of the passport-holder to represent his or her nation in the international realm 
that shaped the Indian state’s discretionary grant of passports only to those deemed 
worthy of upholding the honour of the nation-state.  
 
The Indian passport system was a necessarily exclusionary process shaped by the 
afterlives of indenture and imbued with meanings of caste and class: indeed with 
financial guarantees and even educational qualifications deemed necessary in order to 
obtain a passport, the system was in many ways akin to visa regimes that permit the entry 
of only ‘highly skilled’ migrants. While scholars have shed light on the restrictions 
encountered by Indians migrants in countries such as the United States and Canada, the 
entangled status of Indians as British subjects as per the BNA created a unique scenario 
where strict restrictions were imposed by the Indian government itself, in coordination 
with British officials.8 
 
It is more useful therefore to read the history of the passport not as a document 
‘protecting’ citizens and facilitating mobility, but as one standardizing the restriction and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 7. See also Mark B. Salter, Rights of Passage: The Passport in International Relations 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003) 
6 Kamal Sadiq, ‘Limits of Legal Citizenship: Narratives from South and Southeast Asia’ in Citizenship in 
Question: Evidentiary Birthright and Statelessness, eds, Benjamin N. Lawrance and Jacqueline Stevens (Durham, 
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8 Excellent, diverse examples include Vivek Bald, Bengali Harlem and the Lost Histories of South Asian America 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), Vijay Prashad, The Karma of Brown Folk (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000), Nico Slate, Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the 
United States and India. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), Hugh Johnston, The Voyage of the 
Komagata Maru: The Sikh Challenge to Canada's Colour Bar (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), Renisa 
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regulation of the migration of ‘undesirables’. Indeed in a fascinating intervention 
excavating the passport as a product of Empire, Radhika Mongia has shown that 
attempts to regulate the migration of ‘free’ Indians into Canada – ‘coloured’ British 
subjects, but British subjects nevertheless – produced the passport as an ostensibly 
‘national’ document concealing race. 9  This cemented the notion of a nation-state’s 
‘inherent right’ to control immigration on ‘national’ lines: an ‘alibi’ to deny charges of 
racial discrimination. Indeed, as Mongia points out, this ‘monopoly over migration 
indicates not that control over mobility begins after the formation of the nation-state but 
that the very development of the nation-state occurs, in part, to control mobility along 
the axis of the nation-race.’10 This went hand in hand with the Indian state’s own 
restrictive guidelines as to who could be granted a passport – a process wherein, as 
Radhika Singha shows, the passport was constructed as a  ‘civic credential’ meant ‘only 
for Indians of ‘means, education and standing.’11 This was not a facility extended to 
either the ‘non-regulated’ labourers working in Malaya, Ceylon, and Burma, or the 
indentured ‘coolies’.12  
 
The Government of India’s delineation of those who were eligible to obtain a passport 
thereby also shaped the international production of certain categories of Indians as 
somewhat  more ‘desirable’: indeed, as early as 1904, the Indian government had reached 
an agreement with Australia that facilitated the entry of only ‘“bona fide” Indian 
merchants, students and tourists to enter and stay for up to a year’, while not being 
subjected to its literacy test.13 The granting of a passport was thus tied to the notion of 
the potential acceptability of its holder in the international realm. For those deemed 
eligible to hold a passport, this document bestowed upon them formal recognition of 
their subjecthood and relationship with the British Empire and the colonial state in 
India.14 Until 1914, any passport issued in India (or the Dominions) ‘was proof of British 
subjecthood within that territory.’15 The British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 
1914, for the first time, allowed Indians to enter British colonies freely, even though their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Radhika Viyas Mongia, ‘Race, Nationality, Mobility: A History of the Passport,’ Public Culture, 11, no. 3 
(1999) 
10 Mongia, ‘Race, Nationality, Mobility’, 554. 
11 Radhika Singha, ‘The Great War and a ‘Proper’ Passport for the Colony: Border-Crossing in British 
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14 Niraja Gopal Jayal, Citizenship and its Discontents: An Indian History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2013), 28-29. 
15 Jayal, Citizenship and its Discontents, 32. 
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entry to the Dominions was restricted since the Dominions were now empowered to 
enact immigration policies. The introduction of the compulsory passport regime in India 
in 1917 – as a wartime measure during the first World War – thus both asserted the 
coherence and significance of the Indian empire and also created a state document 
camouflaging race into a ‘national attribute’ that could be justifiably used to deny the 
movement of Indians into white Dominions like Canada without bringing into question 
the putative equality of all British subjects within the Empire.16  
 
Histories of the Indian passport after 1947 have largely focussed only on the India-
Pakistan passport system through which the new postcolonial states controlled and 
authorized mobility. 17  There is little focus on the remarkable 20-year period of 
discretionary grant of Indian passports for those seeking to travel abroad, especially to 
the West, or the fact that until 1954, state governments were in charge of issuing 
passports. This was a process whereby Indian and British officials together constructed a 
category of Indians mutually regarded as ‘undesirable’ for entry into Britain, a narrative 
produced by the intersections of race, caste and class in the long aftermath of Empire. 
 
A significant literature focusing on immigration and border control has traced the 
persistent construction of ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable immigrants’ – terms laden with 
meanings of dirt, pollution and fear of miscegenation. As Tamara Vukov has argued, the 
narrative of the ‘desirable immigrant’ is delineated in relation to their ability to ‘constitute 
the imagined community’ of the nation. This in turn necessitated ‘simultaneously 
repelling undesirable immigrants’ in order to ‘produce and regulate the population while 
securing the state and its national borders against a whole range of “undesirable” 
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others.’18 Imogen Tyler has viewed the status of undesirable migrants as ‘national abjects’ 
who seem to pollute the body politic, provoke disgust and revulsion, and yet by their 
presence paradoxically reinforce the authority and identity of the nation-state. She has 
powerfully argued that abjection is a ‘design principle of British citizenship’, serving as ‘a 
technology to abjectify undesirable migrants from the former colonies’, who are 
positioned as ‘interiorized others.’19 As the horrific practice of ‘virginity testing’ of South 
Asian women entering Britain in the 1970s exemplifies, the border of British immigration 
was a site where the bodies of migrants were subject to rigorous scrutiny and permitted 
to pass through only if they could prove their worthiness, value and desirability for the 
British nation-state. In this reading, the border serves as a ‘filter’, a much-needed barrier 
that ‘distinguishes between the desired and the undesired.’ 20 
 
While these interventions no doubt offer a useful lens to understand the production of 
migrants as ‘undesirables’, a focus on the intersections of race, caste, and class 
permeating discourses about indenture are essential to understanding the particular 
meanings of the term in the Indian context. The presence of Indians in British colonial 
territories and Dominions spurred important if inconvenient narratives of Indian identity 
that derived from frameworks of caste, class and race. The history of Indian indentured 
labour is central to such debates: not just in terms of the stereotype of the dreaded lower 
caste/class coolie that informed such notions, but very much the fact that the ‘coolie’ 
narrative became the overarching discourse against which other notions challenging this 
construction of overseas Indian identity were articulated. Indeed, as Marina Carter and 
Khal Torabully have pointed out, ‘indenture was decried as the cause of a rise in anti-
Indian discrimination throughout the Empire.’21 As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
even when Indian nationalist leaders campaigned to put an end to indenture, their 
motivation was very much the fact that ‘all of their compatriots would be tarred with the 
‘coolie’ brush.’ 22  
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The ‘free’ ‘passenger Indians’ in regions of indentured labour emigration were especially 
keen to dissociate themselves from these ‘coolies’. As is well known, Mohandas Gandhi 
had written to the British High Commissioner in Natal in 1905 calling for an end to the 
usage of the ‘offensive’ term ‘coolie’ in the context of Indian traders – indeed he had 
long bristled at being called a ‘coolie lawyer.’23 Sorabji M Darookhanawala, an Indian 
engineer from Zanzibar, was speaking for many such elite Indians when he argued that 
the ‘unclean…dirty’ coolies  were ‘entirely to blame because of their lack of manners’ for 
provoking the dislike and disgust of the English. Thus, even as such elite Indians 
protested against being treated as ‘undesirables and niggers to be boycotted and got rid 
of’, they themselves delineated a certain kind of Indian as more worthy of respect and 
fair treatment than others.24 
 
Such narratives of the civilizational superiority of a particular type of Indian were further 
complicated by the dynamics of race, wherein the African native was regarded as inferior 
even to the Indian coolie.25 This construction of what W. E. B.  Du Bois fittingly termed 
‘a color line within a color line’ shaped Indian  self-perceptions of their racial identity, 
particularly in the case of overseas Indian communities. 26 These discourses relied on 
upper caste and class elites as the upholders of Indian civilizational glories – a narrative 
that carried with it expansionist histories of British India as a ‘sub-imperial’ power with 
its own sphere of influence, an ‘empire of the Raj’.27 This was further amplified by 
notions, even among the British, that a ‘better class’ of Indians were in stark contrast to 
the coolie and could act as ‘settlers’ or ‘colonizers’ and participate in the ‘civilising 
mission’ in African colonies.28 
 
While it has become increasingly commonplace for scholars to point to the ways in 
which the supposed inherent genius of Indian civilization has shaped discourses of 
Indian exceptionalism, postcolonial identity and foreign policy, it is equally important to 
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reiterate that the rhetoric of civilization functioned in vividly racial terms. 29Indeed upper 
caste Indians in America identified themselves as Aryans in an attempt to circumvent the 
prevalent construction of the menacing, undesirable ‘Hindoo’ race and articulate their 
claim to citizenship. 30  This was a reiteration of the ‘two-race theory’ of Indian 
civilization, propounded especially by Max Müller, which produced binary categories of 
upper caste Aryan Indians as Caucasians and lower caste/Dravidian Indians as 
‘Negroes’.31 This shaped perceptions of the hierarchies of being ‘coloured’, wherein elite 
Indians attempted to distance themselves as much from the infamy of the lower 
caste/class ‘coolie’ as from the status of black Americans and Africans.  
 
Writing in 1933, Lanka Sundaram, Director of the Indian Institute for International 
Affairs, argued that the betterment of overseas Indians was dependent not just on a ‘truly 
national’ Indian government that could better represent their sentiments and concerns, 
but also on the ability of new generations of ‘colonial-born’ Indians to move away from 
the reputation of indentured labourers ‘drawn from the lowest strata of the Indian social 
fabric and as such do not represent all that is fair and noble in our civilization.’32 The 
discrimination faced by these ‘better’ category of Indians, regarded as far more ideal 
representatives of India in the international system, was attributed to both India’s 
dependent status within the Empire and the ignominy brought about by association with 
the indentured labourer. In the words of the academic and demographer S. 
Chandrasekhar, it was ‘irrational to maintain that because the original Indian immigrants 
were of a laboring class, and hence of a low standard of living, no emigration of the 
people of a higher standard can be permitted today.’33 This ‘standard of living’ argument 
utilized by British officials also irked the scholar P. Kodanda Rao, who decried the fact 
that the reputation of the dreaded coolie had resulted in ‘a racial solution … being 
applied to an economic problem.’ 34  Railing against the assumption of British and 
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Dominion officials that all Indians were of low economic, social and cultural status, he 
noted that there was ‘no economic justification for excluding an Indian Maharaja, even as 
there was none for refusing H. H. The Aga Khan a piece of land in the Kenya highlands 
because he was an Indian.’35 While these discourses clearly indicate the ways in which 
elite Indians sought to distance themselves from the histories and legacies of the coolie, 
how does one read this as a narrative of caste? 
 
Scholars of indentured labour migration have challenged widespread stereotypes of the 
‘coolie’ as a passive, gullible, immoral actor bereft of any agency. In so doing, they have 
also stressed the diverse social and caste backgrounds of these labourers, confronting the 
notion of indentured labourers as exemplifying the lowest rungs of Indian society.36 
Caste has thus been an important part of the debate on indenture – both in terms of the 
possibilities it presented for seemingly transcending and losing caste by going across the 
seas, and in terms of its strange persistence nevertheless in indentured communities.37 
Responding to Antoinette Burton’s call for readings of caste and its dynamic vis-à-vis 
race that go beyond a helpful yet largely US-centric focus, I show that the histories and 
afterlives of indenture in Indian diplomatic discourse offer a valuable space to recover 
the intersections of caste, class and race.38 
 
That ‘caste’ is not spoken by name does not negate it from histories of Indian identity 
and diplomatic history. The relegation of caste to the ‘social’ realm has a longstanding 
history evident in the formation of two distinct bodies before independence: the 
National Congress for ‘political reform’ and the Social Conference for ‘social reform’. 
The agenda of the Social Conference took a backseat as elite Congress Hindus argued 
that political reform to liberate the Indian nation from British rule could not wait until 	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social reform was achieved.39 These debates had significant manifestations that continue 
to define the silences over caste in discourses of Indian foreign policy. Caste was placed 
in contrast to the struggle for independence, thereby defined as a problematic that 
questioned the capacity of India to be ‘fit’ for self-rule.40 These narratives resulted in 
grouping together the political and the international, and the social and the domestic: a 
categorization that reiterated the problem of caste as outside the purview of international 
relations and foreign policy. Indeed, this conscious attempt to circumscribe caste as a 
uniquely domestic, Hindu issue within the sovereign borders of the postcolonial nation-
state ensured that there would be no ‘global opprobrium or attention associated with 
slavery or apartheid.’41 Moreover, the Nehruvian developmentalist state’s vision of the 
nation as ‘an inclusive space of casteless and secular citizens’ rendered caste invisible in 
its discourse.42 Indeed, the apparent absence of the word caste itself should be viewed as 
striking; as Mongia has argued in the case of race, ‘the “guilt” of racism is evident … in 
the general policy of not naming race.’.43  
 
These narratives permeate the elite Indian conception of the ‘international’: not so much 
as a distant, casteless realm, but more so as a sanctified space in which the honour of the 
nation-state was at stake. If anything, the notion of a casteless international terrain, 
wherein the privilege of being casteless was one held only by upper caste Indians, was 
facilitated by attempts to exclude lower caste and class citizens from gaining passports 
and thereby entering the international realm in the first place. Indeed, the almost 
normative recognition of the upper caste/class Indian as the ideal citizen and passport-
holder is unsurprising. As M. S. S. Pandian has shown, not only did the colonial 
experience produce the Brahmin as both the authentic representative of Hinduism and 
the true Indian most capable of achieving modernity, the transition to the postcolonial 
era reiterated ‘the Brahminic as the national…a move which implicitly reduced non-
Brahmins and religious minorities as being inadequately Indian.’ 44  This produced 
vocabularies of privilege and humiliation that permeate discourses of Indian foreign 
policy and function as euphemisms of that often unnamed word: ‘caste’. Yet centering 	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the experience of indenture makes the salience of caste all the more visible: a fact most 
evident in the earliest elite narratives about the ‘coolie’. Gandhi’s interpretation of the 
word ‘coolie’, as I have shown in the introduction, relied on more familiar meanings of 
caste – effectively a ‘transcoding' of caste, class and race, to borrow Sankaran Krishna’s 
phrase.45 As Gandhi put it: 
 
We have become the untouchables of south Africa … The word coolie … means 
what a pariah or untouchable means to us46 
 
It is worth interrogating the ‘we’ and ‘us’ in this statement: Gandhi’s reading of the term 
‘coolie’ did not simply mean that the ‘coolies’ were the untouchables of South Africa, but 
that all Indians including elite Indians like Gandhi himself were, by extension, enveloped 
in this untouchable status. Indeed, Gandhi wrote that this was ‘retribution’ for the fact 
that Hindus had excluded a ‘section of their own kith and kin’ as untouchables.47 In these 
recollections of his work as a lawyer representing the indentured labourers of South 
Africa, Gandhi’s articulations of solidarity are nevertheless tempered by a clear indication 
of his difference from them. As he wrote, Indians in South Africa had ‘not insulted me 
by calling or regarding me as “sahib” (master/sir) … others … continued to address me 
as “bhai” (brother) until the moment I left South Africa. There was a sweet flavour about 
the name when it was used by the ex-indentured Indians.’48 Gandhi’s kinship with 
indentured labourers was thus far more special and unique, given his clear dominant 
caste and class status. He had long articulated the ‘humiliation’ brought about due to the 
reverence shown by indentured labourers towards him. In his autobiography, Gandhi 
recalled his shock at the fact that an indentured labourer named Balasundaram had 
entered his office with his headgear in hand – the act of having removed the turban seen 
as reinforcing the inferiority of the person. In his account: 
 
Balasundaram thought that he should follow the practice even with me. This was 
the first case in my experience. I felt humiliated and asked him to tie up his scarf. 
He did so, not without a certain hesitation, but I could perceive the pleasure on 
his face.49 	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For Gandhi, this was not unlike the incident where he had himself been made to take off 
his turban by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in South Africa. Even where 
Gandhi drew attention to the seemingly similar circumstances that both Balasundaram 
and he faced, it served to reiterate the marked difference in the stature of one Indian 
being ‘humiliated’ in the Supreme Court and the other who viewed himself as far inferior 
to a ‘fellow’ Indian.50  
 
Gandhi was far from the only one framing indenture through the rubrics of caste. 
Charles Freer Andrews and William Pearson’s 1916 report on the conditions of 
indenture in Fiji is an archive of anxiety about lower caste, immoral coolies and what was 
in their view the inexplicable presence of upper caste individuals in these communities. 
For Andrews and Pearson, these indentured communities were comprised of individuals 
of the lowest caste and social status in Indian society – a problematic demographic 
profile further compounded by  what they viewed as the tragedy of losing caste by 
traveling outside India. They held that such factors had created chaotic societies bound 
by few rules or morals. This was most problematic, in their view, since these 
communities had humiliated the ‘fair name of India’ in the international realm: 
 
Fiji is, at present, like a great flaring advertisement, saying, in big letters, to all 
who travel to and fro across the Pacific – 'This is India.’ ... We found ourselves 
protesting every day of our journey to our fellow passengers – 'This is not India.' 
But the patent fact remained … It was the only 'India' which the travellers in the 
Pacific saw.51 
 
Writing many decades after Gandhi and Andrews, Kodanda Rao reiterated a familiar 
analogy whereby ‘Indians overseas are treated by the local whites as untouchables are 
treated in India or Negroes are treated in the United States’, arguing that the increasing 
restrictions faced by Indian emigrants was due to ‘India's dependent status, the colored 
racial character of her nationals, and the fact that the bulk of her emigrants have been 
unskilled coolies.’52 Many other scholars of Indian emigration too were unanimous in 	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lamenting the steadily deteriorating status of the Indian abroad and what they viewed as 
the lasting stain of indenture – a discourse laden with meanings of caste and class, as we 
have seen. In Lanka Sundaram’s view, the increasing discrimination faced by Indians 
across the world was clearly a legacy of the coolie: 
 
Even after the abolition of indenture, the psychological as well as the social 
environment, which held sway for nearly a century, persisted in continuing. 
Hence, today problems of Indian emigration in distant countries are not so much 
the products of current difficulties but the net result of accumulated prejudices 
and hatred of over ten decades. The indenture concept is still present in the 
“coolie-swamy” phraseology of colonial administrations .53 
 
These afterlives of indenture shaped the discretionary grant of Indian passports and the 
exclusion of lower caste and class individuals – now euphemistically referred to as 
‘unskilled’, ‘undesirable’, ‘pedlar class’ Indians and deemed as unpleasant reminders of 
the coolie, thereby humiliating for the nation-state. The claim to represent India in the 
international realm seemed far more ‘natural’ for upper caste and class Indians, given that 
other marginalized castes and communities had long been delegitimized as ‘imperfect’ 
Indians within the nation and as particularly shameful representatives of Indianness 
overseas. Indeed, the very articulation of the Indian nation had been ‘imbued with Hindu 
Brahminical consciousness championed by Western educated caste Hindu elites.’54 As we 
have seen, such elites had consistently sought to distance themselves from the reputation 
of the ‘coolie’ – a strikingly persistent term, as evident from the remarks of South 
African politician Oswald Pirow in 1953: 
 
 Nehru is just another coolie … He knows the West, is a good speaker and a 
sharp debater, but immediately he opens his mouth it is all too clear he is only a 
coolie … 55 
 
Thus even while Nehru’s elite upbringing and Western education could not, in Pirow’s 
eyes, absolve him of ‘coolie’ status, such criterion were central to Indian notions of those 
who could represent India in the international stage. This is evident in the profile of most 	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Indian diplomats, almost all of whom were Western-educated and drawn from the ‘“the 
upper middle class” or “well to do semi-feudal segments of ... Indian society”, and came 
from wealthy families.’56  Suraj Yengde has argued that this preponderance of the 
Brahminical class ensured the reiteration of the postcolonial Indian state as the successor 
of the British Raj by keeping ‘the foreign policy stance the same by excluding the 
marginalized community from its deliberations’ – thereby ensuring that ‘the internal strife 
between the majority and minority communities remained muted on international 
platforms.’ 57 Indeed elite upper-caste Indians had long positioned themselves as 
‘authoritative interlocutors between their societies and the white international system’, 
and defined the ‘lower-class/caste Indians and Africans as bringing up the rear of this 
hierarchy.’58 
 
Such notions are evident in India’s representative Sir B. N. Rau’s apparent suggestion 
that a solution to South Africa’s ‘India problem’ involved providing the full rights of 
citizenship to a ‘small number of … the cultured and best type of Indians.’59 According 
to a remarkable memorandum sent by G. P. Jooste, South Africa’s representative to the 
UN, in which he detailed his informal meeting with Rau, the latter had noted that Indians 
who went to South Africa were not ‘the best type’ and had given India a ‘bad name.’ 
Vineet Thakur draws on Rau’s reference to his discomfort with the growing anti-caste 
movement in India –seeing it, remarkably, as a form of discrimination against upper caste 
communities – to show that his ‘euphemistic reference to Indians of the “best type” was 
really a proxy for the upper castes.’ Indeed, as per Jooste, Rau had gone on to suggest 
that India did not mind the discrimination against undesirable, lower caste Indians who 
were not ‘the best type’, as long as ‘it was not based on racial lines’.60 As we shall see, 
India employed similar logics of interpretation in 1961 to assure British officials seeking 
to legislate the discriminatory Commonwealth Immigrants Act that restriction against 
undesirable lower caste/class migrants was permissible, even understandable, and did not 
amount per se to ‘racial discrimination’ as long as ‘skilled’ elite Indians were permitted to 	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enter Britain.  
 
Even though Rau’s overt mention of caste may be unexpected, longstanding narratives 
over the shame of the ‘coolie’ make evident the inherently casteist meanings of such 
euphemisms. Moreover, Rau was no exception even in the blatant articulations of caste. 
Such narratives are also evident in the remarks of S. K. Patil, a leading Congress 
politician who headed the delegation of the Brihad Bharatiya Samaj to East Africa. As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, this was an organization that aimed to champion the 
cause of overseas Indians, and during his trip Patil had called for solidarity between 
Africans and Indians in public speeches. In private conversations with British officials 
however, Patil was far more frank in claiming that the ‘Africans were still so backward as 
to be completely unfit for self-government.’ Most importantly, the internal report 
circulated by British officials after their meeting with Patil quoted his views on 
segregation in East Africa: 
 
 Speaking candidly there was some justification for the desire of the more 
advanced communities in East Africa to have a measure of social segregation 
from the more primitive peoples (he admitted to a similar antipathy on his own 
part towards eating with, living in close proximity with e.g the “adivasis.”)61  
 
This alarming intertwining of race and caste reiterates the ways in which Indian 
understandings of race, particularly regarding the place of Africans in the international 
realm, relied on more local meanings and perceptions of lower castes and tribes such as 
the Adivasis (literally translated as the ‘indigenous inhabitants.’) While Rau and Patil offer 
easier interpretive access to the researcher by ‘obviously’ stating the word caste or the 
term Adivasi, it is crucial to track the more subtle yet evident euphemisms of caste that 
permeate Indian diplomatic discourse – a task I have undertaken by utilising the 
overarching frame of indenture and its afterlives. 
 
The intersections of caste, class and race were not just significant for Indian delineations 
of the lower caste/class migrant undeserving of a passport, but in its own ways also 
shaped British official views of certain categories of Indians as particularly ‘undesirable’ 
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members of the ‘coolie class.’62 Indeed, as Martin Wainwright has shown, British notions 
of the ‘social rank’ of Indians in the metropole were often shaped by the caste and class 
ranking of Indians in their own society – hence their widespread tendency to view 
Brahmans ‘inherently as a respectable class.’ 63 This was further complicated by the 
entangled status of all Indians as British subjects as per the BNA, many of whom held 
British subject or United Kingdom and Colonies passports. The unintended 
‘concealment’ of their racial identity within the broader ‘national’ rubrics of these 
passports was an issue of particular concern for British officials, compounded by their 
inability to legally prevent the entry of British subjects into the United Kingdom.64   
 
IDENTIFYING  ‘INDIAN RACE’ IN BRITISH PASSPORTS 
A significant scholarship has shown the ways in which the colonial British state in India 
enumerated and categorised populations – as communities rather than individuals – in 
order to ‘produce’ knowledge about them, fixing them in these identities and shaping the 
ways in which they came to view themselves.65 Similar processes of classification and 
enumeration pervaded British attempts to understand the extent of the ‘problem’ of 
‘coloured immigration’ in general and the exact Indian percentage of the ‘coloured’ 
population in particular. Given the ways in which ‘documents sometimes create citizens 
instead of the other way around,’ I show that in deciphering the eligibility of particular 
citizens to  hold British passports, British officials produced interesting if awkward 
categorisations of their racial status. As F. A. K. Harrison of the CRO tellingly noted 
while using the term ‘Indian race’: ‘I did not much like that word.’66 
 
Of the many misgivings felt by British officials about the entry of immigrants from India, 
perhaps the most significant was the question of how ‘obviously’ British they were, and 
how assimilable these particular British subjects from the subcontinent were in 
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comparison to other races, notably the West Indians. These discussions often sought to 
clarify the level of desirability of Indians for the British nation-state. A 1958 internal 
report on the ‘problems’ arising from the influx of coloured immigrants noted the 
differences between West Indian immigrants who are ‘mostly of a good type who fit 
fairly easily into British society’, and Indians and Pakistanis who ‘are greatly handicapped 
by their inability to speak English and their lack of any kind of skill’. Indeed, the class 
backgrounds of immigrants entering Britain from the subcontinent, who were ‘mostly 
unskilled simple peasants who know no English’, seemed ‘ominous’ to the British.67 
 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the entangled status of Indians especially until the 
legislation of the Indian citizenship act in 1955 necessarily meant that British officials 
acted as passport issuing authorities for Indians – be they British subjects without 
citizenship or Indian UKC citizens. This often necessitated the grant of UK passports 
based on racial ‘common sense and humane considerations’ to white persons born in 
India who were ‘obviously’ British even if they did not legally qualify as either UKC 
citizens or citizens of any other Commonwealth country. 68 In confidential instructions 
sent to British missions in countries where there was Indian diplomatic representation, 
they noted that those ‘obviously of British European descent, need not be referred to the 
Indian representative, but may be granted a UK passport if a new one is required.’69 This 
‘bureaucratic discretion’70 to enable racism provided for the grant of a UK passport to 
ensure that despite their clear legal status as potential Indian citizens, white persons 
would not be subjected to the possibility of Indian citizenship. In the words of F. H. 
Cleobury, ‘The granting of a passport is not, fortunately, a matter in which, as in the case 
of registration of the Act, we are tied to the letter and we must allow ourselves 
freedom.’71   
 
Such ‘commonsensical’ and ‘compassionate’ bestowals of passports to white persons in 
order to extend UK citizenship to them also produced a new ‘non-racial’ term to 
describe them: ‘British European’. 72 This curious term had first been introduced as a 
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racial category in application forms for those seeking to register for UKC citizenship.73 
Indeed, given that millions of ‘coloured’ people could also lay claim to the term ‘British’, 
the new formulation of ‘British European’ race would assert the whiteness of those 
Britons who had a special claim to Britishness. 74 In one case where British officials 
recommended that an Indian seaman in much the same circumstances as white passport 
applicants be referred instead to the Indian representative for passport facilities, 
Cleobury noted: 
 
The obvious grounds for differentiating his case from those who I have 
mentioned above are that of race or colour.  I do not see how it is possible to 
avoid this although we cannot admit it openly!75 
 
This was in line with colonial usages of the British Indian passport: by not naming race 
but codifying it as a ‘national attribute’ in the document, Dominion and colonial officials 
were able to ‘effect racial exclusion without naming race’ or colour.76 While this strategy 
of erasing race would be seemingly easier to implement with the independence of India, 
the BNA and the putative racial equality of all ‘British subjects’ complicated this, 
resulting in the construction of categories of ‘Indian race’ and ‘British European’ race. 
Internal correspondence however clearly spelled out the exact meaning of the latter: 
those of ‘pure white British European stock’.77 Dominions like Australia on the other 
hand sought to ingeniously limit the entry of non-white holders of UK passports by 
demarcating them on the basis of the region in which they acquired their passport. That 
is, if UK passports were issued outside the geographical borders of the UK itself, these 
persons were required to get additional authorisation to enter Australia.78 
 
The British need to define an ‘Indian race’ also stemmed from their persistent fear of the 
seemingly invisible and unaccounted number of Indians who utilised UKC and British 
colonial passports to enter the United Kingdom. The passport’s role in subsuming race 
as a ‘national attribute’ now ironically meant that those who held UK passports were not 
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classified by Immigration Officers as anything other than ‘UK nationals’. 79  British 
officials seeking to find out the exact number of those of ‘Indian race’ in the United 
Kingdom struggled to find such a number, given that ‘only people traveling with Indian 
passports are classified as ‘Indians’ by Immigration officers.’80 Similarly, those Indians 
born in British colonies who either held British colonial passports of the colony in 
question or had UKC passports after registering as UKC citizens, were also not counted 
as ‘Indians’ by immigration authorities. This created another problem for officials 
seeking to identify the exact number of people of ‘Indian race’ entering the UK: 
 
Unfortunately, we have no statistics which will help, because as a general rule, a 
coloured British subject is classified for the purposes of the HO immigration 
statistics as belonging to the territory in which his passport was issued (eg. 
Holders of Kenya passports are classified as ‘East Africans’), whilst those who 
hold United Kingdom passports are classified according to their places of birth.81 
 
The ‘winds of change’ engulfing British colonies and former colonial territories in 1960 
spurred further fears among officials that this would prompt the increasing movement of 
Indians to the United Kingdom.82 British officials frantically attempted to keep track of 
the movement of Indians from regions as diverse as Malaya, Singapore, Fiji, Uganda, and 
Kenya, by calculating the number of colonial passports sent for endorsement to travel to 
the UK. Since colonial passports ‘generally are only endorsed for the holders’ immediate 
journey’, officials scrutinised them with fear that all those who held a passport were on 
their way to their ‘Eldorado’: Britain.83 As Wickson noted, ‘I was somewhat shattered 
today to be presented with a large batch of 34 British passports (the majority of them 
colonial ones) for clearance prior to the holders (all Sikh) going to the UK.’84 Moreover, 
officials viewed with great suspicion the fact that these passport-holders wanted to add 
the details of their children to their passports:  ‘we often suspect these (children) are not 
their own …  (they are) making some money on the side taking three or four youths with 
them.’85 Even as they discounted more paranoid suggestions that many Indians travelled 
to colonial territories simply in order to register for UKC status and travel to Britain, 	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British officials feared that those ‘whose passports were not endorsed for the UK may 
have found their way here’ simply by virtue of holding passports.86  
 
This was another number of people they simply could not enumerate, given the 
bureaucratic tendency to rely on the passport’s replacement of race with nationality as 
the defining category of identity. Moreover, as long as these clearly ‘undesirable’ persons 
held any passport – be it an Indian passport, British colonial passport or a UKC passport 
–  ‘there is not much to stop them.’87 Indeed, even as they critiqued the tendency of 
colonial governments to register people of ‘Indian race’ as UKC citizens ‘too easily and 
uncritically’,  as in the case of one Mr Asa Singh, they acknowledged that it was 
impossible to deny Singh an endorsement to enter the United Kingdom.88 According to 
M. P. Preston, it was one thing for Indian officials and authorities of colonial 
governments to restrict the issue and endorsement of passports, but yet another for the 
British to ‘restrict the endorsement of a UK passport held by a UK citizen who 
apparently does not “belong” to a colony’ (underlined in original): 
 
We cannot see how we could justify a refusal to endorse his passport as he 
requests … little real point in refusing the endorsement since Asa Singh will no 
doubt soon discover (if he does not already know) that he will not be refused 
leave to land in the UK even if he arrives with his passport not endorsed for the 
UK.89 
 
The possession of any passport as a British subject thus meant potentially being able to 
enter Britain – a prospect that terrified British officials who were unable to prevent their 
entry legally and were already struggling to enumerate and negotiate the influx of Indians, 
whose racial status had seemingly submerged under the ‘national’ identity of colonial and 
UKC passports. The solution therefore lay in preventing the acquisition of passports in 
the first place – a policy that British officials called on an amenable Indian government 
to follow, given the rising influx of Indian passport holders migrating to Britain.  
 
THE ‘HONOUR’ OF THE INDIAN PASSPORT 
In 1956, the extraordinary Garry Davis – self-proclaimed ‘World Citizen’ who had 	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renounced his American passport and citizenship – entered India carrying what he had 
termed a ‘World Passport’. The World Passport had been carefully designed by Davis, 
certifying its holder as ‘a world-citizen’ who would ‘try to recognize his responsibilities as 
a member of the World Community.’ On his visit to India, he sought out an important 
fellow ‘world citizen’. Presenting Jawaharlal Nehru with a ‘World Passport’ and declaring 
him a ‘Sovereign Citizen of the World’, Davis recalls telling the Indian Prime Minister 
that his ‘basic principles are of course yours, one world and one mankind.’90 These ideas, 
along with the quest for world government, had indeed long been a part of Nehru’s 
vision of international relations.91 Yet, one must hope that Nehru was aware of the sad 
irony of being provided a symbolic ‘world passport’ at a time when the Indian 
government was actively denying passports to large numbers of its lower caste and class 
citizens, deeming them ‘unskilled’ and ‘unsuitable’ to travel abroad as representatives of 
India.  
 
Notions of privilege and respectability that served as the guiding principles of granting a 
passport in colonial India had significant postcolonial afterlives, their relevance seemingly 
reiterated by notions of these lower caste and class applicants as unpleasant reminders of 
earlier coolie migrants. Niraja Gopal Jayal has argued that the delay in passing the Indian 
Passport Act – as late as 1967 –was due to the fact that ‘the idea of a passport in the 
western sense had not … been institutionalized or internalized, so that people acquired 
passports quite casually without realizing the implications of such an act for nationality 
and citizenship.’92 While she draws on the India-Pakistan passport system to make this 
point, it is highly unlikely that people struggling to get passports to travel to the West – 
resulting in a forged passport racket – were ‘casually’ acquiring passports. As the British 
Indian writer Dilip Hiro recalled, so ‘stringent’ were the ‘educational and financial 
requirements for successful passport applications’ that in 1957, ‘in spite of good 
academic qualifications and financial references, it took the author (sic) six months to 
secure a passport in India.’93 Far from being ‘casual’ acts of acquisition, access to 
passports was scarce and served as a mechanism through which the second class citizen 
likely to embarrass India in the West was categorised and thereby contained. From 1946, 
the Indian government was issuing passports only if guarantees of maintenance and 
repatriation were provided to ensure that the applicant would not become ‘destitute and 	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require repatriation at (the) government’s expenses.’94 Such financial concerns would 
long shape the criterion based on which an applicant’s suitability to travel abroad was 
judged, with monetary limits in place to assess the ‘solvency’ of an applicant or their 
guarantor.95 
 
Such strict controls following colonial protocols for the issue of passports meant that all 
those domiciled in India including Europeans and Anglo-Indians – much to the chagrin 
of the British – would be subjected to these rules. Noting that such rules were being 
applied far too zealously by Indian authorities, British officials argued that these criterion 
were designed only for those ‘Indian British subjects of a low standard of education and 
limited means.’ Indeed, demanding financial guarantees as a means of denying mobility 
was a mechanism meant not for ‘people of this sort, but people of the Indian pedlar 
class.’ 96 The full or partial whiteness of these special British subjects thus seemed to 
mean that despite their inability to prove financial resources, they were not to be denied a 
passport.97 British officials therefore communicated to the Indian passport authorities 
that they did not have to ask for proof of maintenance from domiciled Europeans and 
Anglo-Indians since, it would seem, they were not quite Indians and therefore not the 
responsibility of the Indian government. As a British official pointed out, ‘we should not, 
in the event of their becoming destitute here, ask the Government of India to accept any 
financial responsibility for their repatriation.’98  
 
Meanwhile, Indian officials had continually recommended to the British throughout the 
1950s that they refuse leave to land for Indians whose passports did not have an 
endorsement – the more lenient equivalent of a visa at that time – for the UK. The 
British High Commissioner in India, Malcolm Macdonald, approved of this course of 
action as a means to ‘catch the undesirable Indians who leave India ostensibly for other 
destinations without having their passports endorsed for the UK.’ 99 However, Home 
Office officials repeatedly noted that this proposal was a ‘non-starter’ since, regardless of 	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the lack of endorsement for the UK, the passport itself served as sufficient proof of their 
nationality and therefore British subject status.100 Therefore, ‘there is no power under the 
present law to require him to satisfy the immigration officer of anything else as a 
condition of being allowed to land in this country.’101 Officials also argued that this 
proposal would ‘only nibble at the main problem’ of ‘coloured immigration’, given that 
only a small percentage of Indians carried passports not endorsed for the UK. 102 They 
therefore rejected suggestions to include such a proposal in the draft of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill that was being prepared then. This would, in the words 
of J. M. Ross, be an ‘extra mesh in an already awkward net, simply for the sake of 
catching a few extra fish.’103 Moreover, by outsourcing to other countries the power to 
approve the entry of British subjects to the UK, they feared that ‘we might well find 
ourselves treating British subjects more harshly than aliens.’104  
 
Given that an Indian passport served as an entry ticket into Britain, as proof of Indian 
citizenship and therefore British subject status, restricting the very possession of such 
passports rather than requiring special endorsements for the UK was deemed essential 
for preventing the movement of ‘undesirable’ Indians to Britain. This was so, even as 
British officials had long been aware that by asking India to keep a certain lower 
class/caste category of Indians away from Britain, they had done something which ‘we 
do not ask Canada or Australia to do.’105 Indian passport applications of such Indians 
seeking to travel to the United Kingdom were thus referred to the Commonwealth 
Relations Office, following ‘long-standing arrangements’ : 
 
when an Indian or Pakistani who is illiterate, indigent or of low social status applies to 
his government for a passport for the purpose of coming to the UK, the name 
and address of a sponsor in the UK and information about the purpose of the 
visit is referred to the appropriate High Commissioner in the UK, who in turn 
passes the details on to us and we ask the police to interview the sponsor and 
furnish a report on his character, financial status, business or occupation, when 
he came to the UK, and how the applicant is likely to be employed if he comes to 
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this country106 
 
These Indians exemplified what British officials deemed the ‘pedlar class’: an especially 
undesirable category of Indians of ‘low social status’, a clear euphemism for low caste 
and class status, whose passport applications were almost always rejected. The presence 
of Indian seamen and other working class Indians who took up peddling in Britain – the 
most easily accessible form of employment for them during the 1920s and 1930s – had 
long been a concern for British officials. Indeed attempting to prevent the entry of 
potential pedlars, the India Office had in 1931 called on the Indian government to warn -
potential migrants of the ‘wholly erroneous’ belief that there was opportunity for 
‘lucrative employment’ as a pedlar or as a seaman and instead indicate to them ‘the perils 
of settling in Britain.’107  
 
It is hardly surprising therefore that British officials viewed the entry of ‘unskilled’ lower 
class/caste Indians after 1947 as an influx of new additions to the dreaded ‘pedlar class’. 
Indian officials were equally wary of this category of immigrants, as is evident from their 
response to the passport renewal application of Mr Salig Ram of Dehradun. While the 
provincial Criminal Investigation Department declared that Ram was eligible to get a 
passport, this was contested by the District Magistrate who warned that the applicant’s 
financial guarantees were insufficient. Most importantly, Indian officials noted that Salig 
Ram’s existing passport identified his occupation as ‘pedlar’. They also suspected that 
Ram’s guarantor – his brother who was already resident in Britain – was not a 
shopkeeper as claimed and was more likely to be a pedlar himself. This application was 
forwarded to British officials, calling on them to check the status of Ram’s brother Des 
Raj in Newcastle. Even as Salig Ram ‘undertook before the magistrate not to engage in 
peddling’, British officials called for the refusal of a passport stating that ‘in the light of 
enquiries which were made concerning the guarantor Mr Des Raj, it appears probable 
that should Mr Ram come to the UK, he would engage in peddling.’108 Ram’s case was 
very much the norm for applicants of such low economic and social status: indeed, as 
Indian High Commission officials noted in 1953, the British government had turned 
down as many as 32 applications in the preceding ten months ‘solely because the 
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applicants’ guarantors in this country happened to be pedlars.’ 109  Yet, given their 
entangled status as British subjects, the British government had ‘not taken exception to 
the continued stay in this country of Indians of this category who came here a long time 
ago.’110  
 
Many of these early immigrants had obtained licenses from the British government to 
engage in peddling, although the legalised status of their occupation did little to remove 
the stigma associated with them. This was as much a grave concern for Indian officials as 
their British counterparts: indeed Indian High Commission officials had been reluctant 
to issue fresh Indian passports for pedlars resident in the UK and instead provided them 
with ‘Emergency certificates’ that would only allow their return to India.111  Complicating 
their status was the fact that the existing passports of many of these applicants did not 
have ‘proper endorsements’ for the UK. While this was in violation of India’s passport 
regulations, this did not in itself prohibit their entry into Britain given their possession of 
a valid passport of a Commonwealth nation. Thus even as they decided to grant new 
passports to these pedlars after widespread complaints and fears of ‘antagonising a large 
number of Indians’, Indian High Commission officials still relied on the criterion of their 
being ‘financially sound’ and ‘endorsed’ their passport only for the UK itself, ‘so that 
they may not visit other countries as pedlars.’ 112  
 
The number of applications referred to the British declined after 1954, leading to further 
doubts among British officials as to the tangible benefits of this system of restricting 
migration at its source. British officials were often unsure if their recommendations 
regarding the refusal of passports to certain applicants were followed by Indian officials; 
nor did they know the exact criteria based on which applications were referred to them. 
Indeed, there was much suspicion that Indians found their ‘own methods’ of getting to 
the UK, even if the CRO and HO had reported adversely about their eligibility for a 
passport.113 As H. W. Savidge of the Home Office noted, they could only hope that there 
was an overlap between Indian and British definitions of ‘undesirable’ persons who 
ought to be denied a passport: ‘it seems probable that the Indian govt could expect us to 	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turn back the people they did not wish to come, rather than those whom we wished to 
reject, but it might well be that these could turn out to be the same in the end.’114  
 
Yet is clear that such a mechanism was in place with the cooperation of Indian officials 
who perceived this to be in their interest. British officials repeatedly asserted that the 
Indian and Pakistani governments were taking steps to prevent ‘working class’ 115 , 
‘unskilled and illiterate persons from coming to this country’116 : these, after all, were 
persons viewed as ‘not likely to do credit to their countries’ reputation in the UK.’117 A 
Home Office memo even claimed that while they had expected such restrictions to end 
with the independence of India and Pakistan, it was at the request of the two 
governments that these arrangements to control the entry of the ‘pedlar class’ were 
continued. 118  
 
Indian acquiescence to these controls was based on a longstanding anxiety of potential 
national embarrassment caused by the ‘unsuitable’ lower class and caste Indian – from 
stereotypes of the coolie to these ‘pedlar class’ Indians. Indeed while a list of guidelines 
issued by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to Regional Passport Officers asked 
them to avoid pre-conceived notions of the ‘ineligibility of any specific class of persons 
for receiving passports’, they were nevertheless warned against granting passports to 
those who were ‘likely to behave in a manner in a foreign country that would lower India 
in the estimation of foreigners.’119 It is telling that the applicant’s apparent inherent 
proclivity to humiliate the nation was considered a main criterion for passport rejection, 
listed alongside other factors such as an applicant’s potential to endanger national 
security and  ability to vilify India abroad.120  
 
Political ‘undesirables’ such as members of the Communist Party of India were often 
denied passports, with Indian officials seeking to provide just enough leeway to plausibly 
deny charges of bias. I. J. Broughton, Undersecretary of the MEA, pointed out in 1952 	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that ‘prominent and active members of the Communist party should normally not be 
given passports, but cases of MPs and to some extent  members of the assembly have to 
be considered rather separately. This does not mean that they should invariably be given 
passports but there must be special reasons for refusing them passports.’121 By 1960, 
even as the guidelines were somewhat reformulated to provide passports for all Members 
of Parliament, local assemblies and councils without calling for financial guarantees or 
security checks, this nevertheless did not apply to members of the formerly-secessionist 
Dravidian political parties such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam or Dravida 
Kazhagam which were apparently ‘blacklisted.’122  
 
The discretionary scope built into the very structure of the passport system was amplified 
further by the fact that state governments were in charge of granting passports on behalf 
of the centre until 1954. The Government of India’s guidelines – effectively calling on 
passport officers to define Indian citizens who would not embarrass the nation abroad in 
order to grant them passports –facilitated clear discriminatory practices in local passport 
offices. The remarkable memoir of Ishwar Das Pawar, the first Scheduled Caste gazetted 
officer in Punjab who became the Undersecretary of the Passport department in 1952, 
makes clear the extent to which discrimination against lower caste applicants was the 
norm. As he recalls, ‘Scheduled caste people would come to me grumbling that they were 
denied passports for the UK while others got them freely.’123 This was evident to Pawar 
in his scrutiny of such applications: he recounts the case of one Scheduled Caste 
candidate whose application had not been dealt with at the state level as was the rule, but 
had instead been sent to Government of India, with the facts of the case misrepresented 
in order to secure a rejection of his passport. Pawar took up the matter with officials in 
Delhi, who reiterated his view that the case be reconsidered and the candidate be issued a 
passport. In his memoir, Pawar quotes the letter sent by I. J. Broughton commending his 
handling of the case: 
 
As it is our policy to be as liberal as possible in the grant of passports consistent 
with the security and honour of the country, it should always be the object of 
state governments to grant passport facilities as freely as they can and only to 	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refuse them when the evidence is really strong that the issue of a passport … 
would be detrimental to our interest … We receive frequent complaints about 
the arbitrary severity with which the passport rules are administered by the 
passport authorities124  
 
Broughton’s representation of the discriminatory grant of passports as a problem of the 
local implementation of guidelines rather than that of the guidelines themselves obfuscates 
the ways in which, as we have seen, these rules were explicitly designed to exclude those 
deemed embarrassing for the nation-state. Indeed the very principle of discretionary 
grant of passports, coupled with strict financial guarantees and educational requirements, 
enabled bureaucrats to exclude many Indians from the lowest caste and class 
backgrounds as unworthy of holding a passport. Pawar was one of the exceptions: he 
attempted to relax the financial requirements for Scheduled Caste applicants and, 
according to Juergensmeyer, ‘helped five hundred SC applicants to emigrate each year.’125 
Pawar movingly recounts his stint in the Passports department: 
 
… quite a number of Harijans were able to get passports for (the) UK …. Many 
of those families are now in that country, and some of them have acquired 
citizenship of that land. It gives me great pleasure and unbounded satisfaction to 
know that they are living there happily and are much better off.126 
 
The complications of dealing with passport authorities in the states eventually led to the 
centralisation of passport authorities in 1954, with the central government setting up its 
own regional passport offices.127 This did not however reduce complaints about the 
arbitrary nature of granting passports, an issue that was more frequently cropping up in 
Parliamentary debates too. In 1961, Lok Sabha MPs called on the Government to 
appoint a Parliamentary committee to look into the ‘rules and procedures regarding the 
issuance of passports with a view to eliminating corruption, discrimination and delays.’128 
A conference of the Regional Passport Officers in 1960 had also likewise discussed 
widespread complaints that passport offices were ‘very slow and dilatory’ and passports 	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were granted only ‘to persons who had good approach … while other applicants had no 
response.’129 Lakshmi Menon, the Deputy Minister of External Affairs, argued that there 
was a great delay in issuing passports  ‘to even most deserving applicants’ and called for a 
more ‘practical and humane approach.’130 Subimal Dutt, Foreign Secretary by then, 
concurred and called on officers to adopt an attitude that ‘a citizen should be given a 
Passport unless there are good reasons to the contrary and not that a passport is not to 
be given until the applicant gives good grounds in his/her application.’ 131  These 
seemingly promising solutions belied the paradoxical conclusions of that same 
conference: making the passport application process easy, according to these officials, 
meant expediting the applications of ‘persons of good standing.’ These persons, they 
pointed out, should be ‘freely’ provided endorsements for the countries they sought to 
travel to and ‘if an educated person (graduate and above) or a person of good standing 
wishes to proceed abroad on a pleasure trip it should not be necessary for RPO to 
enquire about his travel plans or about financial arrangements made.’ 132 Indeed, their 
further suggestions for ‘simplification’ of passport procedures included the following 
incredible proposal: 
 
It was therefore agreed that in addition to the Chief Ministers and Chief 
Secretaries of States and Joint Secretaries to the Government of India, if a 
Secretary/Additional Secretary/Special Secretary/Deputy Secretary to the 
Government of India or various state governments and a Ist class Magistrate 
certifies that the applicant is known to him for more than two years … and 
recommends that the applicant is a fit person to be considered for the grant of 
passport, the Regional Passport Officers should waive the police and security 
verification and grant a passport immediately provided the applicant is eligible to 
receive one otherwise.133 
 
The fact that these suggestions for easy access to passports relaxed rules largely for 	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‘persons of good standing’ only, further illuminates the entirely discriminatory process of 
granting a passport. It is unsurprising therefore that such policies led to a thriving market 
for forged passports utilised by those not privileged enough to be personally acquainted 
with senior government officials.  
 
FORGING PASSPORTS, FORGING IDENTITY 
 
Conditioned to a world of permits, licenses, paper controls of all sorts, the canny 
Indian knows only too well that these things exist, as have other inflictions upon 
him by his rulers from time immemorial, only to be got round.134 
 
This excerpt from a Sunday Telegraph report echoes the widespread perception of British 
officials for whom the ‘canny’, innately untruthful Indian immigrant was a subject of 
great distrust. In the 1950s, these anxieties were exemplified by the controversy over 
forged passports utilised by Indian and Pakistani immigrants to bypass restrictions on 
their movement. Concerns over the scale of organised rackets in India and Pakistan to 
provide fake documents facilitating immigration into Britain became a significant 
diplomatic issue. Routine police reports on coloured immigrants that explored everything 
from their ‘assimilation into populace’ to ‘miscegenation’ and ‘illegitimacy’ warned that 
they ‘strongly suspected that there are unscrupulous agents contacting applicants for 
passports’ in Pakistan and India.135 The overwhelming notion of the immigrant as a 
suspect figure was shaped by the illegitimacy or lack of a paper trail and what was seen as 
the particular proclivity of Indian and Pakistani immigrants for documentary 
discrepancies over their identity. Indeed, the physical characteristics of some Indians – 
Sikhs in particular – were seen as facilitating the deception of forged passports, with one 
newspaper claiming that ‘it was very difficult very often even for Indians to tell one 
bearded Sikh from another from his passport picture’ and therefore unscrupulous agents 
could easily ‘acquire legal documents and pass them over to a client.’136  
 
Police distrust of the evidentiary value of the immigrant’s documents extended to the 
identities of their family, with widespread suspicion that ‘adults, who are not necessarily 	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members of the same family, manage to get their names included in the wives’ passports 
together with those of the minor children’ and therefore easily entered Britain.137 This 
seemed par for the course to British officials, who pointed to the ‘well-known natural 
tendency (of Indian and Pakistani immigrants) to lie and be evasive when approached by 
the police’138 and the Sikhs’ reputation of being ‘natural inveterate liars’. 139 There was 
also considerable paranoia about the increasing numbers of unemployed immigrants 
registered to receive National Assistance money which they allegedly sent back to family 
and agents to whom they owed money in India or Pakistan.140  
 
With increasing focus on the ‘extent to which, and the manner in which, this immigration 
is organised’, British police reports about the techniques utilised by immigrants to defy 
passport restrictions were passed on to the Indian and Pakistani High Commissions. 
Huddersfield police described how ‘after an Indian arrives in this country, he returns his 
passport to one of his compatriots who substitutes his own photograph and then uses 
the passport to travel to this country.’141 Newspapers reported of a network of ‘big uncle 
organisations’ engaged in a form of ‘slave trading’ through which they enabled the 
immigrant’s travel to Britain and in turn took over all their wages (and property owned if 
any).142 They also claimed that ‘unskilled’ Indians obtained passports by claiming to travel 
to a ‘more convenient’ country, typically any non-Western country.143 Officials alleged 
rather remarkable instances of border crossing in order to bypass India’s strict passport 
guidelines, where Indians – particularly from the Punjab – crossed ‘over the border into 
Pakistan and are obtaining passports by posing as Pakistanis.’144 
 
Increasing pressure from Britain – spurred by reports that almost 20,000 Indians had 
entered Britain using fake passports in the mid 1950s – resulted in a range of efforts by 
India to tackle the growing problem, focusing especially on tracing and prosecuting the 
agents and travel companies that were widely acknowledged as masterminding the racket. 
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145 By 1954, Indian officials were aware of travel agents in Delhi and Calcutta who had 
sent ‘more than 300 unsuitable persons’ to the UK on forged passports by colluding with 
staff of airline companies and complicit local passport issuing officers.146 For British 
officials, it was essential that India address the problem since the possession of a forged 
Indian passport, while a crime in Indian law, could not be proceeded against in Britain if 
this was discovered long after they had entered Britain.  
 
Many Indians sought to travel by ship to bypass growing scrutiny at airports. One 
sizeable group holding forged passports sailed from Cochin to Italy in October 1959, 
from where they travelled via Calais to Dover. Some 138 were held in Italy, while others 
were detained upon their entry into Britain via France. This transnational journey 
severely complicated things for all governments involved: while British officials ordered 
the Indians who had reached Britain to return to Calais, French officials refused to 
permit their entry and sent them back again to Britain.147 In an alarmed front page article 
titled ‘Fake Passports Mystery’, the Daily Herald described the ‘amazing see-saw’ between 
Britain and France over who should assume the burden of the Indian ‘invasion’ 
(including the use of makeshift jails in Canterbury and Essex to detain the unwanted 
arrivals).148 The Italian authorities meanwhile insisted that the Indian government pay for 
their repatriation.149 The Government of India’s response to this crisis was somewhat 
astounding: not only did India initially refuse to bear the expenses for their repatriation, 
it also claimed that there was no proof that these forged passport-holders were Indian 
citizens. Indeed, a Home Office spokesperson described the detained Indians as those of 
‘uncertain nationality.’150 As Nehru argued in the Rajya Sabha: 
 
When a person has a forged passport, nobody knows what nationality he belongs 
to. It is only after a due enquiry that one can say. All that one can say is that these 
people are apparently people of Indian origin. People of Indian origin go from 
Hong Kong, Singapore and, I am afraid, all places other than India. Therefore, 	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we were actually asked by the British government: ‘Are these Indian nationals or 
not?’ The only answer we could give was that unless we had a thorough enquiry 
made, we could not say for certain.151  
 
Indeed, Nehru reiterated somewhat implausibly that British officials were deporting these 
persons ‘back’ to India ‘on the clear understanding that we do not accept their nationality 
– it may or may not be so  – without further enquiries.’ 152 The Indian government even 
attempted to place the onus on the shipping company to bring these individuals back to 
their port of departure in India, a suggestion the Italian government refused on the 
grounds that the ‘passports of these persons had been checked and pronounced valid by 
the Indian checkposts prior to embarkation.’ 153  
 
With growing reports of the ‘miserable conditions’ of the Indians detained in Italy until 
their status could be decided, India finally enabled their repatriation to face trial ‘back 
home’ on the condition that the cost of repatriation would be repaid by the individuals 
concerned.154 These lower class and caste Indians had long been regarded as unworthy of 
an official Indian passport and particularly humiliating as representatives of India in the 
international realm. The Indian state interpreted their use of forged passports – for 
which they paid large amounts to agents, often pledging their property – as bringing into 
question their very claim to Indianness, reiterating the state’s long held view of their 
status as problematic, indeed embarrassing citizens. Nehru bemoaned that these 
individuals had created ‘an international scandal ... which has brought us much 
discredit.’155  
 
Due to the large scale of Punjabi immigration to Britain, the region was a central focus 
for Indian officials who viewed it as the epicentre of the forged passports crisis. Writing 
to the Chief Minister of Punjab Partap Singh Kairon, Nehru pointed out that the ‘major 
operations appear to have been in the Punjab, but it is quite possible that the brains 
behind it are in Delhi.’ Given the significant organisational machinery behind printing 
fake passports and the suspicion that ‘a number of fairly prominent men including 
policemen’ were involved, a Central Special Police team had been enlisted to carry out 	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investigations.156 By November 1959, several travel agents from Punjab had been arrested 
and were facing trial, a fact that caused some consternation in the Lok Sabha.157 While 
one Member of Parliament’s remark that ‘all these things happen in Punjab only (sic)’ 
drew protest, the Prime Minister argued that this could be better understood by realising 
that ‘the people of Punjab are more enthusiastic, they are hot-blooded; that is why they 
progress, and sometimes fight among themselves.’158 While these imponderables were 
vigorously debated, it was left to MP Iqbal Singh to draw the more considered 
conclusion that ‘most of the (passport) applications from Punjab are rejected and that is 
why they are compelled’ to find other means to travel. 159   
 
Meanwhile, the anxious Indian community in Britain was represented by a delegation 
from the Indian Workers Association (IWA) who met with Nehru during his visit to 
London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference in May 1960. While they 
stressed the gullibility and innocence of these ‘simple people’ exploited by agents and 
facing the ire of governments for carrying forged passports, the IWA did so by adopting 
the government’s narrative of the status of overseas Indians as representative of India’s 
honour. In their memorandum, they emphasised the ‘serious difficulties, embarrassment 
and humiliation’ faced by Indian immigrants in Britain due to the inaction of the 
government in resolving a crisis created by powerful ‘crooked agents.’ Some of these 
agents were, they alleged,  Government officials. Indeed, they pointed out: 
 
It has lowered the prestige of the Indian government in the eyes of the common 
man and accentuated the atmosphere of colour prejudice. Every Indian is 
suspected of possessing a forged passport.160 
 
While Nehru did not absolve those who had travelled using forged passports of their 
responsibility and indeed emphasised the fact that they would face legal prosecution were 
they in India, he recognised the potential statelessness of such persons if they were not 
granted either an Indian or British passport. Eventually, in many of these cases, the 
Indian High Commission was moved to issue valid passports on ‘humanitarian 	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grounds.’161 The IWA’s recourse to the rhetorical device of besmirched honour to 
legitimise their concerns meant that the nexus between government officials and 
businesses, and the highly restrictive passport policy was held responsible for tarnishing 
India’s reputation. Indeed, their remarkably blunt memo to the PM called for a 
liberalisation of the government’s general policy of issuing passports long before the 
1967 Supreme Court judgement. 162 
 
This crisis of forged passports exemplifies the fissures of caste, class transcended by 
those who had defied the government’s criterion of an ideal Indian migrant and the ways 
in which this shaped the Indian diplomatic response. Despite Nehru’s reiteration of these 
immigrants as ‘undesirable’ representatives of India, the forged passports crisis reiterated 
Indian diplomacy’s continual engagement with Indian migrants and overseas Indians, 
complicating the oft-quoted notion of diplomatic distance from the lower class/caste 
diaspora after 1947. Indeed, as Nehru wrote in a letter to MEA officials, 
 
The fact that some of these people may misbehave … should not lead us to cut 
them off from our High Commission’s activities here … there should be close 
and continuing contact with them. We may be able to help them a little. But what 
is more important is to create an impression among large numbers of Indian 
workers here that we are interested in their welfare.163 
 
As a result of this scandal, stricter guidelines were put in place for a brief period from 
1959-60, making ‘illiterate or semi-illiterate Indians’ who did not know English ineligible 
for an Indian passport. Deputy Minister of External Affairs Lakshmi Menon explained 
that this ban applied to those intending to travel to the West since such people ‘who 
went to Britain to earn a living by petty trades or unskilled labour found it difficult to 
adjust themselves to the new conditions of life, particularly since they lacked a 
knowledge of English.’164 Moreover, by traveling on forged passports, these persons had 
brought ‘discredit’ to India. 165 As Nehru pointed out, the Government was keen on 
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checking the movement of ‘unsuitable persons … who are liable to cause social or 
economic friction abroad.’166  
 
CONCLUSION 
The Commonwealth Immigrants bill, tabled in November 1961, sought to control the 
immigration of Commonwealth passport-holders and introduced the need for work 
vouchers and other guarantees in order to enter the United Kingdom. This marked the 
first major legislative culmination of British fears about unhindered coloured 
immigration and the uninhibited access provided by passports of Commonwealth 
countries – especially for West Indians, Indians and Pakistanis – under the BNA. In a 
discussion in Parliament about the bill, the MP for Southall noted the special 
contribution of the Indian government in restricting the entry of undesirables: 
 
No Government tried more to regulate its emigration than did India. I do not 
know whether we helped the Indian Government particularly in that respect – I 
do not think that we did – but if there was one country with which we could 
have discussed what could be done to strengthen its method of controlling 
emigration and ours of controlling immigration, it was India.167 
 
Indeed, the Indian government had also noted their concern about the lack of 
consultations on these restrictions in their aide memoire to the British government in 
October 1961. In a statement in the Lok Sabha, the Deputy External Affairs Minister 
Lakshmi Menon reminded her colleagues that while the British had permitted the entry 
of Indians whose passports they had not endorsed, the Indian Government had itself 
exercised strict restrictions: ‘We ourselves are against illiterate or semi-literate Indians 
going to the UK or to any other country in search of employment.’168 Thus, India had no 
problem with these particular illiterate, lower caste and class Indians being refused entry 
into Britain and in fact encouraged such restrictions. As long as the British lived up to 	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their assurances that ‘the restrictions which are now proposed to be imposed will not 
operate on the basis of colour’, Nehru assured them that India would understand the 
sovereign right of a nation to control its borders.169   
 
Indeed, as long as the elite, ‘highly skilled’, upper class and caste Indians were permitted 
to enter Britain, there was no question of racial discrimination. The un-assimilable, 
‘unsuitable’, ‘unskilled’, ‘pedlar class’ of Indians were, after all, a secondary class of 
Indians: discrimination against them was not racial, but understandable and even 
warranted. These ‘undesirables’ were the very embodiment of the problematic nature of 
coloured/Indian immigrants and therefore, it seemed to the Indian government, not 
Indian enough for restrictions against them to count as racial discrimination. By bringing 
disgrace and embarrassment to India, these undesirables were not the best 
representatives of the Indian nation in the West and thus, British restrictions on their 
entry –  given that the Indian government itself had long been complicit – could not be 
considered ‘racist’. Indeed, as A. F. Morley of the CRO had earlier noted in a letter: the 
Indians had ‘expressed undisguised pleasure’ that the Home Office ‘found it possible to turn 
back certain would-be migrants.’170  
 
As we have seen, the Indian Supreme Court ruled in a revolutionary judgement in 1967 
that any ‘person living in India has a fundamental right to travel abroad.’171 It is worth 
engaging with the statement of the dissenting judges who argued that ‘unfair’ refusal of 
passports could be challenged in court, but should not form the basis of making 
passports available to all. They pointed out that the ‘right to travel is not included in 
personal liberty’ in the Constitution, since India could not guarantee that those who 
travel abroad will be admitted into other countries. According to them, a passport could 
not be demanded in the same way a railway ticket could, given that the ‘Government 
places in the hands of a person a document which pledges the honour of  the country … 
it is entitled to scrutinise the credentials of such a person.’172 Indeed, unlike the USA 
where ‘travel is a means of spending one’s wealth’, the right to hold a passport and travel 
abroad was apparently not meant for poor Indians who had to be content with a railway 	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ticket. As the dissenting judges noted: 
 
 What we are concerned with is a slender body of persons whose travel abroad is 
considered harmful to the larger interests of our nation and who themselves are in 
any event undesirable emissaries of our nation and who might, if allowed to go abroad, 
cause many complications.173   
 
This reading of the passport as a document of honour to be given only to those whose 
respectability could be vouched for, is very much in line with both the colonial Indian 
state’s treatment of the passport as a privilege for loyal, elite Indians and the postcolonial 
Indian government’s categorisation of ‘unsuitable’ Indians as ineligible for a passport to 
travel to the West. These unsuitable Indians were in many ways legatees of the coolie, 
both of whom were regarded as ‘undesirable emissaries’ of the Indian state – indeed 
British officials too referred to the new wave of migrants into Britain interchangeably as 
‘pedlar class’ and ‘coolie class’ Indians. Euphemisms and vocabularies of caste and class 
are omnipresent in this discourse about those deemed ‘suitable’ to be an Indian passport-
holder, reiterating Mahmoud Keshavarz’s succinct observation that ‘passports are 
material evidence of exercising discrimination.’174 A moving obituary for Ishwar Das 
Pawar, the Scheduled Caste officer in Punjab whose efforts had ensured that  lower caste 
applicants obtained their passports, noted the extent to which he was an exception to the 
norm:  
 
(his) contribution to the upliftment of the community would be remembered for 
ever … Earlier it was really very difficult for the SCs to receive the passport (sic) 
from the upper caste officers.175 
 
The structural discrimination enabled by the passport system relied on the overlapping 
narratives of ‘coolie’/‘undesirable’/‘unskilled’/’pedlar-class’ Indians – stark continuities 
from colonial to postcolonial discourse.  
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5 
THE ‘UNSKILLED’ INDIAN IMMIGRANT 
THE EVERYDAY DIPLOMACY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
 
 
‘As I was saying to a group of students the other day, we are all ambassadors of 
our country. We should behave like ambassadors. I was discussing the subject 
with Mrs Wilkins – Mrs Wilkins is the lady I am staying with. She said, Mr Singh, 
if there were more Indians like you … ’  
               
              ‘There’d be none of this ere prejudice,’ we added.1 
 
In Khushwant Singh’s acerbic short story titled Mr Singh and the Colour Bar, the 
eponymous ‘Mr Singh’ was the most desirable Indian in Britain. Sophisticated, refined, 
and popular among the British people, he was the exemplar for undesirable, uncouth, 
‘unskilled’ Indians desperately in need of tutoring to fit into British society. Indeed Mr 
Singh held that this particularly embarrassing category of Indians had in some measure 
caused the backlash and racial prejudice prevalent in Britain.  In his words: 
 
 Every single case of colour prejudice you examine closely, you will see that some 
Indian or the other has gone and misbehaved … Our boys stretch their hands 
across the table to help themselves before even the ladies have taken anything. 
They belch loudly. They sit on their haunches on lavatory seats and make them 
dirty. They splash water in the bathrooms by pouring it over themselves with a 
lota instead of lying gently in the long baths. These things cause unpleasantness 
and unpleasantness causes prejudice.2 
 
Khushwant Singh’s uncomfortably vivid description of the etiquette and ‘bathroom 
manners’ of these ‘unskilled’ Indians excavates a narrative of humiliation: the identity of 
these Indians and their assimilation into British society was reducible to their dirt and 
filth. This chapter examines how such narratives pervaded both British and Indian 
discourse about the ‘unskilled Indian’, producing him as a dual threat to Britain’s public 
health and India’s international reputation. I am therefore interested in examining the 	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anxieties of British officials and Indian diplomats about the arrival of ‘dirty’, ‘unclean’, 
‘unsuitable’ Indian immigrants, interrogating the ways in which notions of caste and race 
are integral to ideas of hygiene and cleanliness. In so doing, this chapter reads the 
discourse on the Indian immigrant threat to ‘public health’ very much as diplomatic 
history, by investigating the Indian High Commission’s role in mediating immigrant 
behaviour, hygiene and sanitation. The state of the immigrant home and neighbourhood 
was an issue of great concern for Indian diplomats who responded to frequent 
complaints from British officials and the immigrants themselves by nominating ‘Welfare 
Officers’ from their missions and opening a new consulate in Birmingham, a city 
receiving a significant influx of Indian immigrants and the subject of much sociological 
curiosity. I interrogate these instances of everyday diplomacy as a space to recover 
discourses of caste that circulate through euphemisms of hygiene and inform Indian 
diplomatic attempts to delineate an ideal Indian identity in the international realm.  
 
This interaction between Indian diplomats and ‘unskilled Indians’ presented drastically 
different narratives of Indian identity that were intertwined with the question of 
acceptability in British society. Indian diplomats exemplified the ideal upper class, upper 
caste, Anglicised, Western-educated Indians who were deemed most suited to represent 
India in the international realm and welcomed in Britain as an impressive hybrid 
category: Indians whose elite status in Indian society was complimented by a sufficiently 
British upbringing. In stark contrast, the ‘unskilled’ Indians of lower caste and class 
origins had evaded the Indian state’s attempts to confine them within India and were 
now seen as reiterating uncomfortable narratives of India as a land of filth, and Indians 
as inherently unhygienic – reminiscent of the reputation of the coolie. For elite Indian 
diplomats gravely concerned about the ‘shameful’ narratives of Indianness embodied by 
the unsanitary ‘unskilled Indian’,  their (in)ability to assimilate into British society was 
also a larger discourse on India’s capacity for modernity. In this reading, the acceptability 
of Indian immigrants in British society was dependent on their ability to take after the 
ideal, desirable Indian identity exemplified by Indian diplomats. Indeed, as Mr Singh 
notes in the short story, the discrimination faced by ‘unskilled’ Indians in Britain would 
end if only they could learn European etiquette and ‘behave like ambassadors.’3  
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This chapter therefore examines the Indian High Commission’s engagement with 
‘unskilled’ Indian immigrants in Britain – acting ‘in loco parentis’, according to one 
observer – as a discourse on Indian identity and aptitude for modernity, imbued with 
narratives of caste and class as hygiene.4  In so doing, it goes beyond frameworks 
concerned with the Indian state’s oft-quoted ‘distance’ from its diaspora after 1947 and 
instead examines the everyday diplomacy through which the Indian state governed the 
migration of Indians and sought to mediate their ‘integration’ into British society.5 The 
profiles of elite, upper caste Indian diplomats who occupied a liminal status – 
exemplifying the best of Indian society and an almost reassuringly familiar link to 
Britishness – were in marked contrast to the unskilled lower class and caste Indians 
whose identity was still limited to their ‘village-kin’ group in India, reiterating them as so 
foreign that British officials quipped they ‘may as well be creatures from another planet.’6 
Indeed an elite caste and class profile seemed necessary not just to signify an ideal Indian 
citizen, but very much also to delineate the kind of Indian who was most likely to 
deserve the British subject status bestowed on them as per the British Nationality Act of 
1948.  
 
Finally, the apparent ‘domesticity’ of issues of immigrant housing, sanitation and hygiene 
has left them seemingly outside the purview of diplomatic histories. This chapter instead 
recognises the everyday nature of diplomacy and situates it in particular ‘local’ immigrant 
geographies that stretch beyond the overwhelming focus on the metropoles of London 
and New Delhi. By locating immigrant localities in Birmingham as ‘out of place’ sites of 
diplomatic engagement, it challenges dominant accounts of diplomacy as the high 
politics of embassies, consulates, and conferences centred on the metropoles of London 
and New Delhi.  
 
DIPLOMACY AND THE UNSKILLED INDIAN 
A range of sociological accounts, newspaper reports, British official discourse, Indian 
diplomatic memoirs and correspondence are united in the view that the ‘problem began 
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with’ the entry of unskilled Indian immigrants.7 In one of the most influential early 
studies of the Indian immigrant population in Britain, Rashmi Desai defined only the 
unskilled labourers as ‘immigrants’. His argument for excluding other Indians such as 
‘students, qualified medical practitioners who come for further study’ from the 
classification of ‘immigrants’ was not just the fact that they were less likely to 
permanently reside in Britain, but very much also the idea that only the ‘unskilled’ 
Indians formed ‘a relatively closed social system, not unlike the one found in the villages 
of India and to some extent based on the same principles.’8 Thus unlike their more elite 
counterparts who showed an ability to integrate in British society, these unskilled 
labourers were regarded as only concerned with replicating their village lifestyles in 
Britain. Notwithstanding the fact that all Indians were British subjects at the time, it is 
also striking that the title of ‘immigrant’ with its pejorative connotations was bestowed 
not just by the British but very much also by elite Indians.  
 
These unskilled immigrants were also pitted against an idealized representation of early 
migrants as those, in the words of former Indian High Commissioner to the U.K 
Vijayalakshmi Pandit, ‘who had reached the top of their various professions … mostly 
medical men and some lawyers’.9 Pandit’s narrative of the early Indian migrants in Britain 
had little space for the ayahs, lascars and pedlars, but was focused more on the lives of 
elite luminaries ranging from Cornelia Sorabji, Dadabhai Naoroji, Sophia Duleep Singh, 
to the longstanding tradition of British-educated Indians joining the Indian Civil Service 
and leading the nationalist movement.10 Indeed, the list of Indians educated in Britain is 
in many ways ‘a roll call of an Indian elite’, with the very fact of being ‘England-returned’ 
also carrying significant prestige.11 The intertwining of class, caste and race shaped British 
understandings of the ‘social rank’ of Indians in imperial Britain, enabling upper caste 
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and wealthy Indians to distinguish themselves from lascars and working class Indians.12 
In contrast to the elite, ‘better class of Indians’ who had gained access to ‘polite’ British 
society, the new Indian immigrant was viewed as rural, uncultured, unhygienic, 
problematic and unlikely to assimilate.13 This shaped increasing calls for the Indian High 
Commission to intervene and mediate their entry into British life. 
 
The potential (or lack thereof) of the new Indian immigrants to integrate into British 
society was the subject of much concern for Indian diplomats who received frequent 
complaints and requests from local British officials to intervene. For these diplomats, the 
discourse on assimilation was a larger narrative about the Indian capacity for modernity, 
brought into question by this ‘unsuitable’ class of immigrants. Indian diplomats served as 
a patronizing, parental authority of sorts, chiding errant immigrants and teaching them 
the ways of fitting into British society. Indeed as Y. D. Gundevia, the Indian Deputy 
High Commissioner in Britain in 1955, pointed out, ‘All they (local British officials) 
wanted me to do was to come as often as I could, or send my officers out from London 
to teach them how to live.’14 The engagement between Indian diplomats and these recent 
migrants drew on vocabularies of caste and class to define these immigrants as 
embarrassing reminders of the ‘unskilled’ lot of India – the lowest rung of caste society – 
which they could not entirely afford to distance themselves from. Indeed, these 
immigrants were viewed by local British officials as at least in part the responsibility of 
Indian High Commission officials, evident from the fact that a visit by High 
Commissioners to meet immigrants was soon a regular part of the diplomatic calendar, 
with invites sent by Mayors and immigrant organizations. 
 
This was particularly the case for growing Indian immigrant localities in Birmingham that 
functioned as diplomatic sites, forged by and facilitating everyday Indian diplomacy. This 
is a reading of Indian diplomacy in terms of its engagement with the ‘local’, ‘peripheral’ 
spaces outside London and the unlikely ‘domestic’ context of immigrant housing and 
sanitation. Indeed while some creative accounts of postcolonial diplomacy have focused 
on international conferences – Commonwealth conferences, the Bandung Afro-Asian 
conference, and other Heads of Govt meetings – as ‘geopolitical events’ and sites where 
‘people, institutions and states negotiated, performed and experienced becoming 	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postcolonial’, they continue to focus on the most formal, official sites of high politics. 15 
To understand the transformation of a ‘social place into a diplomatic site’ and diplomacy 
itself as an everyday ‘aspect of, even a function of, social life’ necessitates going beyond 
the typical: 
 
Government offices and negotiation tables are typical diplomatic sites. These are 
the places where we expect the activities of politics and diplomacy to ‘take place’. 
When it happens elsewhere it may strike us as ‘out of place’.16 
 
Birmingham was such an ‘out of place’ diplomatic site, facilitating everyday diplomacy 
that was not limited to the occasional visits of High Commissioners and other officials, 
but involved the creation of a local diplomatic apparatus including the nomination of 
Welfare Officers to coordinate with immigrants on the ground. Indeed as Dr Dhani 
Prem, an early Indian migrant and political activist recalled in his memoir: the Welfare 
Officer appointed by the High Commission came ‘to Birmingham once a week … We 
called on civic heads, town clerks, medical officers of health and other officers in 
Smethwick, West Bromwich, Bilston and Wolverhampton and helped them in dealing 
with matters affecting immigrants.’17 Attending a conference organized by Dr Prem in 
October 1955 to inaugurate a Welfare Council for Indian immigrants in the West 
Midlands, Gundevia announced plans to open a consulate in Birmingham, the first such 
Indian diplomatic establishment outside London.18As a local newspaper earnestly noted, 
‘it was hoped that the consulate would be able to give valuable help to local authorities in 
tackling problems created by the presence of the Indians.’19 This had been the persistent 
view of local officials who had met Gundevia and other High Commission officials on 
an earlier visit:  as the deputy Mayor explained, ‘we both agreed that such an 
appointment (of an official representative) would be most advantageous particularly to 
those Indians in Birmingham who cannot speak English and who feel that they have no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  Ruth Craggs, ‘Postcolonial geographies, decolonization and the performance of  geopolitics at 
Commonwealth Conferences,’ Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 35,  no. 1 (2014), 39–55. See also  
Naoko Shimazu, ‘Diplomacy as theatre: staging the Bandung Conference of 1955,’ Modern Asian Studies, 48, 
no. 1 (2014), 225-252 and Ruth Craggs, ‘Hospitality in geopolitics and the making of Commonwealth 
international relations,’ Geoforum, 52 (2014), 90-100. 
16 Iver Neumann, Diplomatic Sites: A Critical Enquiry (New York : Columbia University Press, 2013), 21 and 
23-24. 
17 Dhani R. Prem, The Parliamentary Leper: A History of Colour Prejudice in Britain (Aligarh: Metric Publications, 
1965), 17 
18 ‘Welfare Council for Indians in Midlands’, Birmingham Daily Post, October 31, 1955. See also Prem, The 
Parliamentary Leper, 19-35. 
19 ‘Welfare Council for Indians in Midlands,’ Birmingham Daily Post, October 31, 1955 
	   180	  
one to help them.’20 
 
Much of the help provided by the Indian consulate dealt with the everyday aspects of 
immigrant life ranging from housing, language assistance, to the development of cultural 
forums for interaction. As M. L. Trivedi, the newly appointed Commissioner in 
Birmingham noted during the inauguration of the consulate in March 1958, the primary 
concern of Indian officials was to help immigrants find accommodation.21 The issue of 
housing had by then become the quintessential representation of the ‘problem’ of 
coloured immigration in general and that of Indian immigrants in particular. Given that 
many lived in old houses modified as lodging quarters to accommodate a number of 
immigrants, a bevy of charges of unscrupulous coloured landlords, overcrowding, and 
filth identified the immigrant ‘home’ as a key impediment to assimilation and the 
breeding ground of health hazards. As a 1957 police report noted, the purchase of old 
homes by coloured people was a major source of conflict, given the ‘viciousness of some 
coloured landlords who go to great lengths to evict their white tenants.’22 Newspapers 
too reported rumours that 12,000 immigrants would be eligible for houses in 
Birmingham in the place of others who had long waited.23 Summarizing the general state 
of immigrant housing, the police report went on to note that these houses were 
‘overcrowded, dirty and poorly furnished and the districts in which they are situated are 
deteriorating into near slums.’24 
 
The British official construction of the unskilled immigrant as a public health problem 
facilitated two intertwined processes. First, the delineation of the ‘immigrant problem’ as 
a ‘domestic’, ‘social’ issue of hygiene rather than a ‘political’ one created an arena where 
Indian diplomats felt more comfortable interacting with immigrants without overarching 
concerns of infringing upon internal political debates.  In so doing, it necessitated 
everyday Indian diplomacy – evident from the regular interactions between Indian 
diplomats and local officials responsible for housing and sanitation. Second, hygiene as a 
category of understanding these ‘unskilled immigrants’ enabled the concealment of not 
just race, but caste. Indian discourses of unsanitary immigrants are imbued with 	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euphemisms of caste, providing a space to challenge the dominant tendency of Indian 
diplomatic histories to relegate caste as a domestic issue situated within the Indian 
nation-state and rendered invisible abroad. 
 
PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ‘TWILIGHT ZONES’ OF BIRMINGHAM 
The situation in Birmingham exemplified narratives of public health paranoia about the  
‘twilight zones’ in the city, ‘areas that … are approaching, but have not yet reached, the 
night of slumdom.’25 Ostensibly referring to old, crumbling houses ill-equipped for usage, 
the vividly graphic phrase came to represent ‘an area of multi-occupation and an area of 
(coloured) immigration’ that many white residents frequently sought to escape.26 In the 
imaginative words of one angry letter written to the editor of the Birmingham Daily Post in 
1961, the ‘invasion’ of coloured immigrants left many nervous and unsure of purchasing 
a house ‘in case the twilight zone swamps us.’27  
 
These immigrant ‘twilight zones’ were a subject of much sociological exploration and 
research at the time. As Jordanna Bailkin has powerfully demonstrated, the ‘intellectual 
opportunity’ of the postwar period meant that experts were key to the British state’s 
conception of the migrant and ways of thinking about ‘race relations.’28 Perhaps the most 
influential study of the ‘housing classes’ of Sparkbrook in Birmingham was John Rex and 
Robert Moore’s book ‘Race, Community and Conflict’, commissioned by the Institute for 
Race Relations. The book received wide news coverage and popular attention for being 
what E. J. B. Rose, Director of the Institute termed ‘the first sociological study of a 
twilight zone in Britain.’29 Recollecting the launch of the book at a luncheon at the Café 
Royal in 1967, Moore noted the ‘unusual’ nature of the high profile launch where Rose 
had ‘used his wide contacts in the publishing world to ensure that publication was a high-
profile event at a high status location.’30 Indeed, speaking to reporters, Rose declared that 
‘this project in Birmingham has been our happiest commission.’31 At the book launch, 
Moore and Rex spoke in great detail about the fact that Sparkbrook, right ‘here' in 	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Britain, had proven to be a most ‘exciting and rather terrifying’ place for sociological 
study and fieldwork. Indeed, the houses of the ‘twilight zone’ of Sparkbrook included 
not just the immigrants, but the most underprivileged of society ‘for whom the welfare 
state fails to provide’. For Moore and Rex, this was therefore a ‘totally different world’: 
‘to go into these houses, as we did, was like going into a cave. To go through these doors 
was to enter a different kind of life.’ 32 The houses of Sparkbrook seemed to provide all 
the intellectual excitement of multiple, colonial geographies of research: 
 
In a house of this sort you might find in one room a Glasgow girl with an 
illegitimate baby: in another, a couple of young Irish labourers: in another, a 
group of Pakistanis drinking tea– all these different kinds of people living in one 
house. The Stratford Road – a road leading to that most English of places – 
seemed a mixture of Bombay, Dublin and St Kitt’s.33 
 
While the colonial origins and uses of sociology are well documented, the postcolonial 
continuities of this discipline ‘deployed in the service of Empire’s end’ are well worth 
paying more attention to. 34 Alarmed by the utilization of their book’s arguments about 
coloured immigrants vis-à-vis Birmingham’s housing crisis to call for immigration 
control, Rex and Moore in a later preface sought to go beyond their focus on ‘urban 
sociology’ to instead stress the larger colonial context within which housing 
discrimination affected immigrants:  
 
This wider sociopolitical context was that of the relationship between the former 
colonial territories and the metropolitan countries and the working class. Thus 
although this is a study of the effect on race relations of urban social processes, 
ultimately the overall pattern of race relations cannot be understood solely as an 
urban problem. This is a current American way of avoiding facing up to the race 
war and the Third World Revolution. We do not wish our work to be quoted in 
support of that kind of position.35 	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While Rex and Moore’s work was no doubt the most high profile of sociological studies 
about housing in Birmingham, ‘investigations’ into the ‘living conditions’ and houses of 
coloured immigrants were increasingly commonplace in Birmingham. Dhani Prem in his 
memoir recounts the ‘surveys’ of at least two Birmingham councilors, one of whom 
‘went on a peeping tour of Balsall Heath and accused all coloured people of drug-
addiction’, while the other ‘initiated a one-man investigation’ into the excesses of 
coloured landlords.36 As Prem perceptively noted: 
 
They all say they are doing this in the interest of the coloured people themselves 
and that they do not believe in racial discrimination. They never make such 
investigations into the living conditions of, say, the Irishman or the English 
themselves, as if Birmingham had no slums, no drug addicts, no overcrowding 
before the coloured immigrants arrived here.37 
 
The fear of the dark, amorphous, creeping immigrant twilight zones indeed provided an 
opportunity to talk about race by other means: as one member of the Birmingham city 
council noted, ‘We are entitled to expect immigrants to recognize our standards and our 
conditions, wherever they may come from. This is not a question of colour or creed.’38 
Thus questions of hygiene, sanitation and housing became central avenues to define the 
‘immigrant problem’ wherein officials could deny racial motives even as they studied 
every aspect of immigrant houses as an indication of a national/racial tendency to live in 
unsanitary conditions. Indeed, even as a 1957 police report noted the improvements in 
housing in Birmingham, it argued that ‘by English standards however there are still cases 
of desperate overcrowding, squalor and hardship.’39  The report alleged that immigrants 
deliberately chose to live in such conditions even when they earned good money, since 
they preferred ‘to live in communities … in overcrowded conditions rather than be 
separated from their old associations.’40 Such a delineation of the seemingly inherent 
tendency of immigrants to live in squalor with their fellow nationals also marked out 
some immigrants more than others as especially – almost naturally – prone to dirt and 	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filth. Indeed, as the report concluded, ‘in general the living conditions and standards of 
cleanliness of the West Indians are better than the Indians and Pakistanis.’41  
 
DIRT, HYGIENE AND THE INTERSECTIONS OF CASTE AND CLASS  
Indian diplomatic anxieties over unclean immigrants who soiled the prestige of the 
Indian state by reiterating colonial stereotypes of India as a land of filth can only be 
understood through the undergirding structures of caste. Indeed, the intersections of 
caste, class and race are integral to understanding Indian views of those regarded as 
‘unskilled’ and the concurrent vocabularies of dirt and hygiene that inform their existence 
as a threat to public health. Perhaps the most influential colonial narrative of India‘s 
‘social’ filth and backwardness as informed by Hindu practices and in no way related to 
the political realities of British rule was Katherine Mayo’s Mother India (1927), a book that 
Gandhi famously called ‘a drain inspector’s report’. Not only was Mayo’s book 
considerably spurred by the fearful prospect of increasing Indian immigration to 
America, its primary concern had been ‘the public health risk that the unsanitary 
practices in India posed to the rest of the world community.’42 As Mayo argued:  
 
In estimating the safety of the United States from infection, the element of 
‘carriers’ must be considered. Each epidemic produces a crop of ‘carriers’ whose 
power to spread the disease lasts from one hundred and one days to permanency 
… And India is scarcely a month removed from New York or San Francisco. 
“Whenever India's real condition becomes known,” said an American Public 
Health expert now in international service, “all the civilized countries of the 
world will turn to the League of Nations and demand protection against her.”43 
. 
In Mayo’s reading, India was itself a public health hazard ‘that should elicit more fear than 
sympathy’, a ‘world menace’ and contagion infecting foreign nations through infectious 
immigrant bodies.44 The unsanitary state of Indians had not just been the concern of 
colonial narratives but a longstanding interest of Gandhi whose experiences in South 
Africa informed the centrality of caste-based ideas of hygiene and health to his politics. 	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Sanitation was thus innately political and ‘central to Gandhi’s ideas of an enlightened 
community’.45 He was intimately aware of the burden of hygiene through which Indians 
were racialised as undeserving of equality: 
 
Ever since my settlement in Natal, I had been endeavoring to clear 
the community of a charge that had been levelled against it, not 
without a certain amount of truth. The charge had often been 
made that the Indian was slovenly in his habits and did not keep 
his house and surroundings clean.46 
 
Much of this debate on the hygiene of overseas Indians centred on those regarded as the 
‘sweepings of the bazaar’: the indentured coolies, who were held responsible for the strict 
sanitation codes and laws imposed on all Indians in South Africa.47 Passenger Indians too 
were ‘collapsed’ into the category of the coolie wherein ‘the question of filth and squalor 
in the colony became a “coolie problem”’.48 Indeed, even as Gandhi acknowledged ‘with 
great mortification’ the general complaint of unhygienic practices among Indians, he 
argued that most Indians’ ‘personal habits, it would appear, are not dirty, except in the 
case of indentured Indians, who are too poor to attend to personal cleanliness.’49 While 
some of the innovative scholarship on the sociocultural meanings of ‘public health’ in 
India and its diaspora does mention the role of caste in shaping such ideas, they do not 
sufficiently stress its centrality in the construction of untouchability as a form of hygiene. 
Caste is pervasive in its encoding as a ‘natural and social order where people, place, 
occupation, and knowledge are characterized by pollution and ritual cleanliness.’50 The 
caste system thus structured hierarchies of cleanliness and created a ‘social immunity 
system’ that protects its followers as a ‘health measure,’51 while fixing ‘dirt and filth (as) 
an existential companion of Dalits … Dalits become dirt and dirt is them.’52 In its 
sanitary guise, caste was not just rendered hygienic but even scientific and modern. 	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Indeed, as M. S. S. Pandian has perceptively noted, those that went beyond the 
circumscribing of caste to the social realm were met with a modernising rhetoric that 
sought to ‘inscribe the language of caste (in the political realm) as once again 
illegitimate.’53 As we will see, these attempts to encode caste as hygiene while not once 
naming ‘caste’, had significant continuities in the discourse of Indian diplomats for 
whom uncultured, unhygienic, unskilled immigrants were a ‘problem’ better relegated to 
the Indian domestic realm, rather than the embarrassment of mediating their 
international presence. The words of B. R. Ambedkar are instructive for understanding 
the figure of the ‘unskilled immigrant’ in elite Indian eyes:   
 
The majority of the Hindus, however, believe that you are dirty, you are polluted 
… In such a state of inequality and injustice, some Hindus try to soothe the 
Untouchables. They say, ‘Get educated yourselves, be clean, and then we will 
touch you, we will treat you on par.’ In fact, we all know by experience that the 
condition of an educated, moneyed, and clean Mahar is as bad as that of an 
uneducated, poor, and dirty one … if one is not respected because he is 
uneducated, poor, and not a well-dressed person, what should a common Mahar 
do? How can he secure equality, who cannot gain education, achieve property, or 
dress highly?54 
 
These vocabularies of caste and class permeated the Indian diplomatic response to 
frequent complaints from local British officials about the widespread, almost inherent, 
tendency of Indians for unsanitary, overcrowded living. Indian diplomats visiting 
immigrant localities were forced to come face to face with the unhygienic and dirty 
conditions in which Indian immigrants resided. Visiting Coventry and West Bromwich in 
1955, Gundevia noted that this was a ‘dreadful eye opener’ not just in terms of what he 
regarded as the problematic internal dynamics of the Indian community in Britain, but 
very much also the stark reality of these immigrant ‘hovels’: 
 
A string of well-to-do Indians all over England from London to Birmingham had 
cornered all available residential accommodation in every industrial town. Every 
three-roomed house had been ‘furnished’ with 12 or 16 beds, and this was said to 	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provide ‘ample accommodation’ for 24 or 32 Indian unskilled workmen, half of 
them working eight hours a day in a factory and sleeping in a bed provided for 
them by night … With 24 men sleeping in 3 or 4 rooms, sanitation in most of 
these houses was a thorough mess.55 
 
Apart from Mayors and Councillors, the local officials interacting with Gundevia almost 
always included Health officers, sanitation inspectors and police.56 According to these 
officials, the Indians were not in any way a criminal element – they were largely regarded 
as docile and hardworking, although their lack of familiarity with English and their 
unhygienic lifestyles were regarded as a considerable problem. Much to his surprise, 
Gundevia noted that UK officials did not favour his suggestion that such unskilled 
Indian immigration be stopped, at the very least until ‘better housing and sanitation 
facilities be provided in many of these towns.’57 Instead, they reiterated that they were in 
grave need of labour and did not deem the Indian unskilled migrant problematic enough 
to ban his entry. As Gundevia recalled in his memoir, ‘the consensus at the end of every 
discussion was that they wanted the "docile" Indian, the "hard-working" Indian, 
sanitation or no sanitation.’58 This did not seem like much of a solution to Gundevia who 
was quite clear that the solution to this embarrassing diplomatic problem of the 
unsanitary lower class and caste unskilled Indian remained in preventing his entry into 
Britain. He compiled a report on the unsanitary living conditions of Indians that made 
for ‘nasty reading’ and found unanimous support from Nehru who, having read the 
‘dreadful report’, agreed to restrict the entry of migrants who had not passed a 
matriculation exam and did not know English.59  
 
As we have seen in Chapter 4, the Indian suggestion that Britain refuse entry to those 
Indians whose passports were not endorsed as valid for the UK did not find much 
favour with the British who argued that the status of Indians as Commonwealth citizens 
enabled their free entry into Britain. As B. F. M. Samuel of the Home Office noted,  ‘the 
fact that a passport is not endorsed as valid for entry into the UK does not in itself 
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render the document unsatisfactory as evidence of identity and nationality.’ 60  For 
Gundevia, however, this had little to do with Commonwealth solidarity and more to do 
with the need for unskilled labour at any cost: ‘they (the British) would do everything 
possible to encourage this unfortunate migration from India, Pakistan and the Caribbean 
Islands. I gave it up.’61 These were to him, quite simply, undesirable classes of migrants 
not deserving of entry into a Western country. Indeed in his memoir, he points to the 
inevitability of race riots in a country that had not paid heed to India’s warnings about 
the problems that came with such clearly unsuitable immigrants: 
 
The first race riots in London, not very long after I had left in 1956, were not 
over Indians. They were directed against Jamaicans. Enoch Powell woke up to it 
long after. If Britain had been faced with some problems in the years that 
followed, there is only one thing certain, and that is that India is not to blame – 
and the Indian in the UK is not to blame either.62 
 
In this rather unnerving reading, the ‘problems’ faced by Britain were less a result of 
racial discrimination and more about the behaviour and tendency of these categories of 
immigrants – almost inevitably – to lead to such crises. Gundevia was not the only one to 
draw such conclusions. In her memoir, former High Commissioner in London 
Vijayalakshmi Pandit notes how the ‘unfamiliarity’ of lower class/caste ‘unskilled’ Indians 
with British ways created ‘many difficulties for India House and were the early 
beginnings of the ugly situation that later led to discrimination and race riots.’63 Pandit too 
argues that the inherent inability of unskilled Indians to relate to Britishness was both 
embarrassing for Indian diplomacy and created discrimination to some degree. Pandit’s 
account of the history of Indian immigration to Britain makes this clear: the first Indian 
migrants to Britain were ‘highly respected and happily settled’, in stark contrast to the 
unskilled immigrants that followed. These men ‘obviously … were confronted with a 
very different culture and standards of living and all the difficulties that arose out of this 
encounter.’64 
 
The status of these ‘unskilled’ Indians as unsuitable representatives of Indianness was not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Letter from B. F. M. Samuel to A. H. G. Pope, 21.3.61, HO 344/152, ‘Suggestion to refuse leave to land 
to Indians with passports not valid for UK’, TNA 
61 Gundevia, Outside the Archives, chap. 8. 
62 Gundevia, Outside the Archives, chap. 8. 
63 Pandit, Scope of Happiness, 293. Italics added. 
64 Pandit, Scope of Happiness, 292-293. 
	   189	  
just in variance with the early influx of Indian immigrants, it was the very opposite of the 
ideal narrative of Indiannness exemplified by Indian diplomats themselves. These elite, 
Anglicised, upper class and caste citizens were the most eligible, dignified interlocutors of 
Indianness to local British officials and were thereby – often reluctantly – tasked with 
mediating the behaviour of their more undesirable, lower class and caste counterparts in 
the international realm. 
 
CASTE, CLASS, AND THE INDIAN DIPLOMAT AS EXEMPLAR 
 
The Shaheb’s wardrobe was divided into sets of hangers, each with its own label: 
Calcutta zamindar, Indian diplomat, English gentleman, would-be Nehru, South 
Club tennis player, Non-Aligned Statesman, and so on.65 
 
In Amitav Ghosh’s delightful narrative, the rank of the Indian diplomat – one imbued 
with the registers of class and caste – was an aspirational social status, replete with its 
own sartorial and cultural marks of distinction. Histories and popular accounts of the 
Indian foreign service are replete with the standard narrative of Nehru’s ‘hand-picked’ 
diplomats who were typically Oxbridge-educated, elite, upper caste and class individuals, 
even royalty, charged with performing as exemplars of Indianness in the international 
realm. They were thus ‘positioned socially, culturally and intellectually at the crossover 
from India to the (Western) world’ and were agents of modernity who sought to 
‘extricate themselves from their society to become modern’.66 The Indian Foreign Service 
was the most prestigious service in Nehruvian India, and its members the most desirable: 
their very ability to bridge the national and the international, and in so doing produce 
new narratives of Indianness, was much acclaimed. As Khushwant Singh – himself a 
former diplomat – quipped in a short story: ‘a bachelor in the foreign service abroad was 
worth two in the IAS (Indian Administrative Service) in India.’67  
 
If the Indian Foreign Service performed as modern, cultured, desirable Indians, much 
respected in the international realm, they did so as much through registers of caste as 
class. Archival documents and memoirs of these Indian diplomats offer arenas to 	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uncover these vocabularies of caste and class in other words. Indeed, these euphemisms 
of caste are omnipresent in the vocabulary of diplomats who describe some of their 
fellow citizens as ‘not the best type’, ‘dirty’, ‘unclean’ and ‘undesirable’. These are words 
tied intimately to the affective structures of ‘untouchability’ as a form of ‘hygiene’: to stay 
‘clean’ and not be ‘polluted’ by a certain category of people.68 While scholars have 
skillfully examined the elite class profiles of these early diplomats, their focus on caste is 
relatively limited.69 This is so despite the facts laid out by the Ministry of External Affairs’ 
Report of the Committee on the Indian Foreign Service which found that until 1961, 
there were only two Scheduled Caste candidates and one Scheduled Tribe candidate in 
their ranks. By extension, as Kate Sullivan notes, it ‘is almost certain that many, if not the 
majority, of early elite officers were upper-caste Brahmans.’ It is telling that this clear 
reference to the word ‘caste’, in an otherwise perceptive essay, finds mention only in the 
footnote.70  
 
Yet, as I shall show, the upper caste profile of Indian diplomats facilitated both their elite 
status in the Western societies they served in and reinforced the stark difference between 
the ideal narrative of Indianness produced by them and the ‘embarrassing’ narrative put 
forth by the presence and behaviour of lower caste and class ‘unskilled’ Indians that they 
had to engage with. Moreover, such elite profiles also shaped the oft-noted ‘moralising’ 
tone of Indian diplomats and leaders who perceived themselves as a ‘superior mix of 
East and West’.71 This is best explained in the words of Carlos Romulo, the Philippines 
representative at the Bandung conference, who pointed out that ‘affectations of cultural 
superiority induced by a conscious identification with an ancient civilization’ have ‘come 
to be the hallmark of Indian representatives.’72The Indonesian diplomat Dr Roeslan 
Abdulgani too similarly attributed the ‘arrogance’ of these elite Indians to ‘the fact that 
they had thoroughly mastered the English language, and had very much experience in 
negotiations with the British.’73 
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The fact that Indian diplomats belonged predominantly to upper castes played a 
significant role in mediating their identity in the international stage – their claim to elite 
status as independent India’s first diplomats was bolstered not just by their Western 
education and Anglicised reputation, but also by the fact that their upper caste status 
reiterated their dominant ‘social rank’ within India.74 These diplomats could then be read 
as sufficiently Western enough to merit familiarity, and sufficiently elite enough within 
their own society to authoritatively represent India. Indeed these two aspects went hand 
in hand, reassuring Western observers that they would be dealing with the most elite 
Indians, trained to match Western standards of cultural and diplomatic behaviour. A 
1941 Paramount news video featuring the arrival of Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai in New 
York as India’s first Agent General in the United States, exemplifies these interpretations 
of the status of Indian diplomats through their caste ranking. After showing visuals of 
Bajpai and his family arriving in New York, the video focuses on his two daughters who 
pose for the camera – wearing sarees and eminently photogenic, one of them wears a 
nosering and the other a bindi. The voiceover’s reading of this symbolism is telling: ‘the 
new minister's daughters show the nose diamond and the forehead caste mark of high 
rank.’75   
 
Such narratives of caste as respectable social status were all the more pronounced in 
Britain, where these markers were seen as going hand in hand with the British-educated 
and Anglicised status of these diplomats. Vijayalakshmi Pandit was a ‘diplomatic 
celebrity’ of sorts long before her stint as India’s High Commissioner in London: her 
charismatic performance of gendered, ‘modern’, Indianness perhaps even more popular 
than her accomplishments as a diplomat. As Julie Laut has argued, Pandit’s elite, very 
British upbringing effectively trained her to act as the exemplification ‘of the “educated, 
‘modern,’ new woman” early twentieth-century Indian nationalism desired.’76 Pandit thus 
represented the virtues of caste as social rank and, in so doing, the hybridity of upper 
caste Indians as the best Western-educated, elite representatives of India. Indeed, Laut 
quotes one admirer’s assessment of Pandit as reflecting the ‘best in the two ways of life – 
the Eastern and the Western … Her exterior beams with the manners and etiquette of… 	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her European governess — but her heart throbs with the Kashmiri Brahmin blood of 
her ancestor(s).’77 
 
Similar extrapolations permeate British press reports too. Paying tribute to her term as 
High Commissioner in an article titled ‘Mrs Pandit: Portrait of a Great Indian’, the 
Birmingham Daily Post noted how her ‘great challenge … in Britain has been the 
persistence of old images of British India. They have now dispersed before her as a living 
image of a new India, existing on its own resources, spiritual as well as personal.’78 Yet 
the report was eager to focus on her life in British India and British upbringing, a 
narrative reiterated by the upper caste status of her family: 
 
Her family were Kashmiri Brahmins of Allahabad, aristocrats in the sensitive 
caste structure of Hindu society. Her father Motilal Nehru was a lawyer who led 
a highly Westernised way of life, on good terms with the British. His son went to 
Harrow and Cambridge, his daughters were taught at home by a private tutor. As 
a girl she was called ‘Swarup’ – ‘beautiful face’ – but in the family circle she had 
an English nickname, ‘Nan’.79 
 
These vocabularies of comforting familiarity are reinforced by Pandit’s ‘aristocratic’ 
Brahmin status – an elite, upper caste Indian was no doubt more likely to be considered 
proximate to Britishness. While Pandit was no doubt the exemplar of these narratives, 
especially as they pertained to caste, breathless profiles of her successor Mohammed Ali 
Currim Chagla too reinforced his familiar, elite, British-educated status. The Times pointed 
out how Chagla was returning to Britain, ‘restoring links that he has always cherished since 
his days at Lincoln College, Oxford’, and excitedly noted his prowess as a ‘first class 
bridge player.’80 In addition to his English education, the profile reiterated Chagla’s 
adherence to what were long regarded as familiar, Western values: 
 
 ‘Liberal’ and ‘civilized’ are the words that recur in all estimates, whether they 
come from close friends or acquaintances; in the difficult task of succeeding Mrs 
Pandit, Mr Chagla has all the qualities needed.81 
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Such narratives positioned Indian diplomats both as ideal representatives of India and as 
most suited to British sensibilities – this was, of course, very much in contrast to the 
class and caste background of ‘unskilled Indians’ regarded as embarrassing 
representatives of India and unsuited to British standards. Such diplomats were 
exemplars of Indian citizenship, models of culture and modernity that unskilled Indian 
immigrants could only aspire to. They embodied the ideal Indian authorized to represent 
the Indian nation in the international realm: some other unsuitable Indians in Britain, as 
Pandit once remarked, were playing ‘fast and loose with India’s prestige’.82  In her 
memoir, Pandit recounts how these ‘unskilled’ immigrants ‘economized to the greatest 
possible degree, sometimes several people sharing a room and cooking on a tiny gas ring, 
in a near-slum area that soon became worse.’83 Her visit to some areas in Manchester and 
Liverpool seemed to confirm the worst complaints received by the High Commission: 
 
I saw a number of dwellings occupied by Indian immigrants and was distressed 
beyond words – and also fearful of future consequences. The Indians and 
Pakistanis were happy to see me as they were very lonely, and my coming 
brought memories of home. I spoke to them about the necessity of learning the 
language, the need for cleanliness, and the attempt they must make to fit into 
foreign ways.84 
 
Indian diplomats viewed the question of integration and assimilation into British society 
as the most important question for Indian immigrants, their ability to fit into British 
standards somehow reflective of India’s stature and reputation.  Frequently reiterating 
the importance of ‘achieving integration, the most difficult art in the world’, M. C. 
Chagla applauded ‘sympathetic’ 85 , ‘cosmopolitan’ 86  local governments and urged 
immigrants to ‘mix with British people and try to understand them and be understood’.87 
As he remarked to the Indian community during a visit in 1963, ‘he had been told how 
well-behaved were Indians in Coventry, but that was not enough’.88   The Welfare 
Officers appointed by the High Commission were directly tasked with ensuring the 
assimilation of these Indians: apart from helping with accommodation issues, they 	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facilitated the participation of Indian immigrants in English language classes, often 
checking in on their continual involvement.89 
 
Some of these diplomats also expressed significant curiosity about interracial marriage, 
sometimes viewing the desirability of Indian men for white British women as a gendered 
metaphor of the larger question of India’s place in the new world order. For High 
Commissioner B. G. Kher, interracial marriages between Indian men and white British 
women were indicative of India’s growing stature: 
 
India is now occupying a free status and many women are proud to call 
themselves Indian, although in upper circles colour prejudice is still traceable 
though carefully concealed. As our nation becomes more and more powerful and 
prosperous (and as there is a surplus of women here over men) many women will 
marry Indians. I believe Indians will also prefer fairer wives.90 
 
As Kher’s comment about the Indian preference for ‘fairer wives’ indicates, interracial 
marriage was a discourse on the intersection of race, caste and class in defining the 
desirability of Indian men.  Indeed, it would seem that Indian men of a certain social 
standing were rather more desirable than their lower class and caste counterparts, a 
scenario where miscegenation was seen as a sign of assimilation. As Pandit pointed out in 
her memoir, several ‘highly respected’ elite Indian men settled in Britain had ‘married 
English women’: a fact seen as reflective of their cultured nature and ability to ‘integrate 
into British society’. 91  This was in stark contrast to their lower caste and class 
counterparts who did not speak ‘English to begin with and were slow to learn and 
therefore to integrate themselves with those among whom they now lived’.92 Thus 
interracial marriage was a sign of being a more cultured and desirable Indian who was 
both an easily assimilable British subject and a worthy representative of the Indian 
nation. As a British official reflecting on the lack of assimilation of the undesirable class 
of Indians pointed out:  
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In the very early days of coloured immigration, the alarmists were prone to talk 
about the dangers of miscegenation, that is a development which has not 
occurred … in some ways, the outlook would be less disturbing if it had.93 
 
Perhaps most interestingly, integration was not solely a discourse on the capability of 
unskilled Indians to live up to a seemingly greater standard of culture, sanitation and 
modernity. Rather, their place in Britain and their likelihood of assimilating into British 
society was often a larger statement on India’s place in the Commonwealth and a 
racialised international order. Visiting the Indian community in Manchester, Chagla 
declared ‘his belief in integration’, adding that ‘the future of the world depended on the 
integration of races … the Commonwealth was the best example of integration’.94 Local 
officials too stressed the bonds of the Commonwealth: in the words of the Deputy 
Mayor of Birmingham, ‘our aim is to be a family and for that reason we want 
Commonwealth members to feel at home here.’95 
 
Indian diplomats nevertheless had to manage a delicate balancing act: while they 
continued to receive complaints about the problems caused by immigrants and discussed 
these issues with the Mayors and local officials concerned, they reiterated the fact that 
these ‘Indians’ were more accurately soon to be ‘Indian-origin’ citizens whose presence 
was largely an ‘internal’ British matter. Indeed, when called upon to assist regarding a 
strike by members of the Transport and General Workers Union protesting against the 
appointment of an Indian bus conductor in West Bromwich, Gundevia noted that 
‘discreet enquiries’ had shown that the conductor-in-question had acquired British 
nationality. The Indian High Commission had therefore decided to ‘play it cool … I 
would go to Birmingham only after the strike had been settled.’96 A more telling instance 
of the complexity of India’s relationship with these immigrants is an event attended by 
High Commissioner Pandit where the Indian activist Dhani Prem condemned the fascist 
Oswald Mosley’s plans to hold a rally in Birmingham. Pandit’s response is striking, as a 
newspaper reported:  
 
Mrs Pandit … said she had been approached on the subject of racial 
discrimination in Birmingham but she had replied that she had not come to 	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Birmingham to take up a matter which it was for the people of the city to look 
into themselves.97 
 
Indeed, advocating a Gandhian response to racist attacks, Pandit went on to express the 
‘gratitude of the people of her country for the help and kindness shown to them’.98 The 
Indian diplomatic unease to participate in what could be defined as an internal political 
situation demonstrates the precarity of their interactions with and on behalf of unskilled 
immigrants in Britain, even as they engaged with them on a regular basis in the ‘domestic’ 
realm of housing and sanitation.  
 
POPULATION, BIRTH CONTROL AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE 
IMMIGRANT BODY 
 
An assurance that the Indian government was not seeking to solve its own 
population problems by encouraging mass emigration and that fears of a large-
scale Asian invasion of Europe was groundless, was given by the Indian Deputy 
High Commissioner Mr Y. D. Gundevia99 
 
The Birmingham Daily Post’s lead story of October 1955, ostensibly about a conference to 
establish a Welfare Council for Indians, wasted no time in getting to what it viewed as 
the crux of the issue. The threat posed by the Indian immigrant was not just one of their 
presence in British society, but in terms of the larger question about what this presence 
portended: the looming danger of India’s enormous population besieging Britain, 
coupled with the fact that these existing immigrants themselves had a propensity to 
overpopulate. India had long been the go-to example of the threat of overpopulation to 
public health worldwide, a theme that resonated to the extent that ‘the phrase ‘countries 
like India’ became shorthand for poor countries with high fertility’.100 These narratives 
had long shaped the backlash against Indian immigration. Indeed, as Matthew Connelly 
has skillfully argued: 
 
Whether they were called ‘hordes’ or ‘coolies’, both terms treated them as a 
population, rather than as individual people, a population that, by its very nature, 	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was said to imperil a certain ‘quality of life’ – whether that quality was eugenic, 
economic or both at the same time.101 
 
The menace of population had long been a concern of late nineteenth and twentieth 
century politics, shaping the wide acceptance of ‘positive’ eugenic measures to protect 
‘public health’, accompanied by calls for birth control. Migration in particular was viewed 
as a problem of population control, with eugenic immigration laws in place to allow the 
entry of only those deemed ‘fit’, healthy and acceptable to populate the national 
demography.102 India was integral to these debates: its identity and history of migration 
often defined in terms of its seemingly uncontrollable population. Indeed, the very 
construction of British India’s ‘population problem’ by colonial public health officials 
went hand in hand with the Mother India narrative of India’s unfettered, unsanitary 
‘overbreeding’ wherein all of India’s ills were charted to an inherent, cultural, Indian 
proclivity to overpopulation, while delinking it from the structures and policies of the 
colonial state. 103   This had considerable resonance in the narrative of the Indian 
immigrant as ‘recklessly prolific in procreation’ – as one eugenicist in Kenya noted – and 
thereby a threat to all the countries they sought to settle in.104 As G. C. L. Bertram of the 
Eugenics Society of Britain argued, ‘Without making any subjective judgements, it is a 
fact that in Fiji to-day, in the absence of significant aid of contraceptives, the Indian 
immigrants are outbreeding the indigenous people, and will soon be quite dominant in 
those islands.’105  
 
Other observers perceived strategic motives in Indian immigration, with the South 
African Prime Minister D. F. Malan for instance arguing that Nehru ‘wanted to off-load 
surplus Indian population on Africa’ and in so doing, take over Africa.106 Far from these 	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notions of emigration as a secretive plan for strategic dominance, Indian eugenicists like 
Sripati Chandrasekhar had long articulated rigorous birth control measures and ‘planned 
international migration’ from the overpopulated countries of Asia to the ‘thinly 
populated countries such as Australia, Canada’ as a solution to the problem of 
‘population pressure’. 107 
 
The unskilled Indian immigrant in Britain was viewed as embodying these wide-ranging 
concerns about India’s population problems, further exemplifying their threat to ‘public 
health’. Indeed, British conceptions of the Indian immigrant as a public health hazard 
went beyond the mere focus on their housing and living conditions. Longstanding 
racialised understandings of imperial hygiene and ‘public health’ where ‘purity was the 
project of public health, as well as the project of nation’ imagined the border as the front 
line of defence against contagions and ‘foreign bodies’ that sought to pollute the 
nation.108 This preoccupation with the health of the immigrant body – both as unfit and 
prone to diseases in itself but also as a carrier of disease, importing germs and infecting 
the body politic – was a persistent narrative about the Indian immigrant. The 
overcrowded, poor state of houses in Birmingham, for instance, was viewed as the 
‘breeding ground’ for a number of diseases ranging from tuberculosis, leprosy to venereal 
diseases that these immigrants seemed especially prone to. Grave anxieties abounded 
over the physically weak ‘tuberculous’ Indian and Pakistani immigrants who were 
‘unassimilable medically’, causing a strain on medical services and infecting the body 
politic with disease.  Such was the intensity of paranoid press coverage that the Indian 
High Commissioner contacted the Ministry of Health in 1955 regarding the situation, 
arguing that while these immigrants might be ‘a susceptible lot’, he did not think them ‘a 
menace to the health of this country’.109 
 
While the High Commissioner was assured that this was a more limited threat than news 
reporting might suggest, British officials sought to get the Indian and Pakistani 
governments on board to conduct medical tests on these immigrants before their entry 
into Britain. Unsurprisingly enough, the Indians were not enthusiastic about any such 	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process, agreeing only to advise medical exams for migrants while also reiterating that 
most Indian immigrants do not ‘carry tuberculosis to that country.’ 110 As Bivins has 
pointed out: 
 
The proposed scheme itself was also deeply flawed, as it was unlikely to cover 
‘the people who are the real problem … unskilled labourers and the like with a 
very low standard of living, who are presumably the people most likely to create 
health problems’.111 
 
The increasing interpretation of the immigrant as a medical threat enabled more exacting 
criteria of ‘hygienic citizenship’.112 As one Member of Parliament pointed out in his four-
pronged guidelines for eligible migrants: ‘the immigrant should have a clean bill of 
health. He should have a job to come to, suitable accommodation should be available 
and he should have access to some system of language interpretation.’113  The unhealthy 
immigrants were also considered a great strain to the ‘costly enterprise’ of the new health 
scheme: as one letter writer in Birmingham noted, ‘Should we be glad that a shortage of 
hospital beds is our lot, while dark faces stud the wards in every hospital?’114 One 
Birmingham Councillor argued: 
 
Only good coloured immigrants should be allowed to come here, good in morals 
and health, and they should be licensed so that their good behaviour and 
limitation is guaranteed.115 
 
The body of the Indian immigrant was thus a subject of concern, variously viewed as 
diseased and problematic, prone to damaging public health and reflective of an apparent 
proclivity to procreate. In places like Sparkbrook, long viewed with great sociological 
curiosity given its increasing immigrant populations, Indian immigrants were regarded as 
carrying with them the inherent national tendency for overpopulation and were utilized 
as readily-available test subjects for research on contraceptives that could be utilized for 
populations in their home countries. Indian immigration to Britain until the 1970s had 
been largely male, with Indian women immigrants – almost always women seeking to 	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join their husbands or fiancés in Britain – trickling in at a very slow rate. Evan Smith and 
Marinella Marmo note that ‘over 23,400 Indian men migrated to Britain with work 
permits between 1962 and 1972, compared with just over 2600 Indian women.’116 They 
convincingly argue that the utility of this female migrant in the eyes of the British state 
was to prevent miscegenation by ‘controlling’ the promiscuity of the South Asian male 
and acting as a ‘civilising influence’. 117  In the 1970s, these female migrants seeking to 
enter Britain were deemed just as suspicious as their male counterparts by the British 
state which subjected their bodies to ‘virginity testing’ practices in order to ensure that 
the ‘fast-track fianceé visa regimes’ were not being misused by women – the assumption 
that the South Asian norm of a virginal fiancee would serve as proof of these migrants’ 
fraudulent applications.118 
 
While this timeframe is beyond my period of focus, I argue that the very arrival of these 
immigrant women as ‘wives’ into Britain rendered their bodies the subject of much 
scrutiny and concern, long before the invasive virginity testing abuses of the British 
immigration system. The presence of Indian and other immigrant women in Sparkbrook 
was key to the studies carried out in 1962 by researchers of the Birmingham Family 
Planning Association and Birmingham University to explore new forms of contraception 
vis-à-vis their ‘suitability’ for immigrant women. These studies were funded by research 
grants from the Eugenics Society and the Ford Foundation, which ‘was contemplating 
spending large sums on enquiring into the control of fertility in underdeveloped 
countries, but wished to do this under cover of some English or European research 
organisations that had experience of investigating population control’.119 Their research 
proposal to study the fertility of ‘problem families’ in Birmingham makes clear the 
overarching purposes of their investigation: 
 
 In the vicinity of Birmingham, there is concentrated a larger group than 
anywhere else of immigrants representative of many of the countries most in 
need of population control. In addition, there are indigenous ‘problem families’ 
also for various reasons in need of contraceptive advice, but not likely to seek it 
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for themselves.120  
 
Researchers thus sought to test a range of contraceptive methods on these  ‘problem 
families’ on a small scale, on the bodies of immigrant women, before they could be 
launched on a wider basis. Indeed, as Philip Florence, Vice President of Birmingham’s 
Family Planning Association (FPA) pointed out, ‘Some Pakistani and Indian wives don’t 
easily accept the idea of the birth control pill. We believe the sex coil (the new method 
being trialled in Sparkbrook) could be the answer to this.’121  While we have seen the 
great academic interest in the ‘twilight zone’ of Sparkbrook as a laboratory offering a 
variety of cultural and racial ‘subjects’, the sheer ambition of this trial in seeking to 
analyse the ‘relative acceptability’ of contraceptive methods was not merely about their 
status as immigrant ‘problem families’ but more so about their place as ‘ethnic’ subjects 
from overpopulated, underdeveloped countries that could benefit from population 
control. 122 This was a clear aim of the trial in seeking to provide ‘results (that) could be 
applied in underdeveloped countries.’123 Indeed, as the researchers argued, ‘reactions 
among immigrants of differing origins should throw light also on the acceptability of 
alternative birth control methods in the underdeveloped countries, whose standard of 
living is pinned down by the present population explosion.’ 124  Seeking to study 
‘objections to birth control based on religious or other grounds’, researchers tested the 
seemingly deviant family planning preferences of coloured immigrants against ‘English 
couples (who) will act as a ‘control’ against which our other findings can be checked’.125  
Moreover, they argued that the presence of both immigrants and ‘indigenous problem 
families’ in the trial had particular relevance for the ‘welfare services in this country’ 
exhausted by the burden of these categories of people. The plethora of explorative 
possibilities offered by these immigrants seemed dizzying to researchers who even 
argued that ongoing work elsewhere on birth control facilities for the ‘mentally 
handicapped will be particularly applicable, not only among our own similar groups, but 
among those immigrant peoples whose knowledge of the English language is so poor 
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that their position is closely equivalent.’126 Researchers employed a Pakistani psychiatrist 
Dr Farrukh Hashmi to act as an interlocutor and translator given his ‘knowledge of 
Pakistani and Indian languages and his ready acceptance among these people.’127  
 
The funding of the Ford Foundation was supplanted by the financial support of the 
Eugenics society – of which the lead researcher J. A. H. Waterhouse was a member – 
which decided to grant funds, apparently satisfied by the goals of the project to ‘select 
samples stratified by ethnic, economic and family size groups’.128 While the Birmingham 
trial focused on Irish, West Indian, Indian and Pakistani families in Sparkbrook, there 
was considerable interest in the Indian and Pakistani women as representative of 
‘countries most in need of population control’.129 Indeed Waterhouse excitedly noted that 
there was great scope for research and ‘both the Pakistani and Indian High 
Commissioners are very much interested in this kind of study and are very keen to see 
the results.’130 Newspapers also reported that the eventual aim of the trial was that 
‘immigrant nurses and doctors will be trained so that they can teach the various methods 
in their own countries.’131 
 
India’s growing focus on providing birth control facilities to curb overpopulation 
considerably explains Indian diplomatic interest in a trial where unskilled Indian 
immigrants were seemingly acceptable subjects for a test case on contraceptive methods. 
A significant literature has shown the ways in which international networks of family 
planning activists and eugenicists facilitated the work of Indian pioneers of birth control: 
predominantly elite upper caste men and women, whose attempts to tackle India’s 
overpopulation problem were largely directed towards controlling the fertility of lower 
class/caste and Muslim Indians who they viewed as most prone to having large families 
and therefore most in need of contraception.132 The widely perceived inability and 
disinterest of such marginalized communities in utilising methods of birth control was 
articulated as proof of their lack of modernity, thereby impeding national progress. In 	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their elite reading of India’s ‘population problem’, these masses were deemed ‘irrational 
subjects incapable of making informed contraceptive decisions who could not be 
entrusted with regular and precise execution of birth control techniques’ and for whom a 
‘one time contraceptive procedure’ such as sterilization was better suited.133  
 
Local family planning organisations in Birmingham too were cognizant of the 
international contexts of population control: as the annual reports of the Birmingham 
Family Planning Association (FPA) from the mid 1950s indicate, this was an 
organization intimately aware of not just the larger international concerns regarding the 
‘global problem’ of overpopulation that informed their practice, but also of the potential 
international relevance of their own work with multiracial immigrant patients.134 Thus the 
Birmingham FPA paid host to doctors and family planning specialists from foreign 
countries who sought to observe the work of the clinic, and even announced an annual 
prize for research on ‘the control of conception’ that would ‘bring to our knowledge 
research of a similar nature throughout the world.’135  
 
The increasing number of ‘coloured patients’ – documented by the annual reports that 
frequently highlighted the stories of women from Jamaica and India who  ‘showed more 
than the usual gratitude’ for the help they received – did not just shape the Birmingham 
FPA’ s perception of its international significance but was also central to the task of 
helping control the fertility of immigrants who were the subjects of contraceptive trials 
initiated by the FPA.136These immigrants were representative of the population problems 
of their home countries of the ‘third world’ and therefore even more threatening to the 
body politic of Britain. While, as Smith and Marmo have argued, the presence of these 
immigrant women in Britain had been required to prevent the growth of a mixed race 
population, I have shown that it was just as necessary to ensure that these women did 
not perpetuate what was regarded as the Indian tendency for large families.137 These 
contraceptive tests reiterated the precarious status of these unskilled immigrants and 	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Indian immigrant women as marginalized ‘problem families’ in Britain, while their lower 
caste and class status – regarded therefore as automatically implying a lack of knowledge 
of contraceptive techniques – made their utilisation as subjects for scientific trials 
acceptable for Indian diplomats.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Some said: “I had a thousand bighas of land, and people called us Sardar.” 
[Chief] 
Some said: “There, we were warriors. No one stood against us.” 
… 
Some said: “We were the district scribes, we oversaw everything.” 
Some said “I was the police superintendent, I swaggered and ordered 
everyone about.” 
Some said: “I was a village accountant there – getting sugar cane and rice 
free.” 
As one, they were all in England and were just fools who were full of 
pride.138 
In his poignant poem about his ‘passage to England’ in the 1950s, Madho Ram Mahimi 
paints an evocative portrayal of the lives of ‘unskilled’ Indians: painful hours of work in 
the factories at day, followed by long evenings in the pub reminiscing about the homes 
they left behind. As Clair Wills points out, this ‘shared drinking culture was the public 
face of the overcrowded bachelor houses in which many migrants lived’. 139  These 
immigrant localities were unlikely yet important sites of diplomatic engagement where 
elite, Anglicised, upper caste and class Indian diplomats – exemplifying both the ideal 
Indian in the international realm and, in so doing, the hybrid, Western-educated Indian 
most proximate to Britishness – were charged with teaching the lower class and caste 
‘unsuitable’, un-assimilable Indians ‘how to live’. Declared as a public health threat in 
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Britain, the ‘unsanitary’ lives of these ‘unskilled’ Indians were mediated by Indian 
diplomats through the euphemisms and vocabularies of caste and class as hygiene.  
 
The slow arrival of Indian women as fiancees and wives of the men already resident in 
Britain created a new dynamic where Indian immigrants were known not just as a ‘public 
health threat’, but as ‘problem families’ that could potentially replicate the 
overpopulation of their country in Britain. Indeed, the population concerns unleashed by 
the increasing presence of Indian women is perhaps best exemplified by Dr Prem’s 
remarkable call for the sterilization of Indian immigrant women with large families. 
While he later clarified that he had merely recommended providing the option of 
sterilization to Indian immigrant women who would prefer it,140 newspapers nevertheless 
reported his call for sterilization as the ‘only way to prevent some British towns from 
being swamped by a soaring coloured population’. 141  Noting that attempts to ‘get 
immigrant wives to utilize birth control methods, including the pill’ had not been a 
success, Prem’s solution drew on the fact that sterilization was common practice in India 
for lower caste and class individuals who were seemingly incapable of learning more 
complex means of contraception.142 
 
While these unskilled immigrants carried with them the burdens of dirt, squalor and 
‘overbreeding’ synonymous with India in the Western imagination, embarrassed Indian 
diplomats sought to enable them to  assimilate into British society and in so doing 
represent a more modern, cultured narrative of Indianness. Tracing these diplomatic 
discourses about the intimate registers of sanitation and hygiene in a ‘tertiary’ diplomatic 
space like Birmingham has provided a different reading of everyday diplomacy – one that 
makes evident the registers of caste and class that defined Indian perceptions of the 
international realm and those best suited to traversing it. Through its focus on everyday 
diplomacy vis-à-vis ‘integrating’ new Indian migrants into British society, this chapter has 
also reiterated the need to complicate narratives of the Indian state’s ‘distance’ from the 
diaspora.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 ‘”No campaign to sterilize”’, Evening Express, 26 January 1965 
141 ‘Sterilization urged for immigrant wives’, Minneapolis Star Tribune, 24 January 1965 
142 Sterilization urged for immigrant wives’, Minneapolis Star Tribune, 24 January 1965 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In January 2018, the Government of India announced plans to issue a new category of 
orange-coloured passports for ‘unskilled’ Indians who had limited educational 
qualifications and required emigration clearance while traveling to a group of 18 
countries, predominantly in West Asia. This would differentiate them from ‘other’ 
Indians who would continue to have the traditional navy blue passport. The idea was 
shelved almost immediately, following a backlash that such a plan would only create 
‘second class citizens’.1 In Jiby J. Kattakayam’s words: 
 
I can already see the looks of disdain for the orange passport holders in a highly 
class/caste conscious society like ours … A pristine Blue to breeze through the 
West and a dirty orange to crawl through West Asian immigration counters?2 
 
Such a scheme to colour-code Indian migrants merely reflects the Indian state’s 
longstanding view of the international as a space for narrating Indianness – a task for 
which upper caste and class Indians traversing the hallowed geographies of the West 
were deemed best suited. In the introduction to his profoundly moving and masterful 
Passport Photos, Amitava Kumar describes his book as a ‘forged passport … (an) act of 
fabrication against the language of government agencies’. In so doing, Kumar prompts 
us to read the passport in terms of the stories, emotions and experiences it renders 
invisible.3 Lost within the pages of the postcolonial Indian passport are the histories and 
afterlives of Empire and indenture that shaped the Indian state’s very idea of ‘the 
international’. Simmering beneath the surface of the proposed orange passport are stories 
of ‘unsuitable’ lower caste and class applicants who were denied passports for decades, 
and the experiences of ‘unskilled’ migrants like Isher Dass Bhagat – whom we 
encountered in the introduction – who had to resort to forged passports in order to 
bypass the state’s rejection of their mobility. Indeed the terminologies of ‘unskilled’, 
‘pedlar class’, ‘unsuitable’ Indians carry with them the histories of the ‘coolie' and make 
evident the intersections of caste and class in Indian diplomatic discourse. The well-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I have written about this elsewhere. See Kalathmika Natarajan, ‘Caste, class and the history of the Indian 
passport.’  South Asia @ LSE, 28 March  2018   
 https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2018/03/28/caste-class-and-the-history-of-the-indian-passport/ 
2 Jiby J Kattakayam, ‘We do not need the orange colour passports’, Times of India, 15 January 2018 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/jibber-jabber/we-do-not-need-the-orange-colour-passports-
period/     
3 Amitava Kumar, Passport Photos (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) 
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known 2001 Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora appointed by 
the Indian government is an archive of such narratives; while attempting to articulate a 
triumphant discourse on a united ‘Indian diaspora’, it nevertheless demonstrates an 
unease with the inconvenient histories and demographics of the ‘old’ indentured labour 
diaspora and the newer ‘unskilled’ labour migrants to the Gulf. In a list of 
recommendations ‘to ensure that Diaspora members feel welcomed on their arrival’ in 
India, the report called on immigration and customs officials at airports to adopt a more 
considered, friendly approach: 
 
There have been many incidents of rough handling of Indians coming from 
African countries or the Gulf region. Many of them are not as well-heeled and 
sophisticated in appearance as their Western counterparts. They usually take much longer 
to clear landing formalities. Many of these NRIs (Non Resident Indians) are 
illiterate, nervous and often unable to respond adequately to the queries of the 
immigration/customs officials. Our officials should be trained to deal with such 
NRIs with understanding and courtesy.4 
 
The image of the naïve, uncultured, uneducated NRI resident in less developed regions 
of the world was thus in marked contrast to the stature and even ‘appearance’ of the 
elite, ‘skilled’ Indians resident in the West. These Indians had succeeded in remaking the 
image of India, even as ‘India’s emergence as a modern society, destined to play a role in 
knowledge-based industries … has helped to change the image of the Indian Diaspora 
globally.’ 5  This was a mutually-constitutive process wherein India’s economic and 
technological prowess also ensured that Indians abroad were no longer seen ‘as an 
economically disadvantaged, silent minority’ in their countries of residence.6 The much-
touted achievements of elite Indians in the West were a deeply cathartic experience for 
the postcolonial nation-state. This is most clearly evident in the report’s assessment of 
the Indian diaspora in Britain, where it proclaimed that the script of India’s international 
reputation – forever intertwined with the status of its overseas Indians – had been 
rewritten: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 ‘The Indian Diaspora’, Report of the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora (New Delhi: Ministry of 
External Affairs, 2001), 394. Italics added. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20020815030030/http://indiandiaspora.nic.in:80/contents.htm 
5 ‘The Indian Diaspora’, vii 
6 ‘The Indian Diaspora’, vii 
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Far from being stereotyped as a land of snake charmers, saints and fakirs, India 
now appears to the Western world as a computer-savvy, intelligent and dynamic 
nation. A century ago, India was the land from where Western countries would 
get factory workers and farm labourers.7 
 
The afterlives of indenture permeate this discourse. Indeed, listing a group of successful 
Indian businessmen in Britain, the report notes that this was a ‘continuously growing list 
of what is jokingly called the “coolie millionaires.”’8 While the provenance of the term is 
unclear, this remarkable turn of phrase – twinning two seemingly paradoxical words – 
only serves to reiterate the significance of indenture: as a constitutive element of Indian 
identity in the international realm and, therefore, a narrative that required to be 
transcended by the Indian state with the help of these elite, ‘skilled’ Indians who were 
more likely to be remembered by the millionaire tag than the coolie one.  Indeed if the 
elite, upper caste, technologically skilled NRI resident in the West is now produced as an 
exemplar of Indian identity, the ‘“true” postcolonial, reassuring the West and reassuring 
to the resident Indians’, this is an identity shaped very much as a repudiation of the 
Indianness of the coolie and his modern day legatees – the ‘unskilled’ labourers.9 The 
afterlives of indenture qua caste endure to this day.  
 
*** 
 
This thesis has examined the entanglements of British-Indian diplomatic relations as a 
means of tracing the central figure of the migrant and the afterlives of Empire and 
indenture in Indian diplomatic history. This is a history that intertwines the stories of 
migrants traveling across the kaala paani to colonies like Fiji, British Guiana, Mauritius in 
the late nineteenth century with the experiences of migrants seeking to travel to Britain 
in the 1950s. British-Indian diplomacy after empire stretched well beyond the metropoles 
of London and New Delhi in seeking to negotiate the often precarious citizenship claims 
of  overseas Indians. This was a diplomatic realm shaped by the histories of indenture 
and the provisions of the 1948 British Nationality Act (BNA), producing Indians as 
entangled citizens whose status often remained precarious.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 ‘The Indian Diaspora’, 128 
8 ‘The Indian Diaspora’, 128.  Italics added. 
9 Himadeep Muppidi, Politics of the Global (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 56. For an 
excellent exploration of the ‘technocultural Hindu nationalism’ facilitated by these narratives of the ‘NRI’, 
see Rohit Chopra, Technology and Nationalism in India: Cultural Negotiations from Colonialism to Cyberspace (New 
York: Cambria Press, 2008) 
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At a time when overseas Indian communities faced crises of citizenship in their countries 
of residence, India sought to utilise the rubric of the Commonwealth to engage with the 
status of its overseas Indians, a vast majority of whom were resident in British colonial 
territories and Commonwealth nations. Articulating its membership of the 
Commonwealth through terms of ‘reciprocity of citizenship’, India sought to ensure the 
‘un-foreignness’ of its overseas communities. The status of overseas Indians also shaped 
the making of the Indian Citizenship Act and served as the basis for India’s claims to 
diplomatic representation in colonial territories. One of the main objectives of this thesis 
has therefore been to complicate a pervasive assumption about the Indian state’s 
relationship with the diaspora as defined by the moment of independence that apparently 
served also as a moment of abandonment. Independence has been described as an 
‘overnight’ shift when the Indian state ‘deliberately turned its back’ on its overseas 
communities in 1947.10 Indeed, Marie Carine-Lall goes to the extent of noting that 
‘Mother India has pushed its diaspora away since independence.’11 Yet this thesis has 
pointed to the complex and continual scale of the Indian state’s engagement with overseas 
Indians. A focus on the BNA and its recognition of Indians as British subjects after 1947 
enables an understanding of the Indian state’s dynamic vis-à-vis overseas Indians that is 
more cognizant of the entanglements of Empire and afterlives of indenture. Even with 
all the severe limitations of performing postcolonial diplomacy, it is nevertheless clear 
that the Indian state engaged with the status of overseas Indians, particularly those in the 
colonies, and often made continual representations to British officials on their behalf. 
Contrary to accounts of the Indian state’s decision to join the Commonwealth that rely 
solely on geopolitical explanations, I have instead shown India’s belief that the 
Commonwealth provided a space within which the rights and status of overseas Indians 
could be negotiated. This is most evident in Indian diplomacy’s clever utilization of the 
oft-repeated narrative of the ‘Commonwealth family’: within the ‘family’, India could 
bring up issues concerning overseas Indians in a way that British officials would 
otherwise deem unthinkable.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Itty Abraham, How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2014), 70 and Latha Varadarajan, The Domestic Abroad: Diasporas in International Relations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 52. 
11 Marie Carine-Lall, ‘Mother India's Forgotten Children’ in International Migration and Sending Countries: 
Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations, ed, Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003), 122 
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This is not to claim that the Indian state regarded overseas Indians necessarily as ‘their 
responsibility’ in the narrow sense of the term: it is, however, to reiterate that the state 
sought to ensure the citizenship rights of Indians, not necessarily Indian citizenship. 
Indeed, provisions for citizenship by registration were provided to overseas Indians, 
though it was widely held that the protections offered by the Indian state would be far 
weaker than the citizenship rights afforded by the countries of residence. Moreover, by 
viewing the postcolonial Indian state’s relationship with long-settled overseas Indians as 
closely tied to its regulation of the mobility of prospective migrants, this thesis has 
reiterated the need to go beyond binaries of the Indian state’s inclusion/exclusion of the 
diaspora. Instead, it has interrogated the centrality of the migrant and the very act of 
migration to the making and performance of Indian diplomacy: intertwining migrations 
past and present. Indeed the Indian state’s call for the citizenship rights and equality of 
overseas Indians went hand in hand with the control of any further emigration of 
‘unskilled’ migrants – successors of the coolie who were likely to cause more problems 
for the Indian state. Such a perspective also enables a closer look at the Indian state’s 
diverse engagement with Indian migrants – ranging from regional passport offices to the 
immigrant localities of Birmingham. Postcolonial Indian migration to Britain in the 
period of my study largely involved the migration of men, followed by the increasing 
arrivals of women especially from the late 1960s and 70s. While I have pointed to the 
discourse around Indian immigrant women in Chapter 5, there is much scope to 
interrogate the gendered dimensions of these evolving narratives and the Indian state’s 
role in mediating these new migrations.12  
 
Weaving together diverse stories ranging from the experiences of former indentured 
labourers and descendants from British Guiana ‘returning’ to India on the M.V 
Resurgent in 1955 to the status of Indian ‘unskilled’ migrants deemed a ‘public health’ 
threat in Britain, this thesis has sought to put people back into the study of Indian 
diplomatic history. In so doing, it has made visible the underlying narratives of caste and 
class that have shaped Indian diplomatic discourse and ideas of the ‘international’. This is 
essential historical context to the recent work of anti-caste activists in the Indian diaspora 
who have stressed that ‘wherever the diaspora go, they take their caste with them, and so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Evan Smith and Marinella Marmo have done important work in this regard, focusing particularly on the 
virginity testing controversy of the 1970s, but these larger themes remain untapped. See Evan Smith and 
Marinella Marmo, Race, gender and the body in British immigration control: subject to examination (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 
	   211	  
… discrimination goes with them.’13 Indeed, as we have seen, the very claim to migrate – 
especially to the West – had long been governed by dynamics of caste and class.  
 
The neglect of indenture in much of the literature on Indian diplomacy has resulted in an 
often-narrow frame of reference largely focused on the ‘great powers’ or India’s 
immediate neighbourhood, particularly through securitized narratives. Drawing on the 
vast scholarship on indentured labour migration and the entanglements of Empire that 
shaped histories and discourses of indenture, this thesis has articulated a reading of 
Indian diplomatic history that is deeply cognizant of the foundational structures of caste 
and class and the importance of regions long deemed peripheral. The lives of migrants in 
colonial territories and Commonwealth nations were thus structured by the afterlives of 
indenture and the negotiation of imperial identities. Centering the diverse histories and 
geographies of Indian migration, from Ceylon and Burma to British Guiana, Fiji and 
Britain, thus enables a nuanced reading of postcolonial diplomacy. As the diplomat Y. D. 
Gundevia wrote in his memoir in 1984: 
 
I had seen no sculptures in black marble in Burma. I saw none in Durban or 
Cape Town when I went there in 1950, and none in the beautiful tea gardens of 
Sri Lanka in later years, and I am told there are none in Fiji, nor anywhere across 
the great continent of Africa and all the way to the West Indies – no monoliths 
to the black Indian Labourer that helped to enrich the Empire, with the sweat of 
his brow… Indeed, it would be true to say that the sun never set on the persons 
of Indian origin all over the world.14 
 
This is a reading of the ‘international’ as a realm produced by the labour and status of 
Indian indentured and ‘unskilled’ migrants, a reworking of that quintessential imperial 
saying to convey instead the vast diplomatic space and stature provided by the presence 
of overseas Indians, particularly across  Commonwealth nations and British colonies. 
Indeed, it is striking that the 2001 Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian 
Diaspora borrows much of this phrasing to proclaim a dominant international profile for 
India: ‘the Indian Diaspora spans the globe and stretches across all the oceans and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See reports published by the Equality and Human Rights Commission in 2014.  Research Reports 91 and 
92, ‘Caste in Britain’. https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-91-caste-
in-britain-socio-legal-review.pdf  and https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-
report-92-caste-in-britain-experts-seminar-and-stakeholders-workshop.pdf  
14 Y. D. Gundevia, Outside the Archives (Hyderabad: Sangam Books, 2012 online edition), Chapter 4, Kindle. 
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continents. It is so widespread that the sun never sets on the Indian Diaspora.’15 
Recovering the figure of the migrant is thus integral to understanding the very making 
and practice of Indian diplomacy after Empire. 
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